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Summary	  
The growing interest in foreign direct investments (FDIs) in large-scale agricultural land 
in Asia—especially from newly developed countries such as South Korea—has been 
increasingly noted in the literature. Nevertheless, limited information about these FDIs 
is available from previous academic studies in regard to how they impact on local 
development. Previous research examining these issues focuses either on the monetary 
terms of FDIs or on the perspectives of the local community. There is also limited 
research that focuses on the perspectives of the investors and the dynamics and practices 
of the investments in the local community. Aiming to address these gaps in knowledge, 
this dissertation provides empirical evidence of three Korean FDIs in large-scale 
agricultural land in Cambodia. It analyses the perspectives of FDI investors and 
explores their embeddedness in the local community through entrepreneurship and 
stakeholder engagement in order to provide better understanding of the dynamics, 
practices and impacts of investments.  
The dissertation employs multiple-case study methodology, utilising diverse methods to 
gather ethnographic data in three different research sites in Cambodia. The data 
comprises the FDI companies and investors’ embedding process through their 
entrepreneurial activities, interactions with stakeholders and their contributions to the 
local communities.  
The research finds that the Korean investors do not (fully) embed themselves in their 
local settings due to barriers imposed by the investors and the local community. The 
research also finds that each of the Korean FDI companies examined contributes to 
local development differently—and not to their full potential—according to their 
operational patterns and extent of embeddedness in local communities. Moreover, the 
presence of these FDI companies does not help to increase local wages, as found in 
previous studies. In fact, as far as local community development is concerned, this study 
argues that the more entrepreneurial an investor, the more value is created for the local 
community. The entrepreneurial investor tends to operate their business not only in a 
socially responsible manner but also through welcoming the involvement of local 
villagers in the company’s operations. With more involvement of the local community 
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in the economic land concession development, the companies may generate even 
greater value added for the local community. 
This research contributes to debates on the impact of FDIs on local development in 
several ways in terms of the analysis of the terminology of FDIs, methodology and 
scope and scale. In addition, the research findings contribute to the limited literature on 
Korean FDIs in Cambodia. This research also generates empirical findings about 
Korean investors, which will complement studies that try to counterbalance the current 
focus on the dominant Chinese investors in Cambodia. Moreover, by analyzing the 
extent to which foreign investors play a role in local development in Cambodia, this 
PhD research contributes to the Cambodian Research Group programme by studying 
Korean FDI companies, as an example of foreign stakeholders in Cambodia’s 
development. Given the potential impact of FDI companies on the local community, 
this PhD dissertation contributes to promoting rural sustainable development in 
Cambodia. It provides unique information about foreign investors that is useful for 
effective policy-making to enhance the positive contributions of FDIs to sustainable 
rural development. In summary, the empirical findings are expected to benefit different 
groups of academics and policymakers, as well as development investors and 
practitioners.  
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Chapter	  1: Introduction	  
What is the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on development? 
The answer is important for the lives of millions […] Yet determining 
exactly how FDI affects development has proved remarkably elusive 
(Moran et al., 2005, p. 1). 
1.1 Introduction	  
In the past decade there has been a rising trend in foreign direct investments (FDIs)—
especially FDIs from South Korea, China, India and Vietnam—in large-scale 
agricultural land in developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia (Borras Jr et 
al., 2012; De Schutter, 2009; Üllenberg, 2009a). Large investments in agricultural land 
have been viewed as one of the driving forces in promoting the agricultural sector in 
those countries by injecting much-needed capital. As noted by Dorward et al. (2004), 
one effective way to fight poverty in developing countries is to promote the agricultural 
sector; therefore these investments may ultimately reduce poverty in developing 
countries. This approach seems to hold true for Cambodia, where around 80 per cent of 
the population resides in rural areas, the majority of whom are poor and rely heavily on 
agricultural activities for their livelihoods (UNCDF, 2010). The agricultural sector is 
crucial to Cambodia’s national economy, contributing around 35 per cent of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and employing up to 60 per cent of the total 
workforce.1 
Understanding the anti-poverty potential of the agricultural sector, the Royal 
Government of Cambodia (RGC) has actively promoted the sector in its national 
development agenda (RGC, 2009). Cambodia is rated by the United Nations (UN) as 
one of the least developed countries that exhibit the lowest indicators of socioeconomic 
development (UNCTAD, 2000). Cambodia has consequently constantly faced the major 
challenge of having limited investment resources to develop its agricultural sector. The 
government has therefore tried to attract more large investments, including FDIs, in the 
sector. In Cambodia the government holds about 80 per cent of the country’s territory 
                                                
1Source: The World Bank data (available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia; accessed on 
February 18th, 2011). 
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under the status of ‘state land’ (USAID, 2011). Thus, in addition to promoting the sector 
through relaxing taxes on agricultural production, in 2005 the government adopted a 
sub-decree on economic land concessions (ELCs) to facilitate land concessions to 
foreign and local investors to exploit unused and/or infertile land (Hang et al., 2011). 
Each ELC of up to 10,000 hectares is granted to a foreign or domestic company in the 
form of a long-term lease (up to 99 years) with a very reasonable annual rental fee that 
varies from USD0 to USD10 per hectare according to the types of soil, region and 
geographic location.2 Since the government adopted the sub-decree, ELCs have proved 
to be attractive to foreign and domestic investors. For instance, between 1996 and 1999, 
only seven companies were granted a total land area of 44,124 hectares as ELCs. 
However, by June 2012, land concessions amounting to 1,204,750 hectares had been 
granted to 118 domestic and foreign companies.3 The total ELC figure is even higher in 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports. For instance, according to the 
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), a 
total land area of 2,289,490 hectares had been granted as ELCs by April 2013.4 
Private investors in several Asian countries have been strongly encouraged both by their 
own governments and the Cambodian government to tap into the lucrative Cambodian 
ELC market (Üllenberg, 2009a). Korean FDI companies—the second largest investors 
in Cambodia following the Chinese—have responded to these incentives since the mid-
2000s.  The investment of Korean FDI companies in the agriculture sector had grown 
considerately in Cambodia, rising from USD 100,000 in 1997 to USD 63.58 million in 
2008.5 According to the log-book6 of Cambodia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF), Korean investors who obtained large concessions mainly invest in 
cash crop plantations. These can be classified into two plantation groups: rubber and 
cassava, both of which have high potential for growth with strong support from the 
Cambodian government. Both groups, particularly rubber, are labour-intensive crops 
and are concentrated in rural areas.7 
                                                
2 http://www.elc.maff.gov.kh/index.php/laws/12-the-fixation-of-concession-land-rental-fee (accessed on 
24 March 2013). 
3http://www.elc.maff.gov.kh/index.php/overview (accessed on 24 March 2013). 
4http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/land_concessions/ (accessed on 12 November, 2014). 
5 2010 data acquired from the Council for the Development of Cambodia. 
6An official record of large-scale economic land concessionaires in Cambodia. 
7http://www.maff.gov.kh  
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While attracting much needed investment in the agricultural sector and thereby 
contributing to poverty reduction, the granting of such huge ELCs has been criticised by 
Cambodia’s development partners, international and local NGOs, and the media for 
producing exactly the opposite effect. It is alleged that some ELCs displace entire rural 
communities, thus disrupting their existing means of livelihoods which include rice 
farming, cash crops, raising animals and forest foraging (WRM, 2008). With an 
estimated 20 per cent of rural households already having no land (Üllenberg, 2009a), 
these ELCs can further increase this situation. Some other ELCs, particularly those for 
cash crop plantations, reportedly encroach on forested areas that are used by local 
communities, thus cutting off their traditional access to essential non-timber forest 
products they need for food, medicine, construction materials and cultural/tribal rites 
(WRM, 2008). There have even been allegations that some concessionaires have carried 
out illegal deforestation in order to establish plantations, which is made possible by the 
lack of institutional capacity and incentive for monitoring such concessions on the part 
of the government (Hunt, 2007). Some of the plantations employ a sharecropping 
system in which villagers are allowed to use the land that has been granted to a 
company as an ELC on the condition that they grow a crop that can only be sold to the 
company. Thus, local villagers have to give up other activities to take care of the 
plantations. As the sharecropping job is seasonal with irregular income, villagers find it 
difficult to earn enough money to feed their families (Sedara et al., 2002).  
Development partners and research institutes in Cambodia have therefore attempted to 
evaluate the issues occurring in local communities after being exposed to FDIs in order 
to recommend policies to maximise the positive contribution of such investments. For 
example, in 2009 the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)—a development 
partner from Germany—published a report entitled “Foreign Direct Investment in Land 
in Cambodia”. Similarly, in 2009 the Cambodian Development Resource Institute 
(CDRI)—Cambodia’s leading independent development policy research institute—
issued two reports on Chinese FDIs entitled “China’s Investment in Cambodia” and 
“Maximising Opportunities of Chinese Investment in Natural Resources in Cambodia”. 
In 2012 CDRI published an article “Foreign Investment in Agriculture in Cambodia”. 
Likewise, in 2013 the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Cambodia office—an international 
non-governmental organisation—released a publication entitled “Moving Beyond 
Misconceptions: A Critical Review of Korean Investment in Cambodia”. These reports 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
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indicate that generally the granting of ELCs to FDI companies seems to generate more 
adverse than positive impacts on local development due to weak law enforcement and 
the lack of accountability and transparency in the process of granting ELCs. 
Nevertheless, these studies focus on Cambodia’s laws and the socioeconomic impacts 
of FDIs on the country from the perspective of local communities, and offer policy 
recommendations. 
Likewise, many academic and empirical studies examine the link between investments 
by foreign companies and local development. However they predominantly focus on the 
outcome rather than the process of the investments (see for example: Braunstein, 2006; 
Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; 
Herzer et al., 2008; Lehnert et al., 2013; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004; Spiezia, 2004). 
Previous studies of the impact of FDIs on local development generally focused only on 
the monetary aspect of FDIs or on perspectives of local communities. However, FDIs 
also consist of people, such as investors, an issue which is not addressed in these studies. 
When the focus is on the impact of FDIs on local development, excluding FDI investors 
from the analysis can leave out important aspects that help capture a clearer picture of 
the real impacts.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides the 
rationale for the research, and then presents the research purpose and questions, 
following by a brief explanation of the significance of this research. The last section 
outlines the organisation of the dissertation. 
1.2 Research	  Rationale	  
This research is part of the Cambodia Research Group (CRG) programme, which is an 
NWO WOTRO integrated programme entitled “Competing hegemonies: Foreign-
dominated processes of development in post-conflict Cambodia.” One of the 
programme’s aims is to analyse the partly converging and partly conflicting ways in 
which the main stakeholders in Cambodia’s development (government, civil society, 
foreign investors, and the Cambodian returnee and business community) position 
themselves vis-à-vis one another and the development models that emerge from their 
interaction. Two projects in the programme are devoted to studying foreign investors in 
Cambodia. As a result, the first and second largest foreign investors, Chinese and 
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Korean, are selected as examples of foreign stakeholders in Cambodia’s development. 
Hence, as part of the “Competing Hegemonies” programme, the current dissertation 
examines Korean FDI companies operating in Cambodia’s agricultural sector, which is 
a major contributor to Cambodia’s economy and development.  
Another reason why this dissertation focuses on the Korean FDIs is that while there is 
much research on Chinese investments, other investors in Cambodia such as the 
Koreans have been little documented. Moreover, despite the increasing inflow of 
Korean FDIs in South-East Asia, there appears to be limited empirical evidence about 
these FDIs in Cambodia. Thus, this dissertation will contribute to filling this knowledge 
gap.  
The few in-depth empirical studies that focus on foreign direct investors’ perspectives 
indicate there is a gap in the field of FDI and local development studies. In order to 
suggest more suitable policies or strategies to enable host countries to benefit from 
investments, it is important to understand the dynamics and practices of the companies 
and investors in the local communities. In other words, it is essential to comprehend the 
investors’ perceptions of opportunities, challenges and contribution to the local 
communities, as they are the ones who make or influence the investment plans. 
Therefore, focusing on FDI companies beyond their injection of investment money into 
recipient countries is another approach to promoting local development.  
Scholars acknowledge that, in addition to investment capital, entrepreneurs significantly 
contribute not only to the economy but also society in the areas where they invest 
through their entrepreneurship, if we examine such activities beyond the level of 
personal profit and not in isolation from issues of community (Dahles, 2013, p. 386). 
Hannafey (2003, p. 101) argues that entrepreneurs contribute considerably to society 
and social change as they combine labour, capital and business know-how in a creative 
and dynamic way to perform “economic tasks that increase employment, create new 
organisations, uncover new production processes and perform other business activities 
which improve material well-being.” Granovetter (1985) argues entrepreneurial 
activities are embedded in social context. In other words, entrepreneurs operate their 
businesses through interacting with and becoming part of the communities and/or 
societies in which they invest (Jack and Anderson, 2002). Through their engagement 
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with society, entrepreneurs contribute to social change in many different ways, ranging 
from creating social values and operating their business in a socially responsible manner 
to addressing social problems through providing help in times of need and scarcity 
(Swedberg, 2006). According to Rindova et al. (2009), entrepreneurs’ contributions to 
local communities and/or societies—through stakeholder engagement (Freeman et al., 
2010)—extend beyond economic growth, as the initial and ultimate aim of their 
economic activities is to contribute to social change, and to make a difference in the 
world.  
Therefore, according to many debates about the impact of FDIs on host countries, a 
question worth asking is to what extent FDI investors embed themselves in the local 
community through their entrepreneurship and engagement with local people. Therefore, 
this dissertation aims to fill the gaps in knowledge by adopting a social approach to the 
FDI field of study through incorporating the theoretical concepts of entrepreneurship, 
stakeholder engagement and embeddedness. 
For firms investing in new locations, being embedded is crucial because it allows them 
to gain and acquire local knowledge, credibility and resources (Jack and Anderson, 
2002). However this may or may not hold true in the case of Korean investors in the 
Cambodian agricultural sector. In Korea the most common business practice is the 
conglomerate, called Chaebol. This business practice has been the real catalyst for 
Korea’s economic development as Chaebols have dominant shares in the Korean market 
and exports (Chang and Shin, 2007; Chang, 2003).  The Chaebol model is a close 
network structure within which actors are perceived as family members. In the Chaebol 
style, a business has its own infrastructure since it is diversified into many business 
areas and is well connected to the ruling elite (Chang and Shin, 2007; Yoo and Lee, 
1987).  That is, in addition to running a company, the company owner(s) establishes and 
owns a complete supply chain for that company and has a good relationship with high-
ranking government officials. In other words, the company and/or owner do not involve 
other people/businesses in their supply chain. Thus, the company may not need to 
embed itself in the local community as it has its own supplies and networks.     
Based on the author’s general observations in Cambodian urban areas, Korean investors 
frequently establish their own business infrastructure. For instance, in Phnom Penh—
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the capital city of Cambodia—Koreans have developed a completely Korean 
infrastructure with their own schools, restaurants, supermarkets, commercial banks, 
churches, associations and chamber of commerce. Given Cambodia’s weak government 
administrative system (Ojendal and Sedara, 2006) and patron-client relation political 
patterns (Hughes, 2006), the Chaebol business model may fit well in the context of 
Cambodia. 
This raises the question of whether or not the Chaebol business model is practiced by 
Korean investors and/or companies in the agricultural sector in Cambodia and whether 
they involve local people in their businesses by outsourcing any of their production and 
service demands within this sector to locals; effectively, whether Korean investors 
and/or companies actually embed themselves in Cambodian society. If Koreans do 
embed themselves, their investment may benefit local people through their involvement 
in the business operations that result in contributing to local development. However, if 
the Korean investors and/or companies do not embed themselves, their investments may 
not contribute to local development in Cambodia in the long run.  
1.3 Research	  Purpose	  and	  Questions	  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the embedding process of Korean FDI 
investors through their entrepreneurial activities and stakeholder engagement in large-
scale agricultural land investments in Cambodia. The dissertation further explores and 
analyses how the selected case studies of Korean FDI companies and investors 
contribute to local community development. The following research questions are 
formed to guide this research.  
Main	  Question	  
To what extent do Korean investors embed themselves in Cambodia’s local 
communities through their entrepreneurial activities in economic land concession 
development; and to what extent do they contribute to local development? 
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Sub-­‐questions	  
• How do Korean companies operate 8  economic land concessions in local 
Cambodian communities? 
• To what extent do Korean investors perform their entrepreneurial activities in 
economic land concession development?   
• How do Korean investors interact with their stakeholders in local communities?  
• What value added do Korean companies generate in local communities and the 
Cambodian agricultural sector? 
To answer the research questions, a conceptual framework for this research is 
formulated in Section 2.3 based on conceptual theories of embeddedness, 
entrepreneurship and stakeholder engagement. 
1.4 Relevance	  
Through the study of the three investment cases, this dissertation makes a contribution 
to the existing theoretical lacuna studying the impact of FDIs in large-scale land on 
local development by examining the perspectives of FDI investors and their 
embeddedness in the local communities. Local development has been considered to 
happen either through capital investments or an injection of money in the recipient 
countries from aid or donors. Scholars investigating the impact of FDIs on local 
development have focused only on the monetary aspect of the investments. However, 
both development and FDIs are much more than money. FDIs consist of both money 
and investors who may be based, and directly run the FDI companies, in the recipient 
countries. So far, other approaches to local development—such as embedding the FDIs 
in the recipient countries through the FDI companies and/or investors’ 
entrepreneurship—have not been well explored and explained.  
Therefore, the current dissertation contributes to development and FDI studies in 
several ways. Firstly, by incorporating embeddedness, entrepreneurship and stakeholder 
engagement concepts, this dissertation contributes to FDI studies in terms of adding a 
focus on investors as actors to the research agenda. Secondly, this research applies an 
in-depth case study approach and within-case and cross-case analysis through multiple 
                                                
8 “Operate” includes company establishments and access to ELC. 
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theoretical lenses, contributing to development and FDI studies in terms of further 
developing the case study methodology. Thirdly, through focusing on Korean FDI 
companies’ embeddedness in the Cambodian agricultural sector at the local community 
level, this dissertation contributes to development and FDI studies in terms of an in-
depth local perspective to supplement macro-economic trend analyses.  
The research findings contribute to the scarce literature on Korean FDIs in South-East 
Asia. This PhD dissertation also generates empirical findings about Korean investors, 
which will supplement studies that try to counterbalance the current focus on the 
dominant Chinese investors. Moreover, this research contributes to the Cambodian 
Research Group programme by evaluating Korean FDI companies’ position in and 
influence on the development in Cambodia.   
Given the potential FDI impact on local community, this dissertation contributes to 
promoting rural sustainable development in Cambodia. It provides unique information 
about foreign investors, such as their business practices, challenges, and interactions 
with local stakeholders in Cambodia. This information is useful in enabling the 
development of effective policy recommendations that will enhance the positive 
contributions of FDIs to sustainable rural development. Moreover, the findings can be 
useful for Korean investors who may be interested in the impact of their investments on 
local community development. In summary, the empirical findings are expected to 
benefit different groups, including academics, policymakers, development investors and 
practitioners.  
1.5	   Organisation	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  
The dissertation is organised in nine chapters. It begins with an introduction chapter that 
presents the background and problem statement, the rationale and the research questions 
and the significance of the research. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and the empirical 
research around dimensions of the economic, political and social impacts of FDIs on 
local development. Drawing extensively on theoretical debates on the impact of FDIs on 
local development, it identifies knowledge gaps that motivate this PhD research. The 
chapter then reviews the major development of theoretical concepts and investigates the 
assumptions and implications for practice before outlining the conceptual framework 
for this research.  
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Chapter 3 identifies a cross-case study methodology for the dissertation in order to 
operationalise the theoretical concepts. The chapter then discusses the rationale for the 
use of a qualitative and case study methodology. It then explores data gathering and 
analysis, employing a range of methods and data sources, and concludes with a 
reflection on the researcher’s research journey throughout this PhD dissertation.   
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical findings of the first, second and third case 
studies respectively. The three chapters are presented in a standardised format, informed 
by the conceptual framework in Chapter 2. Each chapter starts with the researcher’s 
fieldwork. It then describes the FDI company’s profile and operations, ELC acquisition, 
development, and FDI investor(s), and the stakeholders’ perspectives, and concludes 
with a summary. Chapter 7 presents within-case analysis for each case according to 
empirical evidence from the three case studies, while Chapter 8 discusses the cross-case 
analysis and highlights the similarities and differences among the three cases. The 
within-case and cross-case analysis chapters conclude with a summary.  
Chapter 9 synthesises, discusses and concludes the entire dissertation. It starts with a 
response to the research questions. It then emphasises the significance of the research 
findings and their contribution to the theoretical debates and literature gaps in the field 
of FDIs and local development. The chapter then highlights the implications of the 
research for development practices, discusses the limitations of the research and 
provides suggestions for future research topics. It ends with new developments of the 
three cases and a conclusion.  
  
Chapter	  2: Literature	  Review	  
We readily acknowledge that, in many cases, wealth creation is the main 
aim of “entrepreneuring.” However, there is at least anecdotal evidence 
that individuals often engage in entrepreneuring for motives other than 
wealth (Rindova et al., 2009, p. 477). 
2.1 Introduction	  
The impact of foreign direct investments (FDIs) on local development has been widely 
debated in the literature and varying conclusions have been drawn. This chapter focuses 
on previous studies in relation to the assessment of the economic, political and social 
effects of FDIs in order to identify knowledge gaps from the investors’ perspective and 
their engagement with local communities. It discusses interrelated theoretical concepts 
of entrepreneurship, embeddedness and stakeholder engagement and then develops a 
conceptual framework for the dissertation. 
This chapter consists of five sections. The next section reviews the literature of FDIs on 
local development and Korean FDIs in South-East Asia. It then identifies knowledge 
gaps in the FDIs and local development field of study, while Section 3 discusses key 
theoretical concepts. Section 4 develops a conceptual framework for the research, and 
the final section is the summary. 
2.2 Foreign	  Direct	  Investments	  and	  Local	  Development	  
Foreign direct investment is broadly defined as an investment by an investor from one 
country to establish and control a business operation in another country (Moran, 2011). 
It is acknowledged that FDIs have vast potential to contribute to development in 
recipient countries9, especially poor countries (United Nations, 2002, p. 5). However, 
empirical studies of FDI impact on local development10are not conclusive (Moran et al., 
2005, p. 1; Peter, 2001, p. 1). Remarkably, research on the impact of FDIs on 
development in poor recipient nations has mainly concentrated on economic aspects, 
possibly influenced by the dominance of growth-oriented thinking about development; 
                                                
9  The term “recipient countries” is used to refer to countries where an investing firm’s foreign 
establishment is located.     
10 The term “local development” is used to refer to development of the recipient countries.  
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 12 
that is, the degree of development is judged by the level of economic growth. One 
example of this perspective is in United Nations’ reports. UNCTAD (1999, p. 150) 
asserts that “Economic development remains an urgent global need.” Likewise, the 
United Nations (2002, p. 5) state that “... private international capital flows, particularly 
foreign direct investment […] are vital complements to national and international 
development efforts.” Therefore, arguments on the impacts of FDIs on local 
development are predominantly built on economic assumptions, theories and models 
(Moosa, 2002, p. 71; Peter, 2001, p. 7). Since FDIs may affect millions of people in 
poor nations—the main host for FDIs (UNCTAD, 2013)—scholars have also tried to 
assess FDI effects on local development from political and social perspectives (Busse 
and Hefeker, 2007, p. 399; Büthe and Milner, 2008, p. 743; Lehnert et al., 2013, p. 286). 
The following sections will discuss the impacts of FDIs from each of these three 
perspectives. 
Economic	  effects	  
Due to the vast amount of literature on the economic effects of FDI on local 
development, only the most cited studies are discussed here. FDIs are theoretically 
assumed to be one of the main solutions for savings and foreign exchange problems11 
that poor countries encounter (Moran et al., 2005) for several reasons including: FDI 
companies have better access to financial markets than domestic companies; their 
ability to attract investments from other multinational corporations; their ability to 
stimulate the flow of official development aid from the home country; their ability to 
generate local investment opportunities which may mobilise domestic savings; and least 
developed and developing countries have skills shortages and poor technology which 
affect their capability for development (Romer, 1993). 
                                                
11According to the two-gap model, one of the major constraints faced by poor countries is a gap in 
savings and in foreign exchange. In the less developed and developing countries, most households do not 
have enough money to be able to save. These countries are normally faced with a problem of increasing 
their savings to match their investment needs. Thus, the saving gap—the difference between investment 
and saving—cannot be filled. In the long run the gap causes productivity to fall. As a result, poor nations 
end up importing goods, which leads to a negative foreign exchange gap (the difference between exports 
and imports) as they import more than they export. Consequently, these two gaps lead to deterioration in 
the balance of payments (a record of all monetary transactions going in and out of a country), as total 
money leaving the country exceeds total money coming in to the country. Theoretically, the balance of 
payments should be zero. Moreover, the balance of payments plays a more important role in poor nations 
than rich ones since foreign exchange is considered a scarce resource. For more details, see McKinnon 
(1964) and Taylor (1994). 
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Thus, FDI is assumed to be an effective tool in addressing savings, foreign exchange, 
skills shortages and poor technology problems of least developed and developing 
countries. The literature argues that FDI has positive effects through its net positive 
impact on capital flows to developing countries (Bacha, 1990; Chenery and Carter, 
1973; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1983; Papanek, 1973). 
Moreover, FDI is viewed as a package of management know-how and up-to-date 
technology (De Mello Jr, 1997, p. 1). Therefore, FDI companies play a crucial role in 
raising productivity and product quality, improving organisations, market structures and 
trade, and establishing backward and forward linkages in the recipient countries. As 
well, FDI companies generate direct and indirect employment opportunities and 
increase wages (UNCTAD, 1994; Watkins and Fowler, 2002).  
However, empirical research on the economic effects of FDIs on development in 
recipient countries has mixed results. Some scholars report that FDI companies have 
positive impacts on local development. De Mello (1999) examines the impacts of FDIs 
on capital accumulation, output and total productivity growth in developed and 
developing countries from 1970 to 1990 and reports a positive link between FDI and 
economic growth in FDI recipient countries. Hansen and Rand (2006) re-examine the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth in 31 developing countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America and analyse the causal relationship between FDI and GDP 
(gross domestic product). They conclude that there is a strong link between FDI and 
economic growth. Likewise, Li and Liu (2005) evaluate the impacts of FDIs on 
economic growth by testing a set of indicators such as GDP, population growth and 
level of secondary school attainment in 84 developed and developing countries from 
1970 to 1999 and find a positive link between FDI and growth. Chowdhury and 
Mavrotas (2006) also explore the link between FDI and economic growth, focusing on 
GDP growth in Chile, Malaysia and Thailand between 1969 and 2000. They find strong 
evidence of a relationship between FDI and economic growth. Chowdhury and 
Mavrotas (2006) confirm that FDI companies have a positive impact on 25 recipient 
countries in central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Similar results on the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth are confirmed by Vu et al. (2008), 
Cuyvers et al. (2008), Marwah and Tavakoli (2004) and Kohpaiboon (2003). These 
authors examine the link by using economic indicators such as GDP, capital labour ratio, 
the presence of foreign firms, labour quality and firm size.    
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In addition, Watkins and Fowler (2002) suggest that FDI companies not only generate 
jobs directly, but also create jobs indirectly throughout their supply chains, highlighting 
that more indirect employment is created by FDI companies than direct employment. 
For example, they estimate that Nike company directly employs around 20,000 people 
globally. However, the company generates a very large indirect job spillover, with an 
estimated 500,000 jobs indirectly created through the company’s subcontracting. 
However, UNCTAD (1999) claims that examining the employment effects of FDI is a 
challenge, especially estimating the indirect effects on job creation, because it is 
difficult to estimate indirect effects on job creation and employment displacement 
(UNCTAD, 2005). Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Girma et al. (2001) argue that FDI 
companies generally pay higher wages than domestic firms, regardless of their  size,  
characteristics, and  sectors. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) study the effect of FDI on 
education and wages in Indonesian manufacturing by examining economic indicators. 
They conclude that FDI companies contribute to increasing wages by placing wage 
pressure on domestic firms. They find that the higher the FDI companies’ concentration 
in a sector, the higher the wages paid by domestic firms in that sector. 
In contrast, some scholars find no relationship between FDI companies and local 
development. Carkovic and Levine (2002) examine economic indicators such as GDP, 
level of education and total productivity in 72 countries from 1960 to 1995 and argue 
that there is no relationship between FDI and economic growth. Their finding is 
consistent with that of Herzer et al. (2008), who employ co-integration techniques to re-
examine the FDI-led growth hypothesis in 28 developing countries. Other scholars such 
as Lensink and Morrissey (2006); Hanson (2001) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
confirm similar findings after testing economic indicators such as FDI and GDP ratio, 
share of foreign ownership, labour and capital.  
Other researchers such as Saltz (1992) find that FDI companies actually have a negative 
impact on local development. The author analyses the impact of FDI on the GDP 
growth rate in 75 developing countries between 1970 and 1980 and finds a significant 
negative correlation between the two indicators. Likewise, Dutt (1997) tests some 
economic indicators to confirm there is a negative effect of FDI stock on growth in 
least-developed countries from 1985 to 1994.  
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Javorcik (2004) provides an explanation of why some recipient countries benefit from 
FDI while others do not. He investigates economic indicators such as foreign firms’ 
share and uses proxy for backward and forward linkages of foreign firms in Lithuania. 
He finds that the positive effect between FDI and economic growth appears only when 
the FDI companies have business relations with domestic firms. Several other cross-
country studies emphasise that the contribution of FDI companies to economic growth 
depends on the type of FDI and the recipient country’s characteristics and conditions. 
For instance, Blomström and Kokko (1998); Blomström et al. (1994); Borensztein et al. 
(1998) and Xu (2000) examine the issue by looking at some threshold levels in FDI 
companies’ recipient countries. They draw similar conclusions, confirming that it is 
crucial for the recipient country’s development and infrastructure to be at a level that 
can absorb the technology spillover. The quality of the recipient country’s labour force 
has to be sufficient to acquire the knowledge provided, and its trade openness should be 
high and equipped with sufficiently developed financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004; 
Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Balasubramanyam et al., 1999). Additionally, Durham (2004) 
concludes that corruption prevents FDI companies from positively contributing to 
economic growth. Spiezia (2004) examines economic indicators and finds that while 
FDIs have an impact on employment in middle-income countries, there is no significant 
effect in low-income countries.  
Therefore, the previous studies have differing findings on the impacts of FDIs on local 
development. However they share some common characteristics: they treat FDIs as a 
phenomenon and use econometric models and macro-level data to explain the impact; 
and they cannot explain if FDI companies have a different impact on local development, 
especially at local community level. 
Political	  Effects	  
The political effects of FDI companies have been examined much less (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2007; Büthe and Milner, 2008). The conventional view is that FDI companies 
tend to be attracted to authoritarian nations where governments tend to have more 
power in controlling their citizens (Greider, 1998; O'Donnell, 1973). Moreover, these 
nations tend to have lower labour costs due to less active labour unions (Rodrik, 1999). 
Autocratic governments can generate an attractive environment for FDI companies by 
controlling pressure from labor unions. (Greider, 1998; O'donnell, 1973). Consequently, 
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these FDI companies are believed to promote authoritarian regimes in the recipient 
countries. 
However, a pro FDI view claims that FDI companies may contribute to changes in 
political institutions and government policies in recipient countries. FDI companies 
must be cautious when deciding to invest in a country, as the cost of disinvestment of 
physical assets in the recipient countries is high (Jensen, 2003). Therefore, political risk 
in recipient countries is one of the main factors affecting the decision-making of FDI 
companies in regard to investment (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Choi and Samy, 2008; 
Henisz, 2000; Jakobsen and De Soysa, 2006; Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003). Thus, 
FDI investors tend to look for countries that have minimal political risk. According to 
theories of international relations, democratic institutions tend to minimise political risk 
to reduce their investment risk. Democratic governments are held accountable for their 
actions and can thus provide protection of property rights that may help FDI investors 
feel secure in investing in their countries (Li and Resnick, 2003). Hence, governments 
in poor countries who want to attract FDI companies are likely to adjust their policies 
and political institutions to suit the needs of FDI investors, which supports the argument 
that FDI companies put pressure on the recipient governments to adopt democratic 
systems.  
Studies of the political effects of FDI companies on poor recipient countries have mixed 
results. Some scholars conclude that democratic regimes attract more FDIs in 
comparison to autocratic ones. Jensen (2003) studies the relationship between FDIs and 
political regimes by employing cross-sectional and panel regression to test cross-
country data from 114 nations in the 1980s and the 1990s. He finds that democratic 
regimes attract more inflows of FDIs than authoritarian regimes and reduce sovereign 
debt risk. Similarly, Büthe and Milner (2008) examine the effect of international 
political institutions on FDI inflows to developing countries. Using an economic model, 
they analyse a large data set for 122 out of 129 developing countries. Their results 
indicate that governments in developing countries which are committed to liberal 
economic policies, including trade openness, attract more FDIs. Similarly, Busse and 
Hefeker (2007) explore indicators for political risk and try to identify the main factors 
that attract FDI companies. They run regression models on a data set of 83 developing 
countries from 1984 to 2003. Their findings identify six indicators that most affect 
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inflows of FDIs: government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and 
ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of 
the bureaucracy.    
However, other research shows that regime types do not affect the flow of FDI into a 
country. Oneal (1994), for example, studies the United States FDI companies in 22 
developed and 26 developing countries and concludes that their investment is not 
related to regime type. He further notes that FDI companies in authoritarian regimes 
tend to have higher rates of return than in democratic regimes. 
Therefore, studies on political effects commonly treat FDIs as a phenomenon and 
employ a macro-level approach. Consequently, the studies fail to capture the views of 
FDI companies in dealing with the recipient governments. 
Social	  Effects	  
There are two different views on the social effects of FDI companies in poor recipient 
countries. The first is that they lead poor nations to a “race to the bottom”. This 
perspective is based on the assumption that FDI companies tend to invest in countries 
with low labour costs, low taxes, and weak social and environmental regulations 
(Friedman et al., 1992; Mandle, 2003; Moran, 2002; Rodrik, 1996; Zarsky, 1999), so 
the poor recipient nations have to maintain low standards to attract investments. 
Moreover, FDI companies tend to support corrupt governments in order to benefit their 
businesses. Natural resource-seeking FDI companies, in particular, tend to have a close 
link with autocratic recipient governments or corrupt officials or their families 
(Collingsworth et al., 1994; Hymer, 1979). Consequently, rather than being a force to 
address poverty, FDI companies benefit only the elite, while the general population, 
most of which is poor, does not gain any advantage from the investment. Thus, FDI 
companies tend to hamper rather than assist local development in poor nations.  
The second view is more optimistic and maintains that instead of exploiting the low 
practice standards in authoritarian countries, FDI companies promote higher practice 
standards in these countries (Spar, 1999). In autocratic states, the labour costs and 
standards tend to be lower and the number of strikes tends to be fewer than in less 
autocratic nations because of limited human rights and few active unions. Although 
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these factors are important for investment, Klein et al. (2001) argue that these are not 
the only ones FDI companies consider when investing in a country. The authors further 
argue that increasing net profitability is more important than low labour costs in FDI 
companies’ investment decision-making. Moreover, low labour costs can be offset by 
higher productivity (Kucera, 2002). Thus countries with higher labour productivity, 
standards and business environment tend to be attractive for FDI companies. As a result, 
poor autocratic recipient governments seek to improve their policies and practices to 
attract FDI companies. Therefore, FDI companies are assumed to generate positive 
social effects on poor nations (Oman, 2000; Spar, 1999).  
Discussion of the social effects of FDIs mostly concentrate on social aspects of gender 
equity, education, labour standards and human rights, and use the monetary aspect of 
FDIs as an indicator to evaluate the impact. Earlier research shows that FDI companies 
contribute to the promotion of gender equity in poor countries through job creation, 
especially those that invest in sectors such as the garment and textile industries that 
have a high proportion of women workers. For instance, Braunstein (2006) and Joekes 
and Weston (1994) find that an increase in FDIs has a positive impact on the share of 
women in employment, especially in labour-intensive and export-oriented sectors. 
Moreover, Heyzer et al. (1995);  and Moser and Moser (2005) assert that increased 
employment in formal sectors offers women in poor Asian countries a greater 
opportunity to be financially independent. Quisumbing (2003) further concludes that 
when women get paid for their work they become economically independent and, as a 
result, their role and status in the household will change. Quisumbing and McClafferty 
(2006) argue that women tend to spend their earnings mainly on children’s education 
and health care, thereby helping their families out of poverty. Thus, any job 
opportunities for women tend to have a great impact on development.  
Nevertheless, when reviewing case study literature on gender and FDI, Braunstein 
(2006) concludes that FDI companies have a limited impact on women’s empowerment. 
Instead, in developing countries they tend to mainly generate job opportunities for 
highly educated workers who are usually men. The female workforce is concentrated in 
low-skilled and labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, where the wages are low as the 
recipient countries struggle to maintain a comparative advantage in labour costs in order 
to attract more FDIs (Braunstein, 2006). Therefore, FDI companies improve women’s 
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incomes in the short rather than long term as they are often moved to the less valued 
parts of the production chain and easily lose jobs to more qualified men and 
subcontractors when the industry expands (Ghosh, 2002). In short, while FDI 
companies may improve gender equity they can have an adverse effect on women in 
poor nations.  
FDI companies may affect education development in recipient poor nations. Findings 
from earlier studies confirm that they provide more training for local employees than 
domestic firms to improve their capability (Lim, 2001; Miyamoto and Todo, 2003). 
Moreover, due to the demand for a highly skilled workforce, local people and the 
government in the recipient developing counties tend to invest more in higher and 
vocational education (Aitken et al., 1996; Blomström and Kokko, 1998; MacDougall, 
1960). Therefore, FDI companies may directly and indirectly contribute to the 
development of the educational sector.   
Rodrik (1996) argues that FDI companies may exploit workers in poor countries due to 
their low labour standards. Friedman et al. (1992) imply that foreign firms tend to 
concentrate in a location where union representation is weak. However, neither Rodrik 
(1996) nor Kucera (2002) find any evidence to support the claim. Their findings about 
the effect of low labour standards and weak democratic institutions on FDI companies 
are not conclusive. In contrast, Oman (2000) claims that FDI companies contribute to 
improving labour standards in developing countries. He asserts that they have a strong 
interest in saving their brand reputation, especially firms whose markets are in 
developed countries. FDI companies are held responsible for not only their own 
business practices, but also for their local subcontractors’ conduct (Spar, 1999). Spar 
(1999) asserts that when an FDI company invests in a foreign country, it brings capital 
and technology, its brand name, reputation, and international image. These intangible 
assets are a double-edged sword—they can help the FDI company to expand its parent 
company’s power and profitability, but at the same time they make the parent firm 
vulnerable. They therefore need to be mindful that their operations attract attention from 
buyers, especially in Western markets, and take precautions in regard to human rights in 
order to avoid damaging their image in the international market, which might 
detrimentally affect profit and reputation. Hence, Oman (2000) argues that FDI 
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companies introduce a specific corporate culture of setting higher social and 
environmental standards for their operations in comparison to domestic firms.  
Hallam (2011, p. S93) notices an increasing trend of privately owned FDIs in large-
scale land with (or without) financial support from their home government, and claims 
that “private investors are often holding companies rather than holding technical 
expertise, which means necessary expertise for managing complex large-scale 
agricultural investments needs to be acquired”. Frequently, foreign agricultural 
investments are considered resource-seeking rather than market-seeking (Aryeetey and 
Lewis, 2011; Cuffaro and Hallam, 2011). Moreover, FDI companies employ various 
investment arrangements from purely vertical, joint ventures, and contract farming to 
out-grower schemes (Cotula and Leonard, 2010). Interestingly, no good business 
models for investment in large-scale agricultural land can be suggested (Cotula and 
Leonard, 2010; Hallam, 2011). 
The adverse social effects of FDI companies investing in agricultural land have also 
been examined by scholars such as Gerlach and Liu (2010) and Neef et al. (2013). 
Gerlach and Liu (2010) analyse eight large-scale FDI companies in agriculture in 
African countries, namely Uganda, Mali, Madagascar, Sudan, Morocco, Ghana, Senegal 
and Egypt. They conclude that FDI companies negatively affect the livelihood of locals, 
especially poor and indigenous people, and cause their displacement. Consequently, 
local people who reside on land without titles lose their homes and farms to the 
companies. Moreover, some even lose access to traditional income-generation activities 
in nearby forests. Nevertheless, Gerlach and Liu (2010) point out that the data acquired 
from the case studies is limited and call for more in-depth research to investigate the 
issues at the community level. 
Neef et al. (2013) provide an in-depth analysis of two case studies on the impact of FDI 
companies investing in agriculture in large-scale land in Cambodia. Their study 
examines the effects of economic land concessions (ELCs) and of a social land 
concession on local people in the Kratie province. They study two villages: O Taneoung 
and Lar Or/ Kor Sang. The O Taneoung village is affected by two American and one 
Chinese FDI companies that have invested in larger-scale agricultural land.  The other 
village, Lar Or/ Kor Sang, is located within a multilateral development aid-assisted five-
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year Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development (LASED) project. The 
case study of the O Taneoung village supports the claim that FDI companies’ 
investments in agricultural land have negative impact on local livelihoods. The authors 
support Gerlach and Liu’s (2010) conclusion that local people lost their farmland and 
forestland to these companies because they do not have land titles, although many have 
been living there for more than two decades. Even though no such impact is found in 
the case study of Lar Or/ Kor Sang, the authors claim that the LASED project is just a 
tool for the Cambodian ruling elite to counter the adverse social effects of their ELC 
policies and minimise pressure from dispossessed rural people.  
Therefore, most of the earlier studies on social effects commonly treat FDIs as a 
phenomenon and employ a macro-level approach. Although some studies analyse the 
FDI impact at the local level, they largely focus on the community’s perspective and do 
not include the voices of any FDI companies to balance the analysis. 
Korean	  FDIs	  	  
South-East Asian countries have become a popular destination for FDI companies 
seeking large-scale land investments (De Schutter, 2009, p. 3) and since 2006 Korean 
FDI companies have had an increasing interest in investing in large-scale agricultural 
land in the region (Hallam, 2009, p. 2). However, as Hallam (2009) argues, there is 
limited information about these companies and their entrepreneurial activities in these 
countries. This claim holds true for Korea; South-East Asia has been the second largest 
host for Korean FDI companies since 1981 (Shin and Lee, 1995, p. 181). There is 
limited academic research on Korean FDIs in this region in general or on Korean FDI 
companies in large-scale agricultural land in particular. In fact, Korean FDIs in South-
East Asia provide an example of South-South FDIs—FDIs from developing countries 
investing in other developing countries. Moreover, the emergence of South-South FDIs 
has attracted considerable attention among scholars and development agencies as 
highlighted by the UN (United Nations, 2006). However, previous studies on South-
South FDIs are limited (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2011, p. 2). Given their home country 
environment, South-South FDIs—in comparison to North-South FDIs (FDIs from 
developed countries to developing countries)—are assumed to be more familiar with 
working in their host countries’ poor business and institutional environment (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008). Thus, scholars attempt to empirically assess whether their 
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impacts—with regard to their countries of origin—on poor recipient countries’ 
development differ. Nevertheless, prior studies investigating this topic mainly examine 
the cases of South FDIs from China, India, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Korea to 
other developing countries such as Africa, Indonesia, and Thailand (see Aykut and 
Goldstein, 2007; Bera and Gupta, 2009; FONDAD, 2005; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2011). 
The sparse literature on Korean FDI companies in South-East Asian countries is briefly 
discussed in the following sections.   
In 1994, Chung H. Lee published an article on the impact of Korean footwear, apparel 
and consumer electronics firms in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, focusing on 
the motivation for Korean firms to invest in these countries. Using data acquired from 
the Bank of Korea and a survey by the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlement 
in 1991, he lists four main motivations for Korean investors in these countries: cheap 
wage rates, adequate labour supply, cheap price/rent of industrial estates, and access to 
markets in other countries. While he finds that Korean firms contribute to local 
development in recipient countries through job creation, this is based only on secondary 
data from a 1991 survey. He finds no evidence to support the claim that these firms 
generate a linkage effect and transfer technology to the recipient countries because they 
largely import machinery, equipment and raw materials from Korea (Lee, 1994, p. 294). 
This study is one of the few to look at the impact of Korean direct investment in South-
East Asia, but does not engage Korean investors to seek explanations, for instance, on 
how and why their FDIs could contribute to local development and why the Korean 
firms failed to establish linkages in the host countries and to transfer technology. 
In 1995, Shin and Lee conducted a document analysis on the surge of Korean FDIs in 
South-East Asia. They examine the social and economic nature of Korean 
industrialisation and the political factors driving the surge of Korean FDIs in Indonesia. 
They claim that Korean investors have advantages in dealing with the business culture, 
such as associating with high-ranking government officials in South-East Asian 
countries. Korean investors seem to be familiar with and fit well into the bureaucracy in 
this region. This may be attributed to the fact that they have encountered a strong 
bureaucracy and red tape in Korea (Shin and Lee, 1995, p. 191). The authors also 
emphasise that the Korean investors may find Indonesia’s “politico-bureaucrats” or 
“ersatz capitalist” situation very familiar and enable their business operations in 
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Indonesia. Investors are highly dependent on special favours granted by the state in 
Korea. Thus, the role of political patronage played by the state and officials is crucial 
for Korean business success in Indonesia (Shin and Lee, 1995, p. 191). However, the 
authors acknowledge that their study is limited (Shin and Lee, 1995) because its 
analysis is mostly based on publications on Korean investments in Korea and other 
regions, and not in South-East Asia.   
Bun Soon Park (in Steinberg, 2010) studied Korean electronics firms in South-East Asia. 
The author discusses the background, current situation and motives of the Korean 
electronics firms in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. Using 
survey data, he identifies two significant factors that affect a firm’s choice of 
investment location (Steinberg, 2010, p. 142). These are: a large market in terms of 
GDP and population; and local demand for the electronic items. Compared to firms in 
other industries, wage rates seem to be less important to the decision-making of 
electronic firms in choice of investment location. Bun Soon Park (in Steinberg, 2010, p. 
145), argues that the main impact of these firms on local development is job creation. 
They not only generate direct employment, but also indirect employment through 
subcontractors. The author is optimistic about technology transfer from Korean firms to 
South-East Asia, based on evidence that more electrical spare parts have been produced 
domestically in these host countries. 
Although the study examines Korean FDIs in South-East Asia (South-South FDIs), it 
focuses on countries with more developed infrastructure compared to other South-East 
Asian countries such as Cambodia and uses survey data. Thus, the findings of this study 
lack an in-depth analysis and the perspectives of less developed countries such as 
Cambodia. 
Gaps	  in	  literature	  on	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investments	  and	  Local	  Development	  
Resulting from the FDI literature review, the researcher identifies four main knowledge 
gaps. The first is the limited research that focuses on the impact of FDIs at the local 
community level. Previous impact studies overwhelmingly focus on either the macro or 
regional levels and pay little attention to FDI impacts on development in the local 
community. In developing countries like Cambodia, large investments in agriculture are 
a vital strategy to address poverty through the development of the agricultural sector. 
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Due to the country’s limited ability to invest in this sector, attracting FDIs may 
contribute significantly to the development of this sector and rural communities. 
The second gap is the very limited literature on FDI investors as actors when examining 
the FDI impacts on local development. Previous studies that investigate the impacts 
mainly consider FDIs as a phenomenon. However, they also consist of people such as 
the investors who make business decisions and may directly manage the FDI companies 
in the recipient countries. Remarkably, studies on the impacts of FDIs on development 
in poor recipient nations are influenced by growth-oriented thinking about the concept 
of development, so that the degree of development is judged by the level of economic 
growth.  
The third gap results from the limited studies on the interactions among the various 
actors: the FDI companies and investors and their stakeholders. In assessing the link 
between FDIs and local development, previous studies largely focus on the outcome of 
FDIs in recipient countries, while the dynamics and interactions among them have not 
been explored.  
Finally, there is a lack of academic research on South-South FDIs of which the Korean-
Cambodian case is a particular example. Empirical evidence on the Korean FDIs in 
large-scale agricultural land in Cambodia, in particular, has not been analysed.  
To address the four knowledge gaps, this research employs the theoretical concepts of 
entrepreneurship, embeddedness and stakeholder engagement which allow the research 
to assess the impacts of Korean FDIs on local development in Cambodia by 
incorporating investors as actors in the analysis and focusing on the FDI companies’ 
interactions with their stakeholders in the local community. Including investors and 
stakeholders in the analysis allows this research to capture not only the impacts 
generated by the FDI companies, but how the impacts on local development are 
generated. Such information can be useful for enhancing a positive impact from such 
investments. This research argues that investors not only invest capital but may also be 
directly involved in establishing and managing the companies in Cambodia. Their 
involvement in FDI companies raises the question of whether they are entrepreneurial in 
their business operations, as entrepreneurship is emphasized as a key contributor to the 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 25 
economy (Baumol et al., 2007) and to society by creating value added through supply 
chains and employment (Dahles et al., 2010). As noted by Granovetter (1985), 
economic activities of entrepreneurs are embedded in a social context and affected by 
the entrepreneurs’ interaction with outsiders who may have a stake in the entrepreneurs’ 
business (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the concepts of entrepreneurship, embeddedness and stakeholder 
engagement are relevant to explore and explain how Korean FDIs in large-scale 
agricultural land impact on local development in Cambodia. Section 2.3 explains these 
interrelated concepts in detail. 
2.3 Theoretical	  Concepts	  
2.3.1 Entrepreneurship	  
Entrepreneurship has been studied from different perspectives and in different 
disciplines (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). The studies of entrepreneurship can be 
classified into entrepreneurs (individuals and teams), new ventures (modes of 
organizing) and opportunities (environmental conditions) (Busenitz et al., 2003). In an 
effort to bridge the different perspectives, Shane (2003, p. 4) advocates a general 
framework for entrepreneurship by defining it as “an activity that involves the discovery, 
evaluation and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways 
of organising, markets, processes, and raw materials through organising efforts that 
previously had not existed”. He emphasizes the important role of opportunity in the 
entrepreneurial process, as entrepreneurship is about an entrepreneur’s recognizing and 
exploiting opportunities. 
Opportunity Recognition 
Opportunity recognition refers to a process of perceiving, discovering and then 
matching a ‘fit’, or a new fit between a particular market need and specified resources 
in the form of a business concept (De Koning and Muzyka, 1999; Hills, 1995). The 
opportunity recognition starts when some individuals identify possibilities to create and 
deliver new value—either from the perspective of market needs or under-employed 
resources (Ardichvili et al., 2003). The opportunity recognition is associated with 
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attributes such as life experience, information search, prior knowledge, personal traits 
and alertness. 
Life experience such as employment and geographic mobility (Delmar and Davidsson, 
2000; Lerner and Hendeles, 1996) allows entrepreneurs to access more diverse 
information that increases their likelihood of exploring or recognizing hidden 
opportunities (Casson, 1982, 1995). Information search helps entrepreneurs obtain 
useful information that leads to opportunity recognition (Gilad et al., 1989; Shane, 
2003). Entrepreneurs’ prior knowledge about markets facilitates their opportunity 
recognition as it helps them to recognize demand conditions and sources of supply 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Johnson, 1989; Shane, 2003). 
Personality traits such as optimism and creativity facilitate entrepreneurs’ opportunity 
recognition. Optimism allows entrepreneurs to positively evaluate the potential success 
of their venture based on their abilities and knowledge (Guth et al., 1991; Krueger and 
Brazeal, 1994; Krueger and Dickson, 1994; Neck and Manz, 1992; Neck and Manz, 
1996). Creativity plays a vital role in entrepreneurial decision-making that triggers 
opportunity recognition (Hills et al., 1997; Kaye, 1986). Alertness allows entrepreneurs 
to recognize possibilities and opportunities when they present themselves (Gaglio and 
Taub, 1992; Hisrich, 1990; Ray and Cardozo, 1996; Sathe, 1989). 
Opportunity Exploitation 
Opportunity exploitation refers to building efficient, full-scale operations for products 
or services created by, or derived from, a business opportunity (Choi et al., 2008, p. 3). 
Entrepreneurs are more likely to exploit an opportunity when they expect to receive 
greater value from its exploitation than their opportunity cost for alternative use of their 
resources (Shane, 2003). Some attributes such as career experience, age and personality 
can contribute to opportunity exploitation.  
Career experience includes work experience (Evans, 1989; Robinson and Sexton, 1994), 
labour market experience (Schiller and Crewson, 1997), industry experience (Aldrich, 
1999; Johnson, 1989; Johnson and Cathcart, 1979; Kaufmann, 1999), and start-up 
experience (Cobas, 1986; Delmar and Davidsson, 2000; Evans and Leighton, 1989). 
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Such experience allows entrepreneurs to gain skills and information useful to 
opportunity exploitation (Shane, 2003).  
Age has an inverted U-shape relationship with opportunity exploitation, peaking at the 
age of 44 years (Alba-Ramirez, 1994; Borjas and Bronars, 1988; Boyd, 1990; Long, 
1982; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Shane, 2003; Taylor, 1996). Personality traits—such as 
commitment to achievement (Caird, 1991; Wu, 1989), risk-taking (Amit et al., 1993; 
Begley, 1995; Caird, 1991; Cromie and O'Donaghue, 1992; Wu, 1989) and 
(over)confidence (Aldrich, 1999; Busenitz, 1999)—increase the likelihood that 
entrepreneurs will exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane, 2003).  
New Venture Creation 
To benefit from the recognized opportunity, “an entrepreneur needs to establish the 
organization or market mechanism that she will use to exploit it” (Shane, 2003, p. 220). 
This process includes creating routines and structures in order to recombine available 
resources into a product or service for customers and to create an entity that will 
undertake the re-combinatory activity (Venkataraman, 1997). According to Sharma and 
Chrisman (2007), a new company financed by a conglomerate can also qualify as an 
entrepreneurial new venture as long as its organizational domain is outside the 
conglomerate’s organization. They call this venture type external corporate venturing. 
Various attributes to new venture creation have been suggested by previous research. 
For example, self-financing is a common approach to resource acquisition which is 
important to the entrepreneurial process (Aldrich, 1999; Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1998; Roberts, 1991; Shane, 2003). However, entrepreneurial financing can also acquire 
capital from a variety of sources such as bank loans, overdrafts, hire purchase, leasing 
and various government or local authority grants (Smith, 1967, pp. 46-47). Prior 
knowledge is another attribute as it affects the design of a new venture (Aldrich, 1999; 
Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Baron et al., 1999; Cooper, 1990; Hannan et al., 1996). A 
further attribute is involvement of close social contacts and/or kin at the early stage of 
new venture creation (Aldrich, 1999; Francis and Sandberg, 2000; Zimmer and Aldrich, 
1987).   
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According to Shane’s (2003) suggested framework and definition, entrepreneurship is 
about entrepreneurs’ response to opportunities through organising a new venture to 
realise their economic interests. Entrepreneurs significantly contribute to a society or 
community where they invest by creating wealth and employment through their new 
venture creation (Hannafey, 2003). Therefore, as far as local development is concerned, 
entrepreneurship as opportunity recognition and exploitation through new venture 
formation contributes more to a local community/ society than opportunity recognition 
and exploitation. Hence, Shane’s (2003) new venture-creation entrepreneurship is 
relevant to the current research as it can examine whether Korean FDI investors through 
new venture creation contribute to development in local communities where they 
invested. 
Despite Shane’s (2003) contribution, the concept is still closely viewed as an economic 
activity involving recognizing market opportunity and new venture formation (Goss, 
2005; Hjorth and Steyaert, 2004), with a common assumption that wealth creation is its 
fundamental purpose (Aldrich, 2010). 
During the last ten years this conventional view on entrepreneurship has been 
challenged as being narrowly conceptualized, and has been reframed into a more critical 
and reflexive concept (Goss, 2010; Steyaert, 2007; Steyaert and Hjorth, 2008; Steyaert 
and Katz, 2004). For example, Swedberg (2006, 2009) emphasises the social change 
approach of entrepreneurship, claiming that entrepreneurs contribute to society through 
operating their business in a socially responsible manner and creating social values. 
Mair and Marti (2006, p. 37) point out that social values are the outcome of social 
change. Swedberg (2009, p. 99) argues that ‘social change’ can be characterized as 
“everybody’s right to economic progress, proper health care and the like.” Rindova et al. 
(2009) take this social change approach of entrepreneurship to another level (Dahles et 
al., 2010, p. 2). Rindova et al. (2009, p. 478) introduce the concept of ‘entrepreneuring 
as emancipation,’ by which they mean “efforts to create something new—a new idea, a 
new thing, a new institution, a new market, a new set of possibilities for the 
entrepreneuring individual or group and/or for other actors in the environment.” They 
view entrepreneuring as social change-oriented activities, a process through which 
economic activities of an individual or group are motivated, in the first place, by the 
goal of making a difference or creating changes to improve society.  
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Thus, using Rindova et al.’s (2009) concept of entrepreneuring allows this research to 
investigate whether or not Korean FDI investor operate their businesses in large-scale 
agricultural land in Cambodia in ways that bring about social change to improve the 
local community. In other words, whether or not the investors contribute to 
development in local communities through creating employment and business 
opportunities (backward and forward linkages), developing human resources, improving 
staff wellbeing, and advancing infrastructure (including health care and education 
services) in the local communities. 
According to Swedberg (2006), entrepreneurs generate social change through their 
interaction with society and the community within which they operate. In other words, 
entrepreneurs embed in a social context to generate social value. Similarly, Chetty and 
Campbell-Hunt (2003) argue that entrepreneurs acquire information about opportunities 
through their interactions and networks with outside entities, which also provide 
emotional support for their risk-taking (Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998) and motivate 
them to remain in business (Gimeno et al., 1997). These interactions indicate their 
embeddedness in the social context (Jack and Anderson, 2002). 
2.3.2 Embeddedness	  
Granovetter (1985, p. 504) defines embeddedness as purposeful behaviour affected by 
concrete and ongoing systems of social relations. He argues that actors’ efforts to meet 
special purposes are actually embedded in specific and ongoing systems of social 
relations (Granovetter, 1985, p. 487). Thus, entrepreneurial activities are “not merely an 
economic process but draw from the social context which shapes and forms 
entrepreneurial outcomes” (Jack &Anderson, 2002, p. 467). Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) 
and Carsrud and Johnson (1989) support this notion, arguing that entrepreneurship is 
embedded in a social context, facilitated or constrained and inhibited by a person’s 
position in a social network with an entrepreneur who depends on the information and 
social capital. Social capital is broadly defined as an asset that inherits in social relations 
and networks (Burt, 1997; Leana and Van Buren, 1999). To possess social capital, a 
person must be related to others, and it is those others, rather than the individual, who 
are the actual source of his or her advantage (Portes, 1998, p. 7). Thus, individuals 
benefits from social capital only if they are embedded in social networks that provide 
the conditions for sustainable social ties (Portes, 1998). Granovetter (1973, 1983) 
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claims that entrepreneurs obtain social capital through sustaining membership in several 
multilayer-social networks that are partly overlapped and consist of both strong ties 
(such as kinship) and weak ties (such as acquaintances). 
Social networks are important platforms for entrepreneurs to gain access to valuable 
information that leads to opportunity recognition. “The structure of the entrepreneurs’ 
social network will influence what information they receive, and the quality, quantity 
and speed of the receipt of that information” (Shane, 2003, p.49). According to 
Schumpeter (1934), new information—created, for example, by changes in politics and 
regulations—is vital to entrepreneurial opportunities. Hills et al. (1997) assert that the 
more extended networks entrepreneurs have, the more opportunities they identify. 
Zimmer and Aldrich (1987) argue that social networks play a vital role in opportunity 
recognition, as many venture owners gather information about entrepreneurial 
opportunities via their social connections. 
In addition, social networks increase the likelihood of exploiting opportunities as the 
networks enable entrepreneurs to gain access to resources and information necessary for 
opportunity exploitation (Aldrich, 1999). Cromie and Birley (1992) claim that 
entrepreneurs acquire information about permits, management practices, appropriate 
investors, and trustworthy suppliers through utilizing their social networks. Thus, the 
entrepreneurs who have networks to source information and resources tend to exploit 
the recognized opportunities (Shane, 2003).  
According to Huggins (2000), embeddedness is vital not only to new venture formations, 
but also sustaining new ventures as social networks provide an entrepreneur with social 
capital (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Entrepreneurs are found to use social 
networks and informal contacts to recruit employees who are known to people that they 
trust (Aldrich and Von Glinow, 1992) for many of the same reasons that social networks 
and informal contacts help the entrepreneur to hire the early employees. In addition, 
many entrepreneurs use informal and indirect networks to look for their potential 
employees (Aldrich, 1999). In short, entrepreneurship is embedded in multiple social 
contexts.  
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Since embeddedness is all about entrepreneurs’ being embedded in multiple social 
relations to perform their entrepreneurship, the concept of embeddedness is relevant to 
the current study. It allows the research to explore Korean investors’ position and 
interactions within their social context in order to understand their strategies in regard to 
opportunity recognition and exploitation in large-scale agricultural land in Cambodia. 
Embedding	  Entrepreneurship	  
Dahles et al. (2010, p. 3) claim that “entrepreneurship viewed as an embedded 
phenomenon” generates social change, as economic activities of embedded 
entrepreneurs in a social context add value to society in terms of creating jobs, 
establishing supply chains, introducing and transferring knowledge and technology, 
improving employees’ wellbeing, or pressuring government to improve infrastructure. 
They further assert that this value added “may not be part of an initial ‘social mission’ 
of the entrepreneurs, but they certainly feed back into the community and may generate 
change in the society at large” (Dahles, et al., 2010, p.3). 
Dahles (2013, p. 393) suggests that to capture such contributions, entrepreneurship has 
to be “conceptually extended beyond the level of personal profit and be not treated in 
isolation from issues of community.” As asserted by Swedberg (2006), entrepreneurs 
generate value added to society or community through their engagement with that 
society or community. Thus, according to Rindova et al.’s (2009) entrepreneuring as an 
emancipatory process, embedding entrepreneurship in, for example, the local 
communities will bring about social change as embedding entrepreneurship is more than 
just an entrepreneur becoming part of a social structure. Embedding entrepreneurship 
also means an entrepreneur changes social structures and brings about development in 
local communities through, for example, providing jobs, creating backward and forward 
industrial linkages, transferring knowledge and technology, improving workers’ 
wellbeing, and improving infrastructure and healthcare services in the local 
communities. In addition to job creation, the human resource and welfare development 
and the establishment of value chains with involvement from local communities would 
not only develop local communities but also sustain development in them in the long 
run. However, for this change to occur, the entrepreneur has to establish and operate his 
or her venture in local communities. Thus, embedding new venture-creation 
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entrepreneurship in local communities has the capacity to bring about this change and 
benefit the communities. 
Moreover, Rindova et al.’s (2009) concept of entrepreneuring as a process focuses on 
the dynamic, change-oriented aspect of entrepreneurship. Langley et al. (2013) argues 
that focusing on the process provides better understanding of why and how change 
occurs. The process of embedding entrepreneurship is therefore a useful angle for 
examining the impact of Korean FDIs on local community development. In addition, 
Rindova et al. (2009), suggest that support from and engagement of stakeholders are 
crucial for entrepreneuring as a social change-creation process. Thus, focusing on 
stakeholder engagement in entrepreneuring helps capture and explain the changes. The 
next section will therefore elaborate on the role of stakeholders. 
2.3.3 Stakeholder	  Engagement	  
Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s objective.” Freeman et al. (2010, 
p. xv) highlight that every success or failure of a venture involves groups and/or 
individuals who have a stake in it. Thus, there are many groups or individuals 
(stakeholders) who have a stake in firms, such as customers, suppliers, employees, 
financiers, local communities and managers. Huse and Rindova (2001) categorise 
stakeholders as central (shareholders and the corporate management) and local (local 
employees, local communities and local customers). In addition, Clarkson (1998) 
classifies stakeholders into two groups: primary and secondary. Primary stakeholders 
have a direct relationship with firms and are critical for their survival, whereas 
secondary stakeholders have a more indirect relationship and are not vital for the firm’s 
survival. Therefore, a firm—for example an FDI company—cannot operate in a vacuum 
and has various relationships with different groups and/or individuals according to their 
stake in the firm.  
Freeman et al. (2010, p. 24) suggest that in order to understand a firm, we have to know 
how its and/or investors’ relationships with the stakeholders work. In other words, we 
have to understand how “customers, suppliers, employees, financiers (stockholders, 
bondholders, banks, etc.), communities, and managers interact and create value,” 
Freeman et al. (2010, p. 24). In stakeholder engagement, Mitchell et al. (1997) split 
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stakeholders into smaller groups according to their power, legitimacy and urgency. 
They categorize stakeholders into seven groups of dormant stakeholders who possess 
power; discretionary stakeholders who possess legitimacy; demanding stakeholders who 
have urgency; dominant stakeholders who possess power and legitimacy (in this 
instance, a firm’s employees may qualify as dominant stakeholders, according to 
Freeman et al. (2007)); dependent stakeholders who possess legitimacy and urgency; 
dangerous stakeholders who possess urgency and power; and definitive stakeholders 
who possess all the three attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency).   
Sloan (2009) classifies stakeholder engagement into control and collaboration models as 
summarized in Table 2.1. The control model is a low-interaction stakeholder 
engagement approach. It involves monitoring activities to minimise the risks in order to 
ensure survival of the company. In this model, stakeholders are assumed to be a source 
of risk for the company. Therefore, “stakeholders must be monitored, assessed and 
managed” in order to anticipate and mitigate any potential risks that they can impose on 
the company (Sloan, 2009, p. 37). Stakeholder engagement activities are at arm’s length. 
The stakeholders are not involved in the company’s business and strategic processes. 
“As a result, fundamental organizational change is more limited, and opportunities for 
innovation and value creation may be missed. Social performance is likely to be good—
but not great” (Sloan, 2009, p. 37). 
Table 2.1: Models of Stakeholders Engagement  
Dimension Control model Collaboration model 
Corporate focus Arm’s-length engagement Inclusive engagement 
Manager orientation to 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders are a source of risk Stakeholders are a source of 
opportunity 
Key engagement processes Monitoring, listening, telling Collaborating, partnering, 
learning 
Relationship to core business 
process 
‘Bolted on’ to core business and 
strategic processes 
Integrated into core business 
and strategic processes 
Potential for corporate 
change 
Limited change Transformative change 
Likely performance Good Great 
Source: Sloan (2009) 
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In addition to Sloan’s (2009) control model, Greenwood’s (2007) concept of 
engagement and moral treatment of stakeholders can help to further illuminate different 
types of such low-interaction stakeholder engagement. Greenwood (2007, pp. 322-324) 
distinguishes the low interaction between a company and its stakeholders as 
‘paternalism’ and ‘neoclassical’. The paternalistic stakeholder engagement refers to the 
situation when the company acts in the interests of stakeholders—such as “philanthropic 
donations to the community”—without necessarily engaging with them (p.322). This 
type of engagement may benefit the local community but only to a certain extent and in 
short-term, as the company does not involve the stakeholders in their business 
operations and decision-making. Paternalism is considered to be weak when there is 
little stakeholder engagement; and strong when there is no stakeholder engagement. 
Thus, if a company operating in a local community employs the control model—for 
example with local stakeholders—and is classified as paternalistic, it can thus imply that 
the company interacts with its local stakeholders only to a certain degree. In other words, 
the company does not fully embed in the local community. 
Greenwood (2007, p. 324) labels as ‘neoclassical’ stakeholder engagement, a company 
that “has little interest in engaging its stakeholders” and does not act in the interests of 
the stakeholders. This type of engagement can take the form of “outsourcing of services 
such as human resource management, employment of contract labour rather than 
permanent staff and use of multiple low cost suppliers” (p.324). As a result, the local 
community may not benefit from this type of engagement as the company may seek 
supplies from outside the community. Thus, if a company operating in a local 
community employs the control model—for example with local stakeholders—and is 
classified as neoclassical, it can thus imply that it does not engage with local 
stakeholders. In other words, the company does not embed in the local community. 
In contrast, Sloan’s (2009) collaboration model is a high-interaction stakeholder 
engagement approach. It involves building long-term relationships with stakeholders to 
ensure sustainability of the company. Sloan (2009) argues that the collaborative model 
creates better social performance than the control model as the former is based on the 
assumption that stakeholders are a source of opportunity for companies. Therefore, 
“effective engagement practices—practices that bring managers and their stakeholders 
together to partner and learn from one another—can open these opportunities and 
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provide the basis for innovation and fundamental organizational transformation” (Sloan, 
2009, p. 37). The collaboration model thus not only benefits the companies, but also the 
stakeholders. If a company operating in a local community employs the collaboration 
model—for example with local stakeholders—it can thus imply that the company fully 
engages these stakeholders in the business process as its business partners. In other 
words, the company fully embeds in the local community.  
These stakeholder engagement models are useful for this research as they help to further 
explain different forms of engagement that the Korean companies have with their 
legitimate stakeholders in the local communities, and thus shed light on the extent of 
their embeddedness in local communities. 
To sum up, the above discussion on entrepreneurship, embeddedness and stakeholder 
engagement demonstrates the linkages between these concepts and their relevance to 
formulating the conceptual framework for answering the research questions. 
2.4 Conceptual	  Framework	  
As outlined in the literature review, examining the process of entrepreneuring of Korean 
FDI companies in ELC as an emancipatory process (Rindova et al., 2009) allows the 
research to explore the impact of the companies on local development in Cambodia. 
Therefore, the impact of the companies on local development is assessed based on their 
embeddedness through their operations, entrepreneurial activities, stakeholder 
engagement and value added. Consequently, the conceptual framework in Figure 2.1: 
Conceptual Framework  is structured according to the above five components: 
embeddedness, operations, entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement, and value added 
for local development. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework  
Source: The author (2015) 
Component 1 sets the foundation for investigating the main research question about the 
embedding process of Korean FDI companies with respect to the other components 
which include their operations, entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement and value 
added. Given that Component 1 allows the researcher to draw conclusions on the impact 
of the companies on local development, this component is then assessed after the other 
four components have been examined. 
Component 2 addresses sub-question 1 by examining Korean FDI companies’ extent, 
nature and operational pattern. Thus, this component focuses on the companies’ types of 
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ownership, financial sources, (potential) markets, business models (investment 
arrangement), and organizational arrangement. This component ultimately provides the 
research with insights into the companies’ ELC development activities. 
Component 3 seeks to answer sub-question 2 by assessing entrepreneurial activities of 
Korean companies, and is built on Shane’s (2003) opportunity recognition and 
exploitation through new venture formation. This research understands entrepreneurial 
opportunity as “a situation in which new goods, services, raw materials, markets and 
organizing methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends or 
ends–means relationships” (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003, p. 336; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000, p. 220). The entrepreneurial opportunity differs from other 
situations in which people seek profit as it requires creative actions to (re)construct the 
means, the ends or both, rather than being given (Shane, 2003, p. 18). Therefore, in 
order to examine entrepreneurial activities of companies and/or investors, the research 
focuses on how they recognize and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities in the ELC 
development in Cambodia.  
Component 4 aims to answer sub-question 3 by investigating Korean FDI companies’ 
engagement with their stakeholders in terms of their commercial and social 
relationships. Based on Freeman et al.’s (2010) stakeholder theory, the Korean FDI 
companies may have stakeholders such as investors in Korea, Korean associations, 
Cambodian national and provincial government, suppliers, local and international 
NGOs, local residents (villagers), local business owners, and local authorities. To fit 
with the research purpose, this component pays special attention to local stakeholders 
such as residents, business owners and local authorities. Through the stakeholder 
engagement lens, this component examines the companies’ interactions with their 
stakeholders, specifically at local level, and the changes that result from these 
interactions.  
Component 5 aims to address sub-question 4 by examining value added by the Korean 
companies and investors for Cambodia at local community, provincial and national 
levels. This component examines value added in terms of direct and indirect 
employment (or employment opportunities) and businesses (or business opportunities), 
and infrastructural contributions. 
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2.5 Summary	  
This chapter draws on the notion of embedding entrepreneurship to develop a research 
conceptual framework based on the three interconnected theoretical concepts of 
entrepreneurship, embeddedness and stakeholder engagement. The conceptual 
framework is then developed for data collection and analysis in order to gain insights 
into the embedding process of Korean FDI companies and/or investors in the local 
community. The framework is used to capture the impact of the FDI companies on local 
community development in Cambodia. The conceptual framework consists of five 
components including: “embeddedness” with respect to their operations, 
entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement and value added; “operations” in terms of 
each company’s extent, nature and operational pattern; “entrepreneurship” in regard to 
opportunity recognition and exploitation through new venture creation; “stakeholder 
engagement” with respect to commercial and social relationships between Korean 
companies and local stakeholders; and “value added” in terms of job opportunities, 
business opportunities and infrastructural contributions. 
  
Chapter	  3: Research	  Methodology	  
Case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research (Yin, 
2009, p. 2). 
3.1 Introduction	  
The focus of this research is to explore and explain how these companies and investors 
engage in the local community. In addition, this research will investigate what is behind 
the external observable behaviour of the Korean investors and local community. To 
understand these phenomena, the researcher has to enter the Korean investors’ and local 
communities’ world in order to study how they make sense of their environment. 
The paradigm for this research is situated within ontological relativism and 
epistemological constructivism. From a relativist ontological perspective, people 
reconstruct an understanding of their social world through a continuous process. In 
other words, meanings are created when people comprehend themselves in their world 
to make sense of their environment (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). Based on this 
ontological perspective, a researcher views realities as multiple, intangible mental 
constructions, socially and experientially based (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). A reality is 
a social construct built through one’s interaction with one’s social world (Merriam, 
2014). Therefore, a reality emerges from the interaction between the people involved in 
a community. Agreement about the reality is the result of negotiations among them, as 
the perception of the reality is subject to change, consistent with the temporal and 
historical conditions of the community (Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 120). Multiple realities 
are therefore centered around and constructed through the perceptions and experience of 
the Korean investors and the company’s stakeholders in their everyday life concerning 
their involvement in ELC investments and development. Thus, examining the personal 
opinions of Korean investors and stakeholders embedded in their responses to the 
researcher’s queries leads to discovery of the realities, which are constructed from the 
viewpoint of the experiences of the investors and the stakeholders.     
From a constructivist epistemological position, a researcher is a part of the social reality 
as constructed by her participants. Through this interrelation, the researcher gains 
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insights into constructed meanings in the social world, which differ according to place 
and time (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). Thus, in this study the researcher employs an 
interpretivist approach and by examining her understanding and that of the research 
participants, she will represent not only the perspective of one group but the 
perspectives of all participants to provide an understanding of the phenomena.    
Influenced by Yin (2009), this research employs a qualitative case-study methodology 
to explore and explain the studied phenomena, utilizing ethnographic methods to 
establish the case studies. To strengthen the research findings, this research applies 
cross-case study analysis to compare and contrast the similarities and differences of the 
three Korean FDI companies prior to justifying and generalising the individual case 
findings and overall research findings. 
This chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, the chapter discusses the 
research paradigm and ontological and epistemological perspectives underlying the 
current research. The third section presents and justifies the choice of case study 
research methodology employed, including the rationale behind the selection of the 
three cases. It then illustrates how the researcher built relationships with and gained 
access to the research participants. The fourth section highlights the data-gathering 
process and tools. The fifth section reviews the data analysis, explaining how the 
empirical data is analysed in each case and compared across the cases to enhance the 
empirical findings and arguments. After addressing the ethical considerations of this 
research, the next section reflects on the researcher’s experience in conducting the 
fieldwork. The chapter concludes with a summary. 
3.2 Doing	  Case	  Study	  Research	  
Yin (2009, p. 13) asserts that a case study is one of research methodologies used to 
“investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Nevertheless, 
the common understanding of case study research methodology varies among scholars 
(Creswell, 2007; Creswell et al., 2007; Lincoln et al., 2011; Merriam, 1998; Stake, 
1995; Yin, 2009). For instance, some researchers consider case studies as a bounded 
system, not a methodology, while others treat case study as a research strategy or a 
research process (see Creswell et al., 2007; Lincoln et al., 2011). The current 
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dissertation acknowledges the intense debate about using case studies as a methodology 
and strategy. However, engaging in this debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Thus, given the different understanding of case studies, this research endorses the 
position of Yin (2009) and Creswell et al. (2007), who treat case studies as a 
methodology of qualitative enquiry in which researchers examine multiple bounded 
systems (cases) over time, by using different information sources for detailed and in-
depth data-gathering.  
The current dissertation focuses on not only Korean FDI investors in ELC investments 
in Cambodia, but also addresses the ways in which they contributed to local 
development. A case study allows researchers to study the phenomenon in question in 
its particular context (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). The current research was conducted in 
the investors’ and their stakeholders’ real-life social world. In other words, the 
researcher had no control over the behaviour of research participants or actual events, 
and no ability to manipulate them (Yin, 2009, p. 8). Additionally, this research focuses 
on the recent development of the Korean FDI companies in ELCs in Cambodia. Hence, 
using the case study methodology would answer the main question of how and to what 
extent the Korean investors/companies embed themselves in the local community 
through their entrepreneurship in the ELC development. 
Designing a case study is associated with the rationale for the case and the objectives of 
the research. Levy (2008) classifies rationales for case study research into three types: 
idiographic case studies which describe, explain or interpret a case and fall within either 
theory-guided or inductive cases; hypothesis generating and testing case studies, which 
refer to theory-informing and confirming case study research; and plausibility probe 
case studies, which probe a case which is situated between hypothesis testing and 
generation. Based on Levy’s (2008) classifications, the rationale for the current research 
design uses a combination of theory-guided and inductive case study. The current 
research is informed and guided by three interrelated theoretical concepts: 
entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement and embeddedness which are used to explain 
the cases, but not to test any specific theories. Hence, the empirical findings of this 
research contribute to generating new or emerging hypotheses in the field of FDIs and 
local development rather than testing the existing hypotheses associated with these three 
concepts. 
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3.2.1 Case	  Selection	  
Case selection can be challenging in case study research in regards to the justification 
for selecting a case or cases (Yin, 2009). However, the case selection criteria are less 
contested for the current research due to the research’s focus and the total number of 
cases. The current research focuses on a particular group of FDI companies investing in 
large-scale ELCs in Cambodia from a particular country, Korea. Therefore, Korean FDI 
companies operating in large-scale ELCs in Cambodia were purposely selected for this 
research. Moreover, during the fieldwork period when the researcher was determining 
the case studies, the number of the Korean FDI companies investing in large-scale 
ELCs was relatively small.     
As of January 2011, six licensed Korean FDI companies investing in large-scale ELCs 
in Cambodia were listed in the logbook12 of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) and in the data of the Council for the Development of Cambodia 
(CDC). These Korean FDI companies acquired the ELCs in the form of 70-year land 
leases from the Cambodian government. The ELCs varied in size, between 5,000 
hectares and almost 10,000 hectares. Prior to fieldwork in October 2011, two Korean 
companies went out of business, leaving only four Korean companies available for this 
research. The four FDI companies invested in agricultural productions in different 
locations. Three out of the four companies were willing to participate in this research. 
The fourth company had recently undergone major restructuring including the 
establishment of a new management team.  
According to Yin (2009, p. 61), a multiple-case study provides more compelling 
evidence than a single-case study. Therefore, instead of combining all three accessible 
Korean FDI companies into a single-case study, this research considers each of the three 
companies as a separate case study. The multiple-case study methodology is 
challenging in terms of replication (Yin, 2009, p. 53) which refers to the verification of 
the case study’s findings through conducting more case studies either under the same or 
different conditions to those of the first case. Thus, as noted by (Yin, 2009, p. 54), “each 
case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal 
                                                
12An official record of large-scale ELCs in Cambodia. 
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replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical 
replication).” 
Nevertheless, the replication challenge is not applicable to the current study due to the 
limited number of cases available for the research. This research purposefully targets 
Korean FDI companies in large-scale agricultural land in Cambodia, and within the 
targeted Korean FDI companies only three companies were accessible for this research. 
Additionally, the three Korean companies operate in three different communities. As a 
result, their embeddedness and value added may vary. Thus, treating the three 
companies as three separate cases allows the researcher to capture the similarities and/or 
differences among them. The different locations of the three companies’ ELCs also 
allow this research to study each individual case separately. Hence, each case study is 
holistic in itself (Yin, 2009, p. 58). Therefore, the three Korean FDI companies were 
then identified as three cases for the current research and are hereafter called Company 
A, Company B and Company C. The methodology applied in each case study is 
summarised in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: The Multiple-case Study Methodology 
Source: Adapted by the author from Yin (2009, p. 57) 
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3.2.2 Contextual	  Background	  of	  the	  Research	  Sites	  
This dissertation is based on three separate case studies, examining three Korean FDI 
companies in ELCs in Cambodia. In order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality (see 
Section 3.6 for details), no localities of research sites have been revealed in the 
dissertation to protect the participants’ privacy. To give a sense of the research sites and 
how local authorities relate to one another on a national level, this section broadly 
presents the administrative structure in Cambodia.  
Cambodia is divided into 20 provinces and four municipalities. Each province is divided 
into districts, each district into communes, and each commune into villages. Each 
municipality is divided into sections and each section is divided into quarters. Provinces 
can consists of as few as six or as many as 17 districts, depending on the population, 
while districts can comprise of as few as two or as many as 18 communes. Communes 
can consist of as few as three or as many as 30 villages, whereas villages can consist of 
as few as 46 villagers or as many as 4,658 villagers (CDO, 2010). The sub-national 
administrative arrangement in Cambodia is summarised in Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2: A Summarised Sub-national Administrative Structure 
Source: Adapted by the author from Pak (2010) 
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3.2.3 Participants	  
Although the Korean investors are central to the current research, other participants 
from the investors’ social environment as well as experts on FDIs and ELCs in 
Cambodia are also included so that a more comprehensive analysis of the studied 
phenomena can be obtained. Overall, the researcher conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 78 participants and had casual but purposeful conversations with 17 
additional participants in the three research sites (see Appendix A for an overview of 
list of participants). The casual conversations were carried out for several reasons. 
Firstly, some of the conversational participants refused to have a formal interview due 
to their position in their institutions. These participants felt more comfortable and talked 
openly during off the-record conversations. The researcher respected their decision and 
tried to gain their trust, so that she could converse with them about some sensitive 
topics related to the research. These participants are her main source for obtaining the 
official documents regarding the companies studied. Secondly, other conversational 
participants were either not familiar with being interviewed and did not feel comfortable 
participating or were busy people and not interested in the research. Thus, the researcher 
had to adopt other approaches such as visiting their workplaces and homes and having 
casual conversations with them instead. Information gathered from the casual 
conversations serves as background information for the researcher to get a sense of the 
issues being studied and further explore them with interview participants.  
All of the participants were identified based on publicly available information and the 
snowball technique. Overall, the participants in this research can be divided into eight 
categories as follows.       
The first category consists of those who are immediately employed by and work full-
time for the companies. The participants in this category include Korean 
investors/managers who have shares in the companies and are physically based in 
Cambodia, and Korean and Cambodian personnel (managers, supervisors, office staff, 
drivers and security staff).  
The second category comprises companies’ subcontractors. The participants in this 
category include Cambodian business people that have been directly or indirectly 
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subcontracted by the companies to develop the ELCs such as by clearing land, grafting 
and/or planting. 
The third category refers to the local residents on or in the immediate vicinity of the 
companies’ plantation sites. These residents are either day labourers who work in the 
companies or local residents who do not work for the companies. The participants in 
this category are divided into two sub-groups: those whose land is affected by the 
companies and those whose land is not affected by the companies.   
The fourth category consists of local business people residing on or in the immediate 
vicinity of the companies’ plantation sites. The participants in this category are divided 
into two sub-groups: those whose land is affected by the companies and those whose 
land is not affected by the companies.  
The fifth category is the local authorities. The participants in this category consist of the 
commune councillors and village chiefs of the communes and villages where the 
companies’ ELCs are located and/or with which they share their borders.  
The sixth category comprises provincial and national authorities. The participants in this 
category are government officials in relevant departments and ministries concerned with 
granting and monitoring ELCs.   
The seventh category refers to representatives from local and international non-
government organisations (NGOs) and experts. The participants in this category include 
local NGO staff who directly facilitate and provide assistance to local communities in 
regard to ELC development related issues; international NGO staff whose projects are 
related to FDIs, the business environment, investment regulations and the agricultural 
sector in Cambodia; and experts who have at least five years experience working with 
ELCs and agricultural investment-related issues in Cambodia.   
The eighth and last category comprises Korean business associations and facilitation 
organisations in Cambodia. The participants in this category consist of the board 
members of a Korean business association for large investments and a Korean 
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association for agricultural business in Cambodia; and a director of a Korean business 
facilitation organisation sponsored by the Korean government in Cambodia.   
Interestingly, all of the management participants, including the Korean, local and 
national government experts and the companies’ managers, are male. In contrast, 95 per 
cent of the local business participants are female. The local resident participants are 
more mixed in terms of gender.  
3.2.4 Gaining	  Access	  
Gaining access is acknowledged to be challenging for researchers, especially for 
research on sensitive topics. This includes the current research. As a female Cambodian 
who had never been acquainted with Korean businesspeople, the researcher encountered 
numerous challenges in gaining access to Korean FDI investors because of their busy 
schedules and the high status in their companies, closed networks and language issues. 
The researcher also faced challenges in gaining access to high-ranking Cambodian 
government officials due to the sensitive nature of the research topic. As a result, the 
researcher had to employ a wide range of strategies to overcome the challenges, such as 
learning the Korean language, socialising with Koreans in Phnom Penh in order to build 
a network, utilising intermediaries, employing the walk-in technique and using the 
casual conversation technique, and being clear to all the (potential) participants that the 
research is for academic purposes.    
ELCs are regarded as a sensitive topic in Cambodia for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
ELCs are frequently reported to be involved in land conflicts with or resettlement of 
local communities. Secondly, issues related to ELCs, including granting and monitoring 
of ELCs, have been either politicised or criticised. As a result, many participants are 
reluctant to participate or speak openly. Therefore, throughout the fieldwork, the 
researcher was mindful not to be viewed as a person with affiliations to any political 
parties, NGOs or media. Being an academic researcher helped her gain trust from her 
key participants and the local residents, as she could not be perceived as a threat to them.    
Korean	  Investors	  	  
As the current research focuses on Korean FDI investors, gaining access to the Korean 
participants was the researcher’s main concern. Her first attempt to approach the key 
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participants was to visit their offices. However, this walk-in technique did not work, as 
the publicly available information of the companies’ addresses was outdated. Most of 
the companies’ information on the Internet was not up-to-date; for example, the 
telephone numbers were no longer in use and offices had moved to different locations. 
The new tenants and/or the owners of the properties did not know where the companies 
had gone. The researcher then changed her approach and used intermediaries, a 
commonly recommended approach in gaining access (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
However, this approach did not work for all three cases. Consequently, the researcher 
ended up employing different approaches to gain access to different Korean participants. 
The researcher’s first breakthrough in gaining access to the investors was through a 
Korean intermediary. After socialising with her Korean teacher and church-related 
people had not resulted in meeting key Korean participants, the researcher started to 
search for a link from her Cambodian networks. She managed to get contact 
information for Korean business associations’ board members in Phnom Penh through 
one of her former colleagues. These Korean board members are considered as respectful 
persons by many Korean FDI investors in Cambodia as they were elected to these 
positions. They proved to be indeed important intermediaries who helped to connect the 
researcher with a Korean investor from Company A.  
The researcher repeatedly used the snowball technique in getting access to other key 
Korean participants as she learnt that in Korean culture references were important in 
getting to know someone. However, this technique was not always successful. Most of 
the key Korean participants did not socialize and sometimes the contact information 
provided was inactive. Thus, to gain access to the Korean investors of Company B, the 
researcher changed her strategy: she first approached Cambodian plantation-based 
employees, after locating this company’s ELC. However, these contacts did not lead her 
to Company B’s investors as expected. After many unsuccessful attempts, the 
researcher re-employed the walk-in technique. After spending some time in the 
province, she decided to visit the company’s office in Phnom Penh, the address of 
which had been acquired from the Cambodian employees. Based on her previous 
experience, she did not expect her walk-in approach would work. The researcher 
submitted her request for an interview appointment during her first visit to the office. A 
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day later she was unexpectedly notified by a company employee that the company’s 
vice-president would grant her request for an interview.  
Gaining access to the key Korean participant for the third case study was the most 
challenging. The only information available was the location of Company C’s ELC and 
this company’s office is located outside the ELC site. During the first visit, the 
researcher planned to visit this company’s ELC. However, she was advised not to go 
there by local authorities, as there had been a robbery where the victim was killed on the 
way to the ELC on the morning of her visit. Instead, the first strategy that the researcher 
employed was to visit the commune chief at his house, but he did not know the exact 
whereabouts of Company C’s office. Since she had obtained no lead from the commune 
chief, the researcher went to the commune’s police office. She identified herself to the 
police chief, who was busy reviewing the report of the crime incident. He knew where 
the company’s clearing team stayed. At that time, this company outsourced the land 
clearing to another company.  
The researcher asked the police chief if she could be accompanied by one of his staff as, 
based on her previous experience, she was afraid that the clearing team would not let 
her in to talk to their supervisor. The police chief granted her request. As predicted, 
after introducing herself, the researcher was told by two men dressed in military 
uniforms that they did not know where their supervisor was and did not know how to 
reach him. The accompanying police officer told one of the men to ask for someone 
who could reach the supervisor and one of them pulled out a phone from his pocket and 
called the supervisor. Five minutes later the supervisor arrived. He refused to grant the 
researcher’s request for an interview. However, he was kind enough to give her 
Company C’s office address and a contact number. Through this contact number the 
researcher reached Company C’s Cambodian staff who set up a time for her to come to 
the office to meet with his Korean general manager. After assuring the Korean general 
manager that the current research was for academic purposes only, he was willing to 
participate.  
Other	  Groups	  of	  Participants	  
The researcher’s experience in approaching the local residents was less challenging in 
comparison to approaching the investors. She used the walk-in technique by visiting the 
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participants at their home without appointments. One of the downsides of this technique 
was that sometimes the participants were not at home. Thus, the researcher had to come 
again the next day, as most of the villagers in remote and poor areas do not have or 
carry their cell-phones. Some participants got home very late in the evening, as they had 
to work on their rice or cashew nut fields. Thus, the researcher went to meet them where 
they worked. Sometimes, she helped them out at their fields.    
Gaining access to provincial and national government officials was challenging as they 
were required to submit an official interview request to their office or department for 
approval. This process was time consuming, as the request letter was considered a low 
priority in the government administration. Therefore, the researcher asked her friends 
who had connections with government officials to introduce her to potential participants 
at the relevant departments and ministries. This approach was effective in acquiring 
official documents from government offices. However, the contacted officials refused to 
be interviewed. Most preferred to discuss and express their views off the record, as they 
considered the research topic to be relatively sensitive. The off-the-record discussions 
provided the researcher with insightful background information that sometimes became 
interview topics to be explored with other categories of participants.       
The researcher generally gained access to the experts, NGO staff, Korean business 
association boards and company staff through acquiring their contact information from 
her networks. She contacted each participant by email or telephone to request an 
interview which they normally granted. The only challenge that the researcher faced 
with participants in this category was frequently rescheduling interview appointments to 
accommodate their busy and flexible work schedules. Nevertheless, some participants 
were kind enough to do interviews on weekends due to their unavailability during the 
week.  
To approach the local authorities, the researcher visited their commune office for 
contact information. Village chiefs are not based at the commune office but their 
contact information is posted on their commune notice board. The researcher usually 
called the commune councillors and village chiefs to make an appointment to meet at 
their residences or the commune offices, which is the common practice in the local 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 52 
community. The local authorities were generally willing to participate in the research 
once the researcher had identified herself. 
3.3 Data	  Gathering	  
Case studies rely on evidence from multiple sources (Yin, 2009, p. 99). Based on the 
design of this dissertation, the researcher gathered both primary and secondary data. 
Various tools were employed to gather the ethnographic data on the entrepreneurial 
activities of the Korean investors and/or companies and their engagement in the local 
communities. These include interviews, focus group discussions, participant observation, 
indirect observations, casual conversations, field notes and documentary analysis (see 
Appendix B for an overview of sources and collected evidence for the research). As 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 5) emphasise, the use of multiple tools helps to ensure an 
in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon.  
The data gathering was carried out between February 2012 and March 2013 in three 
different research sites, one for each of the three case studies in Cambodia. The 
researcher conducted the fieldwork for each case study separately (see Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 for details). When conducting the three case studies, this research was carried out in 
multiple settings ranging from very formal (conference/meeting rooms and offices) to 
very casual (plantation sites, worker campuses, farmers’ fields, houses, kitchens, stores, 
coffee shops and roads). 
3.3.1 Primary	  Data	  Gathering	  
The current research gathered primary empirical data through interviews, focus group 
discussions, observations and field notes. Each tool possesses strengths and limitations 
(Yin, 2009, p. 102). However, the use of multiple data-gathering tools minimises their 
limitations as various tools complement each other and help enrich the case study (Yin, 
2009, p. 101). Thus, to enhance the quality of the gathered data, the research employed 
more than two tools (Sarantakos, 1998) to gather particular data as outlined below.  
Interviews	  
Of all the various data-gathering techniques employed for this research, semi-structured 
interviews with individual participants were the main technique. As Mishler (1986, p. 
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27) notes, the semi-structured interview approach not only guides the research using 
relevant questions, but also allows flexibility in order to obtain rich, detailed 
information from the participants. Moreover, semi-structured interviews allow the 
researcher to make a cross-case comparison by minimising the inconsistency in the 
interview topics across the cases.  
The researcher prepared separate interview protocols for each participant group 
depending on the relevance of the themes to the participants (see Appendix C for an 
overview of the interview protocols). Interviews with the key Korean participants, for 
instance, placed emphasis on their business-life history (Dahles, 2004) with specific 
focus on their motivation for investing in Cambodia, their experience in establishing the 
business, resource acquisition, business strategies and management, and their major 
successes and failures in operating the business. The Korean participants were also 
asked to empirically comment on their involvement in the local community and the 
impact of their investments on local communities. In contrast, interviews with local 
residents focused more on the impact of the investments on the local communities, and 
their involvement in the ELC granting, evaluation and investment than on the 
companies’ internal affairs.   
The interviews were conducted in English with non-Khmer speakers, while interviews 
with Cambodian participants were conducted in the Khmer language. Most of the 
interviews were tape-recorded with prior consent from the participants. If any 
participants refused to be tape-recorded, notes were taken and detailed reports were 
written immediately after the interviews. Normally, the researcher made more than one 
visit to build up trust and maintain a relationship with the participants and enhance the 
in-depth quality/ reliability of the data. 
Focus	  Group	  Discussions	  
During the fieldwork, two focus group discussions were held with day labourers on the 
ELCs. Each focus group discussion was of a manageable size (fewer than 10 
participants) and tape-recorded with permission of participants. Six and eight day 
labourers from Companies A and B respectively were invited to each focus group. 
Discussion centred on their experience in working for the companies and their living 
conditions, with specific attention paid to working conditions, their treatment by the 
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companies, their views on living conditions before and after working for the companies, 
past work experience and overall development progress in the ELCs. The focu sgroup 
discussions aimed to obtain an understanding of the working and living conditions of 
the day labourers.  
Other	  Data-­‐gathering	  Methods	  
As suggested by Yin (2009), participant and indirect observations were employed to 
gain more insight and validate the information gathered from  participants. During the 
fieldwork, the researcher divided her timeframe for each site into four three-week visits. 
She spent the first week in each research site becoming familiar with the area and/or 
observing the daily life of local residents. She also moved around the area to observe 
residents and stopped at different places and talked to people. She would frequently sit 
at a village’s coffee shops, dessert stores and/or food stands to observe and listen to 
local people chatting. These places are the most common meeting areas for local people. 
Observations were also carried out before, during and after each interview. 
The researcher also visited and observed the companies’ offices, worker 
accommodation, cafeterias, construction sites and plantation sites. Whenever she visited 
the plantation sites, she would work with the labourers; for example by planting, 
weeding and applying fertilizers to the planted rubber saplings. In addition to 
experiencing the workload first hand, the researcher took the opportunity to build trust 
with the labourers and observe their interactions with each other and with their 
supervisors. She often received unexpected and personal information from the informal 
conversations with labourers in these settings. She also spent time with the companies’ 
office staff at coffee shops in town during their days off.  
After each observation, the researcher would write a descriptive note about the 
observational evidence. At the end of each day in the field, the researcher took time for 
reflection and recorded her impressions in a field journal as well as made plans for the 
next day. Field notes and interview reports were constantly produced over the fieldwork 
period. 
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3.3.2 Secondary	  Data	  Gathering	  
Secondary data relating to ELCs and Korean FDIs in Cambodia has been gathered since 
the literature review stage from various sources through Picarta, Web of Science and 
Google Scholar searches and media articles. During the fieldwork, the researcher also 
gathered related regulations (decrees, sub-decrees and other proclamations) on 
environmental and social impact assessment and ELC, investment laws, natural 
resource management and land laws. In addition, she managed to obtain the companies’ 
ELC contracts, master plans, budget plans and progress reports, the government’s 
evaluation reports and NGO reports.  
3.4 Data	  Analysis	  
The analysis of a multiple case study consists of two stages: within and cross-case 
analysis. In the within-case analysis, each case study is treated as a comprehensive and 
independent case, then all the cases are compared and contrasted with each other in the 
cross-case analysis (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009).  A qualitative multiple-case study 
seeks to build abstractions across cases (Merriam, 1998) and this research attempts “to 
build a general explanation that fits with each of the individual cases, even though the 
cases will vary in their details” (Yin, 1994, p. 112). Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 
204-205) claim that cross-case analysis is tricky and demands a careful study of the 
complex configurations of processes of individual cases. Merriam (1998, p. 195) 
concludes that “ultimately, cross-case analysis differs little from analysis of data in a 
single qualitative case study.” Hence, for the current research the three Korean 
companies are treated separately and independently as three cases. The analysis for each 
case was conducted separately. After the compilation of the within-case analysis for all 
three cases, a cross-case analysis was carried out in order to sum up and build 
abstractions across the three cases. 
3.4.1 Within-­‐case	  Analysis	  	  
The data analysis took place throughout the data-gathering process and after the end of 
the fieldwork. As suggested by Glesne (1999, p. 130), analysing data continuously 
during data gathering allows the researcher to focus and identify the patterns of the 
ongoing study. Thus, the researcher transcribed each interview herself soon after the 
interview took place as she wanted to be familiar with and gain better insight into the 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 56 
data. All of the tape-recorded interviews were fully transcribed. The transcripts were 
compared with the researcher’s field notes and interview reports to identify missing or 
unclear information that the researcher needed to follow up. The researcher worked on 
the gathered data of one case at a time. After gaining sufficient information on one 
research subject, she would write a comprehensive report to her supervisors. Writing up 
these reports helped the researcher in drafting the empirical chapters.  
The researcher used a matrix analysis to organise and record data that informed the 
research questions. The creation of a matrix display provided the researcher with an 
innovative yet systematic way of processing the data collected across sites and sources 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Due to the design of this PhD research, a basic list of 
themes has been identified according to the subjects covered in the four sub-questions. 
However, during the coding, the researcher was also open to any new themes emerging 
from the data in order to improve the list. As a result, four main themes—operations in 
ELCs, entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement and value added—were finalised, 
along with 47 sub-themes (see Appendix D for an overview). After having familiarised 
herself with the transcripts, the researcher developed a series of separate matrices using 
Microsoft Word software (see Appendix D for an overview) that allowed her to 
examine each case study. Each matrix was divided into two levels: individual and 
company. Each level had the same main themes and sub-themes on one column, then 
each piece of the transcript was allocated under appropriate themes and sub-themes. The 
original transcripts were continuously consulted throughout the analysis and writing 
process in order to stay true to the original meanings and contexts. 
3.4.2 Cross-­‐case	  Analysis	  
Case study methodologists (Bennett and Elman, 2006; Levy, 2008) argue that an in-
depth case study should not be compared with another case study as the empirical 
evidence of each case is unique. However, this research advocates the importance of 
cross-case comparison in order to explain how and why three different Korean FDI 
companies carried out their embeddedness and entrepreneurship for local development. 
Factors that promote or undermine each case’s success or failure were compared and 
analysed to explain their contributions to local development. 
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Built on the results of the three within-case analyses, another matrix was developed (see 
Appendix D for an overview), in which the three cases were compared according to the 
four main themes, in regard to operational pattern, entrepreneurship, stakeholder 
engagement and value added. Based on the comparison matrix, the researcher could 
compare the three cases together in order to discover the similarities and the differences. 
She conceptualized their different and similar operational patterns, their engagement in 
local communities and the impact of their behaviour. The researcher then analysed the 
justification behind the Korean FDI companies’ choices by relating them to the context 
of the characteristics of the business, its environment, the investors’ social and cultural 
backgrounds and the involvement from other stakeholders. Then the researcher wrote 
up the within and cross-case analysis chapters. 
3.5 Ethical	  Criteria	  
The main ethical concern of this research, as with any academic research, is to avoid 
any potential unintended harm to research participants and organisations. Thus, all of 
the necessary ethical measures were taken to ensure research integrity and transparency. 
During the fieldwork, the researcher made careful attempts at building and retaining 
trust with the research participants. She took several measures to comply with ethical 
issues. A standardised informed consent form was developed in both English and 
Khmer and presented to each participant to ask permission prior to the interviews (see 
Appendix C). The informed consent form consists of the following research and ethical 
information:  
• The background and purpose of the research with detailed contact information 
for verification purposes; 
• The potential consequences and risks involved with the research; 
• The rights of the participants, such as that participation in this research was 
voluntary and they could withdraw from the study at any time;  
• A request for permission to tape-record the interviews;  
• A guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality and that the personal information 
of the participants would be protected for privacy and confidentiality. All names 
of the participants, those of their organisations, and places visited in this study 
are changed to protect their identity. In general, the rights, interest and 
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sensitivities of all participants and organisations are protected. Nevertheless, this 
research deals with three Korean large-scale ELCs only. Hence, the identity of 
the owners and the location of the ELCs could be revealed due to publicly 
available information and numbers of large-scale Korean ELCs in Cambodia. 
Therefore, total identity protection in this case is beyond the researcher’s power; 
and 
• The researcher also assured the research participants that the research findings 
would be used for academic purposes only, such as through published materials 
or through research dissemination at conferences. 
3.5.1 Credibility	  	  
A researcher has an obligation to ensure some measure of credibility in conducting 
research that enables audiences to check on the findings and the inquiry process 
(Erlandson et al., 1993, p. 28). According to Erlandson et al. (1993), credibility is 
defined as the compatibility of the realities constructed in the minds of the research 
participants with the constructed realities that are attributed to them by the researcher. 
The authors emphasise that the major concern in establishing credibility is the 
researcher’s interpretation of the constructed realities that exist in the minds of people in 
the studied context. Thus “attention must be directed to gaining a comprehensive 
intensive interpretation of these realities that will be affirmed by the people in the 
context” (Erlandson et al., 1993, p. 30). To address these concerns, the researcher 
employed triangulation and prolonged engagement to establish credibility for the 
current research. These methods are discussed below.   
Triangulation: Triangulation leads to credibility by using different or multiple sources 
of data (Erlandson et al., 1993, p. 137). Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 283) assert that “No 
single item of information (unless coming from an elite and unimpeachable source) 
should ever be given serious consideration unless it can be triangulated.” For this 
research, the researcher collected various types of evidence from various groups of 
participants. The interviews were tape-recorded to ensure the accuracy of the responses. 
The data analysis included data from various sources such as observations, field notes, 
company reports, government reports, NGO reports, and news articles. 
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Prolonged engagement: Erlandson et al. (1993) argue that prolonged engagement 
provides a foundation for credibility. These authors claim that such engagement allows 
the researcher to understand “the culture of an organisation or other social setting over 
an extended time period that tempers distortions introduced by particular events or by 
the newness of researchers and respondents to each other’s presence” (p. 133). The 
prolonged engagement also enables the researcher to build trust and develop a rapport 
with the participants (Erlandson et al., 1993). The current study covered a period of 
about four months at each case study site. Each participant was interviewed at least once 
and the researcher familiarized herself with their home and families. There were also 
repeat visits to the sites and continuous observations. 
3.5.2 Reliability	  	  
Babbie (2007) argues that reliability allows the research results to be duplicated. 
According to the nature of the current research, the researcher was the primary research 
instrument, and the timeframe and events involved in these cases were limited to some 
extent. Thus an exact replication cannot be accomplished. However, the primary goal in 
this study, as in case studies in general, is “to minimize the errors and bias in the study” 
and “make as many steps as operational as possible” (Yin, 2003, pp. 37-38). To enhance 
the reliability of the results, this research follows strategies suggested by Schensul 
(1999) through describing clearly both the nature and the context of the researcher’s 
relationships with the research population and the research site; clarifying and 
describing clearly who the study’s key participants are, the groups that they represent, 
and their status in the community; making clear how and where observations are made; 
providing details of sample size and data-gathering methods, so that readers will be able 
to identify and duplicate the primary sources of information for the study; identifying 
clearly the social contexts and situations of the research; defining and operationalising 
the employed concepts clearly to avoid idiosyncratic interpretation and limited 
replicability; and establishing reliability when coding the data. 
3.6 Reflection	  
This research aims to give another perspective of the impact of FDIs on local 
development. Since our social world consists of multiple realities—which are 
constructed and reconstructed continuously—the researcher has constructed meanings 
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through her interrelation with the participants’ social world (Lincoln et al., 2011). Thus, 
it is essential to reflect on the researcher’s position in the fieldwork that helped shape 
this research design, data gathering and analysis. 
The researcher found strengths and limitations in conducting the research in such 
remote settings. One of the strengths of the researcher is the extensive local knowledge 
she possesses that allows her to gain insight into the studied issues. The researcher was 
born and grew up in rural Cambodia, and is a native speaker of the Khmer language. 
She was therefore exposed to the setting and culture of the rural areas. She benefited 
from her background and experience in the sense that she could easily comprehend the 
points that the participants discussed which may have been problematic for researchers 
without any prior knowledge of their cultural background. During the interviews with 
local residents she could easily grasp the issues and the problems they faced without 
having to worry about misinterpretation of the information. However, to minimise the 
adverse effects of being a local researcher, she tried not to make assumptions. As a 
result, she ended up asking for clarification on many things that appeared obvious to 
Cambodians, who assumed she would know the answer.  
As a female Cambodian researcher conducting research among Korean male investors, 
the researcher was obviously a stranger to them. While undertaking participant 
observations and interviews, the researcher herself was the subject of considerable 
observation and interview, for example being asked how old she was and whether she 
was married. Mullings (1999) asserts that researchers will be labelled with some self-
representation and this labelling is often out of the researcher’s control. Being a person 
unassociated with the Korean participants, such inquiries were not a surprise and could 
not be avoided. However, as the research went on, the researcher began to know the 
people and they got to know her better. Thus, some of their differences seemed to 
become less of an issue in the research process. The researcher found advantages in 
being a Cambodian researcher conducting the research with the Korean participants, 
even though she does not speak the Korean language well. Firstly, the Korean 
participants have good English language proficiency, thus they were able to express 
themselves in English. Secondly, the researcher, based on her impressions, was 
perceived as non-threatening by the male Korean participants. This perception may 
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have resulted from the researcher being an academic with no affiliation with other 
business people or political parties. 
The researcher also had various types of relationships with the research participants, 
such as close, reciprocal, distant or even difficult. Sometimes, after a few meetings, 
some participants considered her as a friend. In most cases, participants had different 
expectations of her. For instance, one participant asked her to submit a petition 
regarding land conflicts against one of the studied companies to the cabinet of the Prime 
Minister. It was a difficult moment for the researcher as she was unable to help the 
participant due to her determination to remain neutral. She could hear disappointment 
on the other end of the phone conversation. Generally, the researcher did not want 
participants to expect too much from her, explaining that the findings of this research 
will hopefully have a positive impact on their businesses and the community. The 
researcher still maintains contact with some of the key participants by exchanging 
emails for special occasions or meeting up occasionally to chat or provide updates on 
progress of the research. On all occasions, the researcher remains professional 
concerning research integrity by not disclosing information that could harm any other 
participants in the research.       
One of the drawbacks in conducting the fieldwork was that the researcher was not able 
to stay overnight on the sites, as a safety precaution. It was impossible for the researcher 
to live among people in the research sites, as the sites are very remote and deep in the 
forest. For safety reasons, it was not recommended that the researcher stay in these 
remote villages or on the plantation sites, so she had to stay at a guesthouse in more 
populated areas nearby. Most of the time, she had to get up early in the morning and 
drive to the sites and then leave before it got dark (around 5 pm) as driving on such 
roads in the dark without streetlights was challenging. It is also considered unsuitable 
for a Cambodian woman to stay at a guesthouse or hotel on her own without a 
companion. Thus, the researcher sometimes asked her husband, siblings, father or best 
friend to come along with her. As the fieldwork progressed, she was not able to be 
accompanied all the time as her companions had other priorities, so she made her visits 
shorter during those times. Although the researcher did not stay on the sites, she 
managed to visit the sites everyday during her trips.    
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As described earlier, gaining access to key participants was sometimes difficult for 
various reasons, which was a key challenge for the researcher. In some cases, people 
looked at her with suspicion and refused to take part. Sometimes she managed to get 
access with the help of an intermediary, while at other times, she failed. In other cases, 
people had high expectations of her, hoping that she would be able to connect them with 
some potential resources. Reflecting on her fieldwork experience, the researcher could 
have approached some of the participants differently and on a different time frame. For 
example, in the second and third case studies, she should have insisted the Cambodian 
contacts put her in touch with the Korean participants earlier. In regard to the 
government officials, the researcher should have sought an official endorsement letter 
from the Ministry of Interior at the beginning of the fieldwork. Such a letter might have 
helped attract more participation from high-ranking government officials.   
Overall, the researcher found her fieldwork experience unique and enriching, invoking 
feelings of excitement, frustration, rejection, failure and inspiration. She had to be 
prepared for different types of surprises as the study on the large-scale agricultural land 
involved land conflicts, which are considered a sensitive issue in Cambodia. Thus, 
along the fieldwork process, she found it important to adjust to the prevalent fieldwork 
conditions and always stay true to her role as an academic researcher.  
3.7 Summary	  
To explore and explain the contribution of Korean FDIs to local development through 
their embedding process in the local community involves explaining their success or 
failure in their embedding processes. This dissertation employs multiple-case study 
methodology which delves into each case’s phenomena. This research employed in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions, field observations and informal 
conversations to gather empirical evidence from each case. A triangulation approach 
was also employed to ensure the reliability of the data. To understand the Korean FDI 
companies’ embeddedness and contribution to local development, the research analysed 
the data using within and cross-case analyses to understand why a company fails or 
succeeds in embedding themselves in an ELC development. 
  
Chapter	  4: Case	  Study	  One	  
4.1 Introduction	  
This dissertation investigates the embedding process of Korean FDI companies and 
their contribution to local development in Cambodia by examining three Korean FDI 
companies that have invested in economic land concessions (ELCs) in Cambodia. This 
chapter contains the first of the three case studies.  It describes a case study of Company 
A, a Korean company that holds the legal rights to cultivate almost 10,000 hectares of a 
70-year ELC in Cambodia. This first case is mainly constructed from face-to-face 
interviews and observations completed between February and June 2012. It provides an 
in-depth understanding of Company A’s operational activities and how the company is 
received by the local community. This case also introduces the company’s founding 
owner (hereafter referred to as Mr Lee)13 and his perspective on managing his ELC 
business. Stakeholders’ viewpoints on the impact of this ELC on the local community 
are also highlighted. Overall, this chapter will serve as a background for the within-case 
and cross-case analyses in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Chapter 4 has five sections. This section introduces the chapter. The second section 
begins with an ethnographic description of the researcher’s fieldwork journey and 
highlights her experience and first impressions in conducting this case study. The third 
section describes Company A’s profile and operational activities. It also introduces the 
company’s founding investor, including his personal and professional background and 
views on running the business in Cambodia. The fourth section presents the company’s 
process of embedding and engaging with the local community. The fifth section is the 
summary. 
4.2 Journey	  to	  Company	  A	  
The researcher’s journey to Company A’s plantation begins in a human rights NGO’s 
provincial office. The researcher has been introduced to Mr Lee by a Korean 
intermediary. After her first interview with Mr Lee at one of his offices in Phnom Penh, 
the researcher asks for his permission to visit Company A’s ELC, which is located in a 
province. After waiting for two weeks for Mr Lee to fix a date for the researcher to visit 
                                                
13 All names of places and people in this case study are pseudonyms to safeguard the participants’ privacy.  
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 64 
his ELC plantation, she decides to travel to the plantation on her own. Based on her 
prior knowledge, contacting a human-rights NGO is a good start when one wants to find 
out information about an ELC as in Cambodia; it is commonly recognised that ELCs are 
frequently involved in land disputes with villagers. As predicted, the human rights NGO 
has received some land dispute complaints from villagers about Company A. 
After a meeting with the leader of the affected villagers, the researcher decides to tour 
the disputed area and Company A’s plantation from the outside, as she has not received 
permission from Mr Lee to enter the plantation at that stage. At the entrance stands a 
billboard showing Company A’s ELC map and information in the Khmer language. 
There is a checkpoint with company security guards at each entrance gate. Visitors have 
to inform the guards about their purpose for visiting before they are allowed to enter. 
Despite the presence of this entrance checkpoint, local residents claim to have normal 
access to their cash crop farms located inside the company’s territory.  
On the first day, the researcher notices some young labourers filling pot holes along the 
communal road and piles of dirt along the way from Ta Pring village to the company’s 
plantation. She asks the villagers if they know who hires the labourers to fix the road. 
They answer that the labourers may be hired by the commune chief. That afternoon the 
researcher returns to tour Company A’s plantation without any villagers accompanying 
her. She stops to talk to the labourers who are filling the pot holes. It intrigues her when 
the labourers reveal their employer’s identity. It is not who the villagers think. Rather, 
Company A has hired each labourer for 12,000 riels (approximately USD3) per day to 
fix the pot holes along this commune road. The piles of dirt the researcher has previous 
noticed are supplied by Company A’s trucks. 
Maintenance of the commune road is an obvious contribution to the local community in 
the context of rural Cambodia. The researcher is puzzled that the villagers did not know 
that the donor is Company A or Mr Lee. Based on the researcher’s impression during an 
informal chat after the first interview, Mr Lee looks friendly and humble. He says that 
the Ta Tey commune is like a second home to him, as he spends half of his time at his 
company’s ELC. The local community may have seen him very often. However, the 
researcher notices that the local community knows very little about Company A or its 
owner, Mr Lee. This observation makes the researcher even more curious to find out 
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what is happening between the local community and Company A’s investment in this 
area. 
While touring the Ta Tey commune on her own, the researcher unexpectedly receives a 
call from Mr Lee asking her to come to his plantation because he will be there the next 
day. The following day, while near the company’s cafeteria, the researcher meets a 
Korean director whose clothes are covered in dust. In a firm tone and with a strong 
Korean accent, the Korean director asks the researcher why she is there. He becomes 
friendly to her after learning of the purpose of her visit. However, their conversation is 
cut short when Mr Lee comes to greet the researcher. Mr Lee seems to know the 
plantation very well, which implies that he must have driven around it often. He 
explains how the rubber trees grow and how to take care of them, including the rubber 
trees’ different types and stages, ranging from nursery to two years old.  
Company A’s labourers spread around the nursery fields and the rubber trees. They look 
happy while working: they are talking, teasing each other and laughing. The company’s 
construction team members are busy building track-roads and drainage, and producing 
construction materials within the plantation. After the plantation visit, Mr Lee 
recommends the researcher talk to his Cambodian managers, although she advises him 
that she wishes to talk to both Cambodian managers and Korean directors. She does not 
know why Mr Lee recommended she only speak to the Cambodian managers, but later 
she notices that his Korean directors do not feel comfortable expressing themselves in 
English. 
4.3 Company	  Profile	  and	  Operations	  
4.3.1 Company	  Profile	  and	  Organisational	  Arrangement	  
Company A is a private agricultural investment firm from Korea. Due to the minimum 
USD 25 million capital investment required for the first five years, Mr Lee is seeking 
additional investment funds from various sources in addition to his own savings. The 
company was first established in 2009 with Mr Lee having a 100 per cent share. After 
acquiring the ELC, Mr Lee invited a Korean friend to join the company as a shareholder. 
His friend accepted the request and became the co-shareholder of Company A. Then the 
company applied for the Korean government’s Greenfield investment loan. Mr Lee also 
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intends to invite more shareholders to join Company A in future. Company A’s 
financial flow is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The company’s profile and organisational 
structure are presented in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1:The Financial Flow of Company A 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015  
Figure 4.2: Company A’s Profile 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
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Company A’s Profile 
Business activities:  Rubber plantation and development 
Investment capital:  More than USD 1 million  
Economic land concession:  Less than 10,000 hectares  
Products:  Semi-processed rubber gel for export 
(Potential) markets:  China and Korea 
Progress (as of June 2012): Planted 30 per cent of the total economic land concession 
Staff arrangements:  (For an overview see Figure 4.4) 
• Korean personnel:  A general director (Mr Lee), departmental directors, and an intern 
• Full-time Cambodian personnel (78 employees): Departmental managers, supervisors, skilled 
staff, drivers, security staff, cooking staff and full-time labourers 
• Seasonal labourers: 400 labourers (peak season) and 150 labourers (low season)  
Staff benefits:  
• Korean personnel: Salary, three daily Korean meals, fully furnished single accommodation 
(called Korean house) with utilities, and company vehicles (cars or motorbikes)  
• Full-time Cambodian personnel: Salary (10 per cent increase annually), three daily meals, fully 
furnished single or family accommodation (called Cambodian house) with utilities, company 
motorbikes for managers, paid overtime rate of 150 per cent and annual staff retreats 
• Seasonal Cambodian labourers: 13,000 riels (USD 3.25) daily wage (in 2012), free 
transportation arrangement and rice incentive for regular labourers 
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Figure 4.3: The Organisational Structure of Company A 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
4.3.2 Recruitment	  and	  Capacity	  Building	  	  
Company A’s recruitment strategy uses four approaches: mass media, employees’ 
networks, the general director’s networks, and public announcements in villages. It 
employs the first three approaches to recruit skilled employees, and curriculum vitaes 
(CVs), interviews and/or tests are required. The fourth approach is used to recruit 
seasonal day labourers and there are no CVs, interviews or tests required for such 
positions. The labourers have to be physically capable and between 18 to 40 years old. 
Rather than apply for jobs, new seasonal labourers just need to wait for the company’s 
trucks to collect them at meeting points in the early morning.  
The company has in-house capacity building (such as technical training, management 
training, and team building) and experience exchange programs for the departmental 
managers and supervisors. Mr Lee often invites speakers from Korea, other rubber 
plantations and the technical department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) to share hands-on expertise with his Cambodian managers and 
supervisors on the company’s premise. The Cambodian managers and supervisors are 
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also given opportunities to visit other rubber plantations in Cambodia as part of 
exchange programmes. 
The Korean directors and technicians provide on-the-job training to Cambodian 
technical staff on specific technical and machinery operating and repair skills. The 
trainees are closely supervised and evaluated by the Korean trainers for the first 10 days 
after the training before being handed responsibility for technical tasks. Company A 
also provides free evening Korean language classes for all staff members in the 
accommodation. New seasonal day labourers get on-the-job training from their 
supervisors or other more experienced labourers. 
4.3.3 About	  the	  Investor	  
Getting	  to	  Know	  the	  Investor,	  Mr	  Lee	  
“Sure, you can call me anytime to set up an interview appointment,” says Mr Lee with a 
smile, while pulling out his business card from a leather cardholder and handing it to the 
researcher. Mr Lee looks energetic and younger than his age (late 50s) with a good 
command of English. After graduating in Political Science and Diplomacy, Mr Lee 
served in the Korean National Assembly for some time prior to running his own 
businesses in Korea. He resides in Cambodia and frequently flies back to Korea. He had 
considerable international and business management experience before coming to 
Cambodia. He has travelled to over 40 developed and developing countries, mostly to 
look for business opportunities. He owns four companies: a company listed on a stock 
exchange in Korea and three companies in Cambodia.  
Despite his busy business schedule, Mr Lee is an active member of various Korean 
business associations in Cambodia. He is a board member of an agricultural business 
association and on the steering committee of a big-scale Korean investment association. 
He regularly attends monthly meetings of these two associations, enabling him to 
maintain a close relationship with other Korean investors in Cambodia. Mr Lee is also a 
volunteer speaker at seminars and conferences—both in Cambodia and back in Korea—
related to business investments for (potential) Korean investors. 
Besides meeting with other Koreans at workshops or conferences, Mr Lee socialises 
with Korean investors through the golf tournaments that are regularly organised by the 
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big-scale Korean investment association. The tournament is a bonding activity among 
the members. Since Mr Lee operates a consulting business in the country, it is logical to 
make himself known to other Korean investors who can potentially be his clients or 
introduce him to clients.  
Mr Lee is interested in art and has a collection of oil paintings in his offices. He 
believes that art can make a person well rounded. The first question Mr Lee asks the 
researcher when they meet for an interview is, “What do you think about this painting?”, 
pointing to a painting hanging on a wall along a hallway to one of his offices. It is a 
painting portraying a monk standing with bare feet. He sounds supportive when talking 
about a Korean art school project initiative in Cambodia and he also shares his 
disappointment when the art project is cancelled due to bureaucratic issues in Cambodia. 
He thinks that the cancellation is a big loss to Cambodian people. Mr Lee also jointly 
organises with the Korean embassy in Cambodia, a high-class Association of the 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) opera night which is attended by distinguished 
guests from embassies, high-ranking government institutes and business associations.   
Mr	  Lee’s	  Journey	  to	  Cambodia	  and	  Interest	  in	  Agriculture	  
Mr Lee is among the first wave of Koreans who moved to Cambodia after the United 
Nations-sponsored election in 1993. He first visited Cambodia in 1998, six months after 
the country had been involved in the armed clashes known as 1997 coup (for more 
detail see Peou, 1998). During his first visit, Mr Lee finds there are lots of business 
opportunities: “There were many possibilities to develop, because at that time 
Cambodia stayed at the bottom […] so I decided to do business in Cambodia,” says Mr 
Lee. That is the starting point of his business adventure in Cambodia. After visiting the 
country, he decides to operate a consulting firm in the capital city Phnom Penh. His 
decision is primarily driven by his knowledge of the business opportunities in 
Cambodia and the 200 Koreans living in this country at that time. His company 
provides business-consulting services to potential Korean investors who want to invest 
in Cambodia. Mr Lee has the impression that Korean people in Korea know very little 
about Cambodia.  
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“It’s a very rare case to look at very flat [land] over 500 hectares or 1,000 hectares, 
almost never!” says Mr Lee, referring to what initially intrigued him to start an 
agricultural business venture in Cambodia. After running the consulting firm in Phnom 
Penh, he makes some friends who are small-scale Korean investors in agricultural 
businesses in the country. He had a chance to visit his Korean friend’s 400-hectare 
cassava plantation. He is enchanted by the flat landscape in Cambodia and decides to 
start his second business, Company A, in this country. 
Figure 4.4: Company A's Economic Land Concession Acquisition 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
Mr	  Lee’s	  Business	  Management	  
“This is the first thing we built on this land,” says Mr Lee touching a long wooden 
bench in the company’s rest area. He looks away to the baby rubber trees in the nursery 
field and continues, “I used to sleep here.” He sounds attached to this place, as these 
early memories come flashing back. He is referring to an area that was the temporary 
accommodation where he and his team used to stay whenever they came to monitor the 
work on the land concession. It is an 8 metre by 8 metre wide and about 1.5 metre high 
tent, built from wooden poles and a thatched roof without walls. Nowadays, this 
temporary accommodation where his company’s operation started is a snack and soft 
drink store.  
According to his schedule, Mr Lee spends more time at Company A in Ta Tey 
commune than at his other two companies in Phnom Penh. He normally stays on the 
compound for three days per week. He spends another three days managing his other 
two businesses in Phnom Penh and one day for his private life. Mr Lee is actively 
Company A’s Economic Land Concession Acquisition 
Application type:  A private investor-initiated proposal 
Processing time:  23 months  
Technical evaluation: 4-day mission to assess the proposed ELC 
Evaluation result:  Almost 20 per cent of the proposed ELC deprives local people in four villages of 
their land. Around 16 per cent of the proposed land covers some part of a social 
land concession and protected areas.  
RGC decisions: All the overlapped areas to be deducted from the proposed 10,000-hectare ELC 
to avoid the overlapping areas.  
Approved ELC size:  Less than 10,000 hectares 
Leasing period:  70 years (with a deposit of USD 10 per hectare) 
Annual rent: Not stated in the ELC contract   
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involved in the business management of Company A. He chairs a weekly management 
meeting with his Korean directors, Cambodian managers and supervisors every Tuesday. 
He reviews and approves the company’s work plans and then follows up the actual 
progress against the work plan. As well as work in the office, he likes to drive around 
the plantation. Driving the researcher around the plantation along with some 
explanations on the rubber trees and land conditions, Mr Lee sounds like a rubber 
planting specialist and looks like a local tour guide at the plantation site. In fact, prior to 
starting his company he had no previous experience in the agriculture sector. However, 
he is a quick learner and a good business strategist, so he becomes familiar with this 
business very quickly. 
Mr	  Lee’s	  Third	  Business	  in	  Cambodia	  
A year after establishing Company A, Mr Lee starts a third business—a machinery and 
fertilizer company—in Phnom Penh. This company imports fertilizer and agricultural 
machines from Korea to supply the domestic market. In June 2012, the third company 
had no business signboard and no proper staffing: Mr Lee was in the process of 
recruiting an accountant, secretary and marketing staff. Before establishing this 
machinery and fertilizer company, Company A bought fertilizer from companies in 
Vietnam.  
Although these three businesses belong to Mr Lee, they are independent in terms of 
their operations and management systems. Each company has its own management and 
staff, business plans and independent decision-making power. The only common 
practice within these three companies is they have to report to the same general director, 
Mr Lee. Company A and the machinery and fertilizer company are regular clients of Mr 
Lee’s consulting company. The consulting company’s employees indicate that these two 
clients are their company’s priority, as sometimes they have to shelve their other tasks 
in order to prepare legal documents for these two clients on an ad hoc basis. 
4.3.4 Getting	  Started	  
Company A’s ELC development starts soon after Mr Lee signed the official contract 
with the Cambodian government. Since securing the ELC, Mr Lee has outsourced all of 
the land clearing tasks to a Malaysian company. The clearing work starts first with 25 
hectares on which Company A’s compound and nursery fields are constructed. The 
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compound consists of one-storey buildings with red-tiled roofs, and is fenced by one-
metre high wooden poles. The buildings are used for accommodation, offices, cafeteria, 
clinic, preschool and workshops. The accommodation buildings are named the 
Cambodian and Korean houses and are located in two different blocks and separated by 
a cafeteria building. All the rooms in the accommodation buildings are fully furnished 
and look similar. The Cambodian houses are close to the workshops and the entrance of 
the compound. The Korean house is located near the office, clinic and preschool 
buildings. It was Mr Lee’s idea to divide the accommodation as he is aware of the 
cultural differences between Koreans and Cambodians and he wanted to make his staff 
feel at home when they go back to their accommodation. Due to the remoteness of the 
ELC, provincial utility connections are not available for the company. Thus, Company 
A’s compound is powered by its own generators and supplied by water pumped from a 
well. 
While the company is building its compound on the ELC, Mr Lee starts to recruit full-
time Cambodian personnel in Phnom Penh. Employees are not immediately sent to the 
compound. Instead, the company rents a place for them to stay for about a month while 
the compound is being finished. During that month the company starts to set up its 
internal organisational structure and continues recruiting more employees. When 
Company A is officially opened, all the employees are assigned accommodation 
according to their nationalities. Company A organised a big official opening at the Ta 
Tey commune office, inviting government officials from responsible ministries, the 
provincial governor, the district governor, the commune and village chiefs and selected 
villagers. Each invited villager receives a free lunch at the commune office and a small 
gift (a sarong). 
The company’s first operation is the nursery fields which are opposite Company A’s 
compound. At that time, Company A did not have its own team to take care of the 
nursery fields, especially to do the grafting, so these tasks were outsourced to local 
contractors who hired their own day labourers that returned home after work. By mid 
2010, Company A stopped outsourcing the nursery works after it recruited a skilled 
supervisor who had more than 18 years of nursery experience.  
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4.4 Company	  A’s	  Embedding	  and	  Engaging	  Process	  
4.4.1 The	  Investor	  
Experience	  in	  Dealing	  with	  Government	  Administration	  
Lack of transparency within the government system is one major challenge in doing 
business in Cambodia. “That’s very unfair for foreign investors in Cambodia,” Mr Lee 
explains disappointedly. He says in his experience rules and regulations are different 
from their implementation, and that it is hard for foreigners who do serious business in 
Cambodia to accept the way the Cambodian government system works in facilitating 
business start-ups.  
In regards to the ELC acquisition, the paperwork is similar to a commercial land deal. 
“In Cambodia, to get a concession, we cannot get a concession without networks,” 
claims Mr Lee. As suggested by his remark, he looks for the ELC through his networks 
and meets brokers who claimed to be government officials. He visits the land that is 
available for economic concessions with the brokers before deciding to apply for the 
land concession. The brokers set a price for the land. After some negotiations, he 
decides which land concession to choose. The broker then takes care of the paperwork 
in applying for the ELC from the government. 
Operational	  Challenges	  
Mr Lee considers the plantation’s soil is one of the biggest challenges for the 
investment. There are four technical ratings on ELC soil quality in Cambodia, with the 
first rank the best quality soil. The soil quality of Company A’s land concession is rated 
fourth and is sandy, dry and infertile, which Mr Lee did not know when he decided to 
apply for this ELC. He is trying to improve its quality through soil analysis, using 
fertilizers appropriate for rubber trees and encouraging the staff to apply different but 
suitable plantation methods. 
In general, Mr Lee is pleased with his local Cambodian staff saying, “I am very satisfied 
with their work.” He mentions that his Cambodian staff have good technical knowledge 
as they are well educated and have lots of experience in rubber production. He trusts 
them and notices that they share the company’s vision. However, he admits that 
managing local staff is challenging for a foreigner due to cultural differences and he has 
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had to adjust his management techniques. Since starting Company A, his management 
style and the company’s structure have shifted from merely relying on Korean people to 
empowering and relying on local people in the company’s production. It took him a 
year to adapt his management to the local environment. Currently, Korean staff are in 
charge of the company’s administration, finance and mechanical issues, leaving the 
agricultural and technical issues to Cambodian staff. One of his strategies in dealing 
with misunderstandings is to pay more attention to staff members’ suggestions and 
encourage them to speak up. “I always tell my Korean directors that you have to listen 
to the ideas of Cambodian staff,” he says. As indicated in this remark, Mr Lee shows a 
lot of appreciation of his Cambodian staff’s technical knowledge. 
Another challenge in employing Cambodian staff is that the technical staff lack a 
strategic perspective. Due to Mr Lee’s management experience, he can easily spot this 
issue and address it effectively. “So, I ask, one step at a time,” he says. To handle this 
issue, he splits the staff’s job responsibilities into specific tasks according to the staff 
member’s capacity. He encourages managers to discuss the company’s work plan with 
their subordinates. Mr Lee also applies some Korean management strategies to his 
Cambodian staff. During staff orientation he puts all of the Cambodian newcomers in 
the same building on the compound for two months. They all have to get up at 6 am and 
jog together with him each morning. He also shares with the staff information about 
Korean culture and taboos. These are staff bonding strategies that Mr Lee uses when 
employing newcomers. He believes that the newcomers will feel they belong to a new 
family. He also encourages local staff to learn Korean through the free Korean language 
classes provided on the compound after office hours. 
Support	  from	  Sub-­‐national	  Government	  	  
Since living in Cambodia, Mr Lee has learnt a lot about Cambodian politics, especially 
the dynamics of the central government. He has built good relationships with some of 
the government’s high-ranking officials at the national level. In the initial phase of 
Company A’s operations, Mr Lee experienced some difficulties in dealing with sub-
national level government. 14   He expected the central and sub-national levels to 
coordinate well with each other and that the sub-national government would be 
                                                
14 Provincial, district, commune and village authorities 
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informed about his ELC contract and willing to support his company operation. 
However, the two government bodies are not well coordinated.  
Mr Lee reveals that during the first year of operations he did not establish any 
relationships with the provincial, district, commune and village authorities. He thought 
that since he had the legal right to operate the business in the ELC, the sub-national 
authorities would welcome and support his company’s operations. However, he soon 
realised that the system of the sub-national government works differently. Mr Lee 
admits that it is very difficult for a company to operate without support from the sub-
national authorities. After the first year, he changes his approach and starts to build 
relationships with the sub-national authorities, especially the provincial one. He even 
did personal favours for some provincial authorities, for instance hiring an official’s 
relatives to work for his other company in Phnom Penh.   
Contributions	  to	  Local	  People	  
Discussing the company’s relationship with local community, Mr Lee explains that “ … 
without that [company’s donation] it’s difficult to make good relations.” He further 
admits that building a good relationship with villagers living around the plantation is 
crucial for his agricultural business. Mr Lee has made a number of donations, including 
infrastructural contributions to services and to the local communities. On behalf of the 
company, he donates a bridge worth about USD 100,000 and rehabilitates a main road 
in the commune. Mr Lee also provides monthly scholarships to 25 high school students 
from poor families in the province where his ELC is located and has set up a preschool 
for children of the company’s labourers and residents of nearby villages. The 
company’s trucks collect the children from the villages and take them back home after 
school. However, at the time of the fieldwork the preschool was temporarily closed due 
to recent flooding and teachers not being available.  
Inside the compound, Mr Lee has set up a clinic that is attended by a Korean doctor on a 
24/7 basis. The clinic is also open to all residents in the nearby villages. The Korean 
doctor can communicate in simple Khmer, especially the words related to symptoms. 
He retired from practice and learned the Khmer language for 13 years in Korea. The 
doctor practices Korean traditional treatment and medicine. 
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Mr Lee also has a connection with a Korean hospital in Phnom Penh. The hospital is a 
Korean charity project and its mission is to help poor Cambodian people. Any severely 
sick employee is sent to this Korean hospital for treatment. Mr Lee also invites some 
Korean doctors from this hospital to do free check-ups for nearby villagers at Company 
A’s clinic every three to six months. 
Best	  Practice	  
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) conducts an annual 
evaluation of the development progress of all ELCs. Mr Lee reveals that the company 
receives the top score in MAFF’s 2012 ELC evaluation report. All the ELCs are 
assessed against each other based on their development progress according to their 
master plans. Company A is rated high for its good infrastructure and good ELC 
development progress. This evaluation makes Mr Lee feel good. Furthermore, this 
recognition may lead to new business opportunities for Company A. Firstly, he can 
assure his shareholders and the Korean government that he has used the invested money 
effectively, according to the plan. Secondly, he can attract more potential shareholders 
to join the business. Lastly, this recognition may facilitate the company’s interactions 
with the relevant authorities as he has established such a good company image. 
Another best practice, according to Mr Lee, is improving production. In the second year 
of planting, the survival rate of the rubber saplings went up to almost 95 per cent. This 
survival rate reassures him and the shareholders that Company A can have a successful 
rubber plantation business even with the poor quality soil in the ELC. 
Handling	  Land	  Disputes	  
Early on in the operation of the ELC, Company A encountered land conflicts not only 
with the local community but also another Cambodian ELC company. Company A and 
this Cambodian company have an overlapping area caused by an unclear approval from 
the provincial authorities that occurred due to a restructuring of provincial governmental 
institutions. The new provincial authority granted the Cambodian company the right to 
develop the area that had already been granted to Mr Lee by the national government. 
To deal with this Cambodian company, Mr Lee hires a consultant—a local person who 
knows the history of the land very well and has good connections with government 
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officials. After many interventions from the central government, the two companies 
have finally agreed to put their development activities in the overlapping area on hold.  
Some villagers claim that Company A has cleared six hectares of their farms located 
inside the ELC. Mr Lee has not provided compensation to any affected families in the 
community. He is confused and upset as he legally obtained the ELC land. However, he 
tries to avoid violent confrontations with the claimants. “Of cause, there are some illegal 
residents who claim ownership. Even in that case, we do not fight with them,” says Mr 
Lee. His approach in handling the land conflicts is to ask the affected families to report 
to the local authority. To avoid further land conflicts, he applies the “leopard skin 
policy”, in which each ELC is meant to skirt forest and land that is important to local 
communities, creating a patchwork of land holdings in the manner of a leopard’s skin; 
that is, the company’s plantations intermix with local residents’ plantations. The 
company only develops areas that have not been claimed by any local residents. Since 
the incident over the six hectares of land, Mr Lee has tried to avoid problems with 
villagers and there has been no further land conflict. The company is clearing land in 
other areas, but does not clear land that has crops. 
4.4.2 Company	  Employees	  
The Cambodian employees describe Mr Lee in their own terms as a friendly, caring, 
open, committed and a skillful boss. “He is neutral to all staff. He is not listening to 
only Korean staff, he balances with Cambodian staff,” says Participant 1.2. Many of the 
staff told the researcher that they feel empowered and encouraged by their boss to share 
their views. 
The Cambodian managers say they notice a big change in the company’s management 
style, especially in the agricultural department. During the first year of the plantation, 
Mr Lee recruited some Korean technical staff from Korea to manage the agriculture 
department. The Korean specialists were in charge of the planting techniques and work 
plan. Unfortunately, about 50 per cent of the first year’s rubber tree plantation died due 
to soil and weather conditions. The soil is of poor quality in the company’s plantation 
area and is not a good match for the rubber planting technique introduced by these 
Korean specialists.  
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Technically, in fertile land, rubber saplings can be planted in May. However, for 
Company A’s less fertile and sandy land and a typical short dry period during the wet 
season in Cambodia, the rubber saplings should be planted in August in order to survive. 
At the time, Cambodian staff tried to explain the local soil and weather conditions to the 
Korean experts and made some suggestions based on their experience. The suggestions 
were not adopted and the Cambodian staff’s good intentions were misunderstood by the 
Korean staff as showing disrespect for the Korean experts. As a result, the relationship 
between the Cambodian and Korean experts became fraught. Since then, there have 
been some conflicts between the Korean and Cambodian staff. However, neither party–
especially the Cambodians–took them to the management: “We dared not complain 
about them [the former Korean technical staff], although we don’t like them,” says 
Participant 1.4. They did not complain to the top management, as they were afraid of 
losing their jobs. The Cambodian staff tried to calm down and ignore the Korean 
technicians when necessary.   
The core problem was the different working cultures and perceptions of the Cambodian 
and the Korean technicians. According to the Cambodian staff, the Korean agriculture 
experts are not flexible. Instead of adapting to Cambodian conditions, they stick to their 
technical knowledge of Korean agriculture. After the first year’s huge loss, Mr Lee laid 
off the Korean experts and now uses local experts instead. As a result of that 
restructuring, the success rate of the second year’s production improved to an 
approximately 95 per cent survival rate of rubber trees. The Cambodian managers and 
staff are pleased with the survival rate of the planted rubber saplings in the second year. 
The Cambodian staff report that the current Korean experts are more friendly and 
cooperative than the former experts. For example, when something goes wrong, they 
give the staff a chance to explain before making any judgments. They then try to 
develop a solution as a team rather than pointing fingers and blaming staff. “Now, they 
listen more to me and follow my advice,” says Participant 1.4. The Cambodian staff say 
they are more willing to discuss their work problems with the current Korean directors 
than the former ones, as the current Korean management team is open and appreciates 
their ideas more than the previous team.  
Chapter 4: Case Study One 
 79 
The Cambodian managers and employees also report being happy with the working 
environment in the company and in their team. “I think the owner of this company is a 
real investor,” says Participant 1.3. They describe Mr Lee and the current Korean 
management team as friendly and modest. “… Based on my experience in working for 
countless rubber plantation companies, I think Company A is the best,” says Participant 
1.2. In addition to the friendly working environment, the Cambodian staff are happy 
with the fringe benefits such as free accommodation, utilities, food and other incentive 
policies such as rice rewards for staff who have never taken a day off and a 150 per cent 
overtime rate. 
Although he had a few small land conflicts with the local community, the Cambodian 
employees think that Mr Lee tries to build a good relationship with local people. 
Participant 1.4 says, “I think the company has done a lot for the local community.”  
Reflecting Mr Lee’s comments, the employees mention all the infrastructural and 
service contributions that Mr Lee and Company A have made to the local communities, 
in addition to the job opportunities provided. The Cambodian managers admire Mr 
Lee’s efforts in building and maintaining a good relationship with local residents. 
During the low season, Company A has to lay off some of the seasonal day labourers. 
Participant 1.2 reports Mr Lee’s lay-off strategy, explaining, “When we lay off some 
seasonal day labourers, we start with villagers who reside further from the plantation” 
and retains as many labourers as possible from the neighbouring villages. The company 
also donates some clothes to the labourers. Additionally, the company has a policy that 
if day labourers work 26 days straight per month, they receive rice as a bonus from the 
company. The company staff said that the relationship between Company A and the 
villagers has improved since the number of seasonal day labourers had increased.  
The agriculture manager, supervisors and labourers have a close relationship. For 
example, the labourers share their lunch with the manager during their lunch break. The 
manager can have a prepared lunch at the compound’s cafeteria, but instead he eats with 
the labourers. In the Cambodian rural context, this type of gesture means a lot to the 
labourers. Another example is that the supervisors drive all the way from their assigned 
section to the compound to buy snacks for the labourers with money they provide 
during their lunch break. 
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The Cambodian managers point out two major challenges for the company: the soil 
quality and seasonal day labour supply. To improve the soil quality, the company 
invests in natural and chemical fertilizers. This expense increases the operational cost of 
the production. However, the managers report being impressed with the owners’ 
commitment to making this business work by continuing to invest in fertilizers and 
trying other strategies to improve the soil quality. In relation to day labourers, they may 
have other job opportunities with a comparable daily rate in their villages during peak 
season and they may prefer to work there rather than on the ELC. The managers 
acknowledge that to work for the company, the labourers have to get up early in the 
morning (approximately 3 am) to get ready for the company trucks to pick them up 
from various meeting points. Moreover, young villagers, especially females, tend to 
look for factory jobs in Phnom Penh rather than stay in the village. 
Therefore, to attract more day labourers, the managers have changed some of rules for 
the company’s truck drivers. Previously, the truck drivers had to come back to the 
compound every night after sending the labourers back to the villages and to leave early 
in the morning to collect the labourers from the villages. The new regulations are that 
truck drivers can stay overnight at the village(s) where they drop off the labourers. The 
drivers start to collect the labourers from that village(s) the next morning, saving them 
travelling time. The new strategy is reported to be more effective and efficient for all 
parties. The drivers have more time to sleep, as they do not need to get up so early in the 
morning and arrive back to the compound very late at night. Moreover, they spend less 
time on the roads, so the company spends less on gasoline. The seasonal day labourers 
do not need to get up as early either as the trucks will come to collect them later than 
they previously did. Moreover, the company has shortened the two-hour lunch break to 
a one-hour break, so the labourers can get off work an hour earlier and arrive home 
sooner. 
4.4.3 Seasonal	  Labourers	  
There are more jobs in the commune since Company A has started operating in Ta Tey 
commune. The company provides job opportunities to the local villagers in the form of 
full-time positions and as seasonal day labourers. On average, Company A absorbs 
around 250 labourers per day from local communities. The company needs the seasonal 
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day labourers six days per week to do tasks such as clearing debris, weeding, digging, 
planting, spraying pesticide and applying fertilizers and chemicals.   
The seasonal day labourers state that the workload is not heavy. The labourers have 
never actually talked to Mr Lee or other Korean directors due to the language barrier. 
However, they reported that Mr Lee is friendly to the labourers. He always smiles at 
them, even though he cannot speak Khmer. Sometimes, Mr Lee picks up some seasonal 
day labourers in his own car whenever he is going in the same direction as them.  
There is no reported worker abuse in the company. The labourers report that Company 
A’s Cambodian managers and supervisors have never used bad language with them. 
Participant 1.17 explained this further: “No, not at all. Supervisors even give labourers 
compliments.” The labourers are accountable to their direct supervisors; if they have 
any problems they go directly to their supervisors. Some of the supervisors are from 
local communities, making communication more effective. The labourers feel 
comfortable discussing their problems and the supervisors easily understand them. As 
much as they like working for the company, the seasonal day labourers did complain 
about getting up early for the pick-up by the company’s trucks. 
The company provides steady jobs with regular earnings for local labourers who 
reported that steady wages have contributed to improved living standards. The seasonal 
labourers are unskilled and poor and their income is dependent on selling their labour. 
Before the arrival of the company, most of the labourers said they had to look for jobs 
every day and everywhere. Sometimes during planting season, if they were lucky, they 
could get jobs for up to four days per week in their village. However, this was rare. “I 
used to migrate to Thailand. I paid Riel 200,000 (Approximately USD 50) to the guide 
who could take me cross the border. But, sometimes, there was no job and we risked our 
life to escape from the Thai soldiers’ shooting,” says Participant 1.17, indicating that 
some labourers even had to migrate to other places or countries to look for jobs. They 
have to leave home and pay the cost of transportation and accommodation. So although 
the wage rate is higher, the labourers complain that after paying expenses, the 
remittance they can send home to their family is small. Besides, they feel lonely and 
miss their family back home. Some labourers had terrible experiences of being cheated 
by their supervisors in previous jobs when supervisors ran away with labourers’ wages. 
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Despite these generally positive reports, some seasonal day labourers complain about 
their work environment. They say they feel pressure whenever they see Korean 
directors doing spot checks, although the directors have never said anything. “The work 
is OK, but sometimes when the Koreans come to do the spot checks at our workstation, 
we can’t take a break. We feel like to have to work,” says Participant 1.9. To them, the 
Korean directors look strict and they think they have to work harder whenever the 
directors are around.  
Some seasonal day labourers share their neighbours’ views on the adverse effects of 
Company A’s investment in their community, with Participant 1.8 saying, “I think 
Company A does not benefit the local people as they clear the villagers’ land and keep 
our cattle away from the places that they used to look for food.”  This indicates that 
although some villagers have jobs with Company A, they are not entirely happy with 
the company’s arrival in their community due to land conflicts and changes in their 
daily way of life.  
4.4.4 Local	  Community	  
Socioeconomic	  Contributions	  
Most of Company A’s day labourers come from seven of the 11 villages in the Ta Tey 
commune. The main occupations in that commune are growing rice, cashew nuts, 
cassava and jackfruit. Other occupations include collecting forest by-products. Not 
many residents in the Sralang village work for Company A, compared to other villages. 
Although they are Company A’s neighbours, most Sralang villagers have alternative 
income sources such as collecting wood from nearby forests and/or working on their 
own farms. Villagers in the Ta Tey commune who do not work for Company A are not 
happy with its presence, complaining that the company does not benefit their local 
communities. They acknowledge that while Company A has created jobs for local 
labourers, it pays them at a local rate. Due to the foreign status of Company A, locals 
expect the company to offer higher pay rates than the local ones. Thus, in the villagers’ 
view, the labourers earn very little from Company A’s jobs.  
Another issue that concerns locals is the impact of Company A on their daily farming 
activities: “I don’t like this, my cows used to walk freely, but not anymore,” says 
Participant 1.23. Others —especially those from neighbouring villages—complained 
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that the company interferes with their daily routine in raising cattle. Their cattle used to 
look for food inside Company A’s ELC area, but now locals have to tie up their cattle or 
feed them somewhere else. However, some villagers from the local communities are 
optimistic about Company A’s contribution in the future, with Participant 1.22 saying, 
“I think, maybe in the future, we can benefit something from this company, but not 
now.” Some villagers hope that Company A will provide more and better-paid job 
opportunities for local people in the future.   
Infrastructural	  Contributions	  
In the Ta Tey commune, there is one main road that connects the villages to national 
roads. Its villagers, especially those who reside along the main road, complain about the 
destruction of the commune road since the arrival of Company A. Despite some road 
maintenance, the villagers claim that the road has never been the same. The Sralang 
villagers, in particular, complain about major damage on their village’s main road 
caused by Company A’s water diversion during the flooding period, which left a three-
metre chasm in the road. The villagers built a wooden bridge to connect the road. 
However, daily travelling is still interrupted as the wooden bridge is not strong enough 
to support a car because of its poor construction. 
Villagers whose children have attended Company A’s preschool are happy with its 
curriculum. They report that their children have learned some English words. Their 
children travel to and from the preschool on Company A’s trucks. However, the 
villagers say that the preschool has not been in session since the flood. They told the 
researcher they were looking forward to the resumption of the preschool. The local 
residents have used the free health check-ups provided by Company A. The company 
informs them by word of mouth about the free health check-ups, which do not include 
laboratory tests. Rather they provide physical, oral and blood pressure examinations. 
Doctors may provide medications to some villagers. Not all villagers make use of these 
free health check-ups and/or the preschool provided by Company A. Some are either 
not interested in the services or are busy on the free health check-up days. However, 
residents from local communities view the preschool and health-check up services as 
additional benefits from the investment of Company A. Yet, they are still concerned that 
adverse effects, including land disputes, may outweigh the benefits they receive.   
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Land	  Disputes	  
The villagers have no clear idea about state land. To them, the ELC land is forest land 
that everybody in their community can access and use. Some even claim to have 
cultivated the land inside the ELC area for 20 years. They did not know how Company 
A secured the land from the government, as there was no free and prior consent from 
them before the government signed the contract with Mr Lee. The villagers were not 
consulted when the government staff from the line ministries conducted the ELC 
assessments. 
According to the ELC lease, the Ta Prom and Sralang villages and some of the 
farmlands of the nearby villagers are excluded from the total land concession given to 
Company A. The central government and Company A agree on this exclusion. However, 
the villagers are not informed about this exclusion on Company A’s ELC map. The 
billboard at Company A’s entrance causes more confusion about the company’s 
territory. The map only shows the total coverage of Company A’s ELC without any 
explanation of the agreed-upon excluded areas. The lack of secure land tenure and 
consultation has worried the affected villagers, especially the people living in the Ta 
Prom and Sralang villages who live in fear of losing the land on which they were born 
and grew up to Company A. The company seems to have taken no action to address the 
villagers’ fears and confusion. To make matters worse, Company A’s representatives 
have said to the affected families that their land holding status should be the 
responsibility of the government and not the company. 
The residents of two of the four affected villages, Ta Pring and Narith, sought an 
intervention from a human-rights NGO in the provincial town. Two hundred and 
seventy-seven families from Ta Pring and Narith villages filed a petition about the land 
disputes with Company A to the human-rights NGO which helps them to set up a 
community organisation and elect a representative to act as a community leader. The 
NGO only works with the affected families and does not deal directly with Company A. 
The affected families formally established an organisation with a licence from the 
Ministry of Interior. It has a proper organisational structure, with a president (the 
community leader), vice presidents, secretaries and members. The main reason behind 
establishing the community organization is to have a stronger voice at the negotiation 
table with Company A. Among the 277 families, only two have their land farmed by the 
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company and one of the two affected families is the community leader. The other 225 
families still have normal access to their claimed land. However, they are concerned 
that the land will be cleared by the company in the future. The affected families 
reported the land disputes to the commune council and provincial governor and sought 
their intervention.  
Responding to the complaint, the provincial governor’s office issued a letter asking 
Company A to temporarily stop clearing the land in the disputed areas. However, the 
affected families claimed that Company A only stopped clearing the land during the day, 
but continued to clear it at night. As a result, six hectares of cashew nut farms were 
cleared by the clearing team. Worried that the clearing team might clear all the land, the 
affected families took action to protect their lands. They collectively protested against 
the clearing team, demanding it stop clearing the area. The protest became a headline in 
a well-known newspaper in Cambodia next day. No protestor or any member of the 
clearing team was injured during the protest action and the protests stopped once the 
clearing team moved away from the area. The two affected families then referred the 
case to the Court because they want compensation from Company A. At the time of 
writing this dissertation, the dispute had not been resolved. 
In contrast, the affected families in the Sralang and Ta Prom villages use a traditional 
land dispute resolution practice—bringing their case to the village chiefs. The village 
chiefs play an important role as representatives of the affected families and deal directly 
with Company A. The affected villagers think that this mechanism works, but only on a 
temporary basis as the village chiefs have to intervene every time the affected families 
report spotting the clearing team near their farms. Although they are concerned about 
their land holding status, the Sralang and Ta Prom villagers trust their village chiefs to 
mediate fairly in handling the land issues with Company A, as the village chief’s land is 
also affected. The village chiefs report the land issues to Ta Tey’s commune chief who 
sets up meetings for the village chiefs and Company A’s management. However, 
Company A’s Korean directors never attend these meetings, only Cambodian 
employees participate as the company’s representative. At the time of writing this 
dissertation, there has been no solution or compensation offered by the company to the 
affected families. 
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The local people claim that Mr Lee does not want to have a relationship with the 
villagers, and distances himself from them. Apart from the day labourers, local people 
have never met Mr Lee. Moreover, the image of his investment in the local 
communities is not positive. Whenever they talk about Mr Lee’s company, the first 
thing they mention is the land conflict created by this company. While villagers 
acknowledge the contribution of Company A to creating jobs most, excluding local 
business owners, would prefer not to have Company A in their neighbourhood. 
4.4.5 Local	  Business	  Owners	  
Company A has limited direct transactions with local businesses. The company did hire 
some sub-contractors to do grafting of the rubber trees15 during its first year of 
operation, but the sub-contractors were laid off when Company A set up its own nursery 
team. But the company does deal with local rubber seed suppliers in a nearby province. 
Indirectly, it has spurred business opportunities for local communities to some extent. 
Some businesses started up and expanded after the arrival of the company when its day 
labourers had a more steady income. There are many small stands in the villages that 
sell beverages, snacks, vegetables, fruits, meat, rice, oil, cigarettes, logs, charcoal and 
gasoline. The start-up process is simple and easy. Due to the scale of the business—a 
micro-business with one person—the stand owners do not need to register their business 
start-up with the commune office. The stand owners normally use their savings or a loan 
from relatives for business start-ups and expansion. Only a few of them use credit from 
microfinance institutes or NGOs to expand their business. Half of the stands have 
started since the arrival of Company A. The new stands are normally run by newcomers. 
These micro-businesses have no direct business relationship with Company A. Their 
customers are local villagers and Company A’s seasonal day labourers. 
Internally, Company A generates entrepreneurship opportunities for its staff and their 
family members. One spouse is able to shift from being a full-time housewife to a 
storeowner. Her husband is a supervisor in Company A and she and her children moved 
in with her husband to the company accommodation. The company hired her as a store 
assistant to sell snacks and soft drink. When the company decided to close down the 
store, she bought it from Company A and now runs it by herself. 
                                                
15 A horticultural technique used in order to get good rubber tree seedlings to put in a plantation. For more 
information, visit: http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/ad221e/ad221e03.htm 
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Another supervisor bought a plot of land so he could have a rubber tree nursery field. 
He started his business after the company successfully planted rubber trees in its second 
year. Rubber is a new crop in the Ta Tey commune, which normally plants cashew nut 
trees. So local villagers start to convert their cashew nut or other cash crop farms into 
rubber plantations The supervisor sees local market opportunities and he and his family 
start their own nursery supplying rubber saplings to local buyers. He employs an 
attractive marketing strategy by offering a free planting service to customers who buy 
the rubber saplings but have no experience in planting rubber trees. 
4.4.6 Commune	  and	  Village	  Authorities	  
The commune councillors and village chiefs do not know about the acquisition process 
of the economic land concession (ELC) and were not informed when the government 
decided to grant land in the Ta Tey commune as a concession to Mr Lee. As Participant 
1.25 explains, “They may get an order from somebody on the top, that’s what we 
thought. Later on, we found out that it was Company A when they built their 
compound”. The commune and village authorities did not even know that land in their 
commune had been granted as an ELC to a private company. The land concessions 
always come as a surprise to them: “They didn’t give me any notice in advance about 
their investment plan in this commune. I knew them when they came to operate their 
business,” adds Participant 1.25. According to the commune councillor, neither the 
central government nor Company A informs the commune about the ELC granting 
decision prior to the company beginning its operations.  
A commune councillor describes the relationship between Mr Lee and the commune 
council as not close: “The problem with this company is that they don’t cooperate with 
local villagers or authority,” says Participant 1.25. The other commune councillors 
agree that Mr Lee does not show them any respect, as he does not attend meetings held 
at the commune office. The councillors expect Mr Lee to attend meetings to discuss the 
reported land disputes and concerns with representatives from the affected families. 
However, the commune councillors notice that Mr Lee has become more cooperative 
with the local authorities in comparison to the first year of the company’s operation 
when he ignored all calls for a meeting with local communities. The councillors report 
that Mr Lee now sends Cambodian staff to join the meetings at the commune office. 
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4.4.7 Provincial	  Authorities	  
According to a deputy chief of the provincial hall, the provincial government is happy 
with and welcomes all the ELC investors in this province. He believes that it is the best 
way to improve the villagers’ living standards. Moreover, granting ELCs will help 
protect land from illegal land encroachment. However, the provincial authorities 
acknowledge that causing land conflicts can be a drawback of the ELC policy and may 
interrupt companies’ contribution to the local community. Thus, the authorities try to 
facilitate resolution of such land disputes. The facilitation provided by the provincial 
government is to organise a negotiation meeting for both parties: the affected families 
and Company A. He says that he personally wants to see the affected villagers and 
Company A find a win-win solution. He recommends that the company should consider 
offering compensation to the affected families. 
4.5 Summary	  
Company A is a private agricultural business that has invested in a rubber plantation on 
an almost 10,000-hectare ELC located in the Ta Tey commune. This company is 
founded by Mr Lee and financed by him, an investment from a Korean friend and a 
Korean government’s Greenfield investment loan. Mr Lee has established three 
companies in Cambodia. With no prior knowledge of agricultural business, he has 
successfully managed to operate two companies in agriculture and overcome 
operational challenges. In most cases the company’s successful operations are assisted 
by local staff knowledge and experience. 
Company A’s investment is not well regarded by the local community. As well as 
creating jobs for villagers, Mr Lee has made infrastructural contributions to the local 
community. However, his contributions are not well appreciated by the community. As 
a result, Company A’s and Mr Lee’s relationship with local stakeholders remains distant. 
There are gaps between the central government, sub-national government and local 
community concerning assessing and granting the ELC that prevent Mr Lee and the 
community from benefitting from Company A’s investment.  
  
Chapter	  5: Case	  Study	  Two	  
5.1 Introduction	  
This chapter is a case study of Company B—a Korean company that has a 70-year 
legitimate lease to clear and plant rubber on an almost 10,000-hectare economic land 
concession (ELC) in a remote area in Cambodia. This second case study is built on 
qualitative data gathered between July and November 2012 and also serves as 
background for the discussion in Chapters 7 and 8. This case describes how Company B 
obtained and operates the 70-year ELC, given its foreign status. It then introduces one 
of the main actors, who is rarely mentioned in the discussion about foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) and local development—the company investor. The case study also 
brings together the perspectives of different stakeholders, revealing different interests 
and gaps among stakeholders of an ELC investment.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the researcher’s journey 
to the field and highlights her experiences and research methods. The third section 
presents the profile and operations of Company B, describes how it was acquired and 
started to develop its ELC, the personal and professional background of Mr Jeong16—
one of its two founders—and how he manages the agricultural business in Cambodia. 
The fourth section discusses the views of the stakeholders regarding the impact of the 
investment on the local community. The final section summarises the chapter. 
5.2 Journey	  to	  Company	  B	  
The researcher’s journey to Company B’s plantation begins in Phnom Penh. Similar to 
Case Study One, she visits two human rights NGOs in the province where Company 
B’s ELC is located. However, the NGOs do not have any contacts in the company. 
Although there have been land conflicts on Company B’s ELC, the NGOs have not 
received any requests for interventions from the affected families. The researcher then 
returns to her Cambodian networks in Phnom Penh and manages to get contact details 
of a representative from Company B who is based at the company’s ELC. After 
telephoning the contact and identifying herself and requesting an interview, the 
                                                
16 All names of places and people in this case study are pseudonyms to safeguard the participants’ privacy. 
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company representative agrees to be interviewed at the company’s plantation. That is 
the starting point for her journey to Company B.  
Her first field trip to Company B’s plantation is somewhat adventurous as it is located 
in a deep and remote forest with poor accessibility—the main road to the ELC has been 
partially rehabilitated. On the first day, the researcher stops along the way to ask some 
small stand owners for directions to the ELC. What intrigues her most is that even those 
closest to the plantation know very little about this company. They are not sure what 
exactly the company does within the granted ELC. These responses make the researcher 
wonder how a million-dollar investment in a Cambodian rural area manages to stay so 
disconnected from its surrounding local community.  
The researcher has to identify herself to security guards at two different military-like 
security checkpoints on the way to the company’s plantation. At the first checkpoint are 
four security guards wearing light brown uniforms. The guards look fit with fair skin. 
Conversations with them reveal that they are from outside the local community. They 
live at a four by four-metre wooden and stilt house near the checkpoint. All visitors, 
including members of the local community, must seek permission to enter the 
company’s plantation. The second checkpoint looks older than the first one and has two 
guards wearing military uniforms. Machine guns are hanging at a left side of this 
checkpoint. The guards have dark skin and look firm and thin. They look like army 
personnel who have lived in the forest for many years. Their accommodation near the 
checkpoint is not well established; they live in a thatched tent and sleep in hammocks.  
Company B’s representative is expecting the researcher as she has called to confirm 
their interview appointment prior to her departure. He is in his early 40s with fair skin 
and is waiting, with 10 other men wearing military uniforms, for the researcher at an 
open living area under an eight by ten-metre wooden stilt house. Some of the men are 
playing cards, while others are playing Cambodian chess. There are three other smaller 
wooden houses nearby. The houses are the accommodation for the representative and 
his team and are the only shelters that the researcher sees after passing the first 
checkpoint.  
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Company B’s plantation looks very different from Company A’s as the former is not 
well organized and quiet. Rubber trees are patchily planted and roads inside the 
plantation are not well constructed. Instead of spreading out around at the rubber fields, 
labourers are resting at their accommodation in the middle of the ELC and it is only 
2:00 pm. There is no sign of Korean personnel at the plantation. Moreover, the strong 
presence of men in military uniforms equipped with weapons at the ELC makes it looks 
more like a Cambodian-elite owned plantation than an FDI owned one. The situation 
puzzles the researcher. All of these first impressions make the researcher curious to find 
out what has happened internally and externally to the company.  
5.3 Company	  Profile	  and	  Operations	  
5.3.1 Company	  Profile	  and	  Organisational	  Arrangement	  
Company B is an agricultural investment project of a Korean conglomerate. The 
conglomerate is a publicly listed and Korea-based company engaging in manufacturing 
of carbon prepregs, heat insulation panels and glass paper products. This conglomerate 
is also involved in a wholesale and export proxy business and a resource development 
business. Company B communicates directly with the conglomerate company in Korea, 
but all financial transactions are facilitated by a proxy company based in Hong Kong. In 
addition to investment from the Korean conglomerate, Company B has also received a 
Greenfield investment loan from the Korean government, with a three per cent annual 
interest rate. Company B’s financial flow is depicted in Figure 5.1. The company’s 
profile is summarised in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The Financial Flow of Company B 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
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Figure 5.2: Company B's Profile 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
More	  About	  Company	  B’s	  Staff	  Arrangement	  
Company B’s top and middle management are based in Phnom Penh. Only supervisors, 
security guards and labourers are based at the plantation in the Sambo commune. Prior 
to 2012, Company B did not have its own labourers, only supervisors and security 
guards stationed at the plantation. During the researcher’s fieldwork, the company was 
in the process of revising its organisational structure to accommodate labourers it 
recruited. One of the supervisors is assigned to design a labourer management structure. 
The company’s organizational structure can be summarised in Figure 5.3.  
Company B’s Profile 
Business activities:  Rubber plantation and development 
Investment capital:  About USD 3 million 
Economic land concession:  Almost 10,000 hectares  
Products:  Semi-processed rubber gel for export 
(Potential) markets:  China and Korea 
Progress (as of Nov 2012): Planted 17 per cent of the total economic land concession 
Staff arrangements:  (For an overview see Figure 5.4) 
• Korean personnel:  A president (co-founder), a vice-president (Mr Jeong), and an intern 
• Full-time Cambodian personnel (28 employees): A project manager, supervisors, skilled 
staff, drivers, security staff, and cooking staff 
• Cambodian labourers: 140 labourers  
Staff benefits:  
• Korean intern:  Salary and three Korean meals per day 
• Full-time Cambodian personnel: office-based personnel receive salary and three meals per 
day. Plantation-based personnel receive a salary, unfurnished accommodation, utilities, rice 
and a motorbike along with regular gasoline supply (only for supervisors)  
• Cambodian labourers: 380,000 riels (USD 95) monthly salary (in 2012), unfurnished 
accommodation, utilities and 25 kg of rice supply per month  
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Figure 5.3: The Organisational Structure of Company B 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015  
5.3.2 Recruitment	  and	  Capacity	  Building	  	  
Company B employs formal, informal, direct and indirect recruitment practices, which 
can be classified into four approaches: the Korean management team’s networks, 
employees’ networks, mass media, and a third-party company. The first approach is 
used to recruit the main sub-contractors for large outsourcing contracts. The selection 
criteria for this approach are mainly based on trust and recommendation. The second, 
third and fourth approaches are used to recruit skilled employees and labourers.  
Company B does not to have clear capacity-building policies for Cambodian employees. 
Unlike Mr Lee of Company A, Mr Jeong has never arranged any in-house capacity 
training or invited speakers to share hands-on expertise with his Cambodian manager 
and supervisors at the company plantation. The company staff—especially those who 
are based in the plantation—have not received proper training or been made aware of 
the company’s capacity-building policies. The only training that supervisors received 
was report-writing coaching provided by the project manager. The supervisors perform 
their daily tasks based on previous work experience and knowledge. The labourers 
receive on-the-job training from the supervisors or other labourers who have more 
knowledge about the tasks. 
President	  (KO)	  
Vice	  president	  (KO)	  
Admin/Accountant	  (CAM)	  
Drivers	  and	  Cook	  (CAM)	  
Project	  Manager	  (CAM)	  
Security	  Guards	  (CAM)	   Field	  Supervisors	  (CAM)	  
Workers	  (CAM)	   Subcontractors'	  teams	  (CAM)	  
Sub-­‐subcontractors	  (CAM)	  
Interns	  (KO)	  
Note:            denotes independent from Company B  
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Only the project manager has received a capacity-building opportunity from the 
company. He was sponsored and financially supported to pursue a Masters degree 
programme in Business Management at a university in Phnom Penh. However, due to 
his dissatisfaction with the quality of the course and his busy work schedule he gave up 
the programme after the first year. Mr Jeong has since then encouraged the project 
manager to pursue a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) programme in Phnom Penh. 
The project manager is satisfied with the CPA course, but the pressure of business trips 
to the plantation, his workload and class assignments force him to postpone his CPA 
study in the second term. He plans to resume the course as soon as the revised staff 
management system is finalised. 
5.3.3 About	  the	  Investor	  
Getting	  to	  Know	  the	  Investor,	  Mr	  Jeong	  
“Soursadey, sok sabay te?,”17 says Mr Jeong, with a smile while offering his hand to 
greet the researcher. He looks more mature than his age (early 30s) with an American 
English accent and is able to communicate in basic Khmer language. Mr Jeong is one of 
the two Korean founders of Company B. He completed a Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA) qualification in the United States with his best friend, the other founder of 
Company B. These two friends have known each other since high school. Mr Jeong has 
a business family background. Although his father runs a business in Korea, he has 
never been involved in it, deciding instead to pursue his own business venture in a 
foreign country.  
Besides managing Company B in Phnom Penh, Mr Jeong makes time to learn the 
Khmer language as he believes that being able to communicate in the local language is 
essential for his business success. The effort he puts into learning the language is 
evident when he tries to make some simple conversation in Khmer and picks up some 
Khmer words from the conversations he hears. He admits that if he had a second chance, 
he would have learned more Khmer language before starting the business in Cambodia, 
saying, “I would have spent at least two years to learn the language and culture.” This is 
                                                
17 Khmer language. The sentence is translated as “Hello, how are you?” in English.  
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one of the reasons why he recommends to any new interns from Korea that they should 
study Khmer when they do their internship at Company B.18 
Mr Jeong seems to focus solely on the company’s internal affairs rather than socializing 
with other Korean investors in Cambodia. Neither he nor his business partner has ever 
joined any business associations or taken part in any business association activities. 
“We were here before those investors, we don’t get anything from them by joining a 
Korean association,” Mr Jeong explained. He sees himself and his business partner as 
pioneers in the agriculture sector in Cambodia and does not perceive diverse business 
networks as beneficial. 
Mr	  Jeong’s	  Journey	  to	  Cambodia	  and	  Interest	  in	  Agriculture	  
“Only here [in Cambodia] we can have a tax holiday up to six years,” says Mr Jeong as 
a way of explaining his reason for investing in Cambodia. Soon after their graduation, 
Mr Jeong and his best friend (Company B’s president) moved to Cambodia looking for 
business opportunities in this least developed country. They were intrigued by the 
investment incentives offered by the Cambodia government for large-scale agricultural 
investment, such as the six-year tax holiday and ELCs. Through some high-ranking 
government officers, Mr Jeong and the president are introduced to a Cambodian tycoon 
named Okhna19 Odom who has businesses related to large-scale agricultural land 
investments (the Okhna secures a few ELCs and is also known to foreign investors as an 
ELC broker). Learning about investments in ELCs from Okhna Odom, the two Koreans 
become interested in a rubber plantation business in Cambodia. That is the starting point 
for Mr Jeong’s agricultural business venture, leading to the official opening of 
Company B in 2010.  
                                                
18 Each intern receives a Khmer-Korean language training kit from Company B. 
19 This is a title “to honour Cambodian business people making financial contributions in excess of 
US$100,000 to national development projects,” Verver and Dahles (2014, p. 1). 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 96 
 
Figure 5.4: Company B's Economic Land Concession Acquisition 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
Mr	  Jeong’s	  Business	  Management	  
“They [the main subcontractor] also outsource the work to other small subcontractors,” 
says Mr Jeong explaining Company B’s business arrangement. He distantly manages 
the operations at the ELC as his company outsources most of its business operations at 
the ELC to subcontractors and has the project manager and supervisors regularly 
monitor the subcontractors’ tasks. Thus, he is mainly based in his office in Phnom Penh, 
and visits the plantation quarterly to monitor progress of the development. He would 
visit the plantation more often if the Cambodian employees cannot handle any 
outstanding issues. Due to poor infrastructure inside the plantation, including 
accommodation facilities, Mr Jeong and the project manager always stay in a 
guesthouse about an hour’s drive from the ELC, visiting the plantation in the morning 
and returning to the guesthouse each evening.  
Although he is physically based in the Phnom Penh, Mr Jeong is actively involved in 
the business management of Company B. He regularly follows up on progress of the 
plantation, designs and oversees the staff management strategy, and produces financial, 
Company B’s Economic Land Concession Acquisition 
Application type:  A private investor initiated proposal 
Processing time:  13 months  
Requested ELC size: More than 10,000 hectares 
Technical evaluation: 6-day mission to assess the proposed ELC 
Evaluation results:  About 70 per cent of the proposed ELC covers some part of forest land and 
affects local people’s land in two communes: Sneng Krobey (three villages) 
and Srey Santhor (six villages). However, the overlapping land in Sneng 
Krobey commune (Kreng Sangke village) is regarded as lawful possession by 
villagers.   
RGC decisions: Around 40 per cent of the proposed ELC to be deducted to avoid the 
overlapping areas 
Leasing period:  70 years (with a deposit of USD 1 per hectare) 
Annual rent: Not stated in the signed ELC contract  
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quarterly and annual progress reports for the parent company and the Korean 
government’s Greenfield investment loan body. Mr Jeong is also keen to improve the 
cash flow during the second year of the ELC’s development, so in 2012 he hired a 
subcontractor to plant cassava in the spaces between the rows of rubber saplings. 
Unfortunately, the cassava yields were disappointing. The company’s cassava 
plantations yielded 50 per cent less than local production. Mr Jeong later discovered 
that the responsible subcontractor failed to take good care of the cassava plants, even 
though Mr Jeong tried to visit the plantation often during planting. 
5.3.4 Getting	  Started	  
Company B first signed an ELC contract with the Royal Government of Cambodia 
under a different name, which was not in the official record of the Council for the 
Development of Cambodia’s (CDC) database. Two years later the original name is 
changed to “Company B” and recorded in the CDC database as a Korean FDI. In 2010 
the company started developing the ELC by outsourcing land clearing and planting of 
rubber saplings to Okhna Odom, who was the only direct subcontractor of Company B 
until 2012.  
But Okhna Odom does not own heavy machinery or equipment or have a large enough 
workforce to perform the tasks. As a result, he sub-contracts the land clearing and 
rubber tree planting and maintenance to other Cambodian contractors from provinces 
outside the local community. Many of these contractors are husband and wife teams. 
The Cambodian contractors then hire their own labourers and charge the Okhna on a 
lump-sum basis according to the clearing and planting undertaken.  
During the first two years of the ELC development, the company recruited a few 
supervisors to monitor progress of the Okhna Odom team in regards to plantation 
development. The company sends its project manager to evaluate the progress report 
submitted by the Okhna Odom team and the company’s supervisors every three months. 
According to the subcontracting agreement with Company B, Okhna Odom’s team has 
to take care of the rubber saplings for one year then Company B will take over 
maintenance of the rubber trees from this team in the second year.  
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 98 
During the researcher’s fieldwork, 34 per cent of the total ELC is cleared. About half 
has been planted with rubber trees and taken over by Company B since February 2012. 
The company then hires another subcontractor to recruit labourers and begins to have its 
own nursery field and labourers. Back in the office, Company B also starts to recruit 
more supervisors and security guards for the plantation, as it is understaffed. The 
company has provided temporary accommodation at the plantation for the labourers and 
the supervisors since 2012. Although it takes responsibility for the tasks at the 
plantation, it still maintains a business relationship with Okhna Odom by subcontracting 
the clearing and compound construction contracts to his team.  
5.4 Company	  B’s	  Embedding	  and	  Engaging	  Process	  
5.4.1 The	  Investor	  
Experience	  in	  Dealing	  with	  Government	  Administration	  
Mr Jeong does not encounter any red tape in the ELC acquisition, as neither he nor the 
other founder ever deal directly with the Cambodian government. Company B obtains 
the ELC through Okhna Odom, which is a common practice for foreign companies in 
acquiring ELCs in Cambodia. Okhna Odom takes care of all of the ELC paperwork, 
including requests for changing the company’s name and revising the developmental 
master plan.  
In Cambodia it is common for the national government to make regulatory changes 
without prior consultation. This is a major challenge for Mr Jeong’s business and 
Company B’s survival. As an investor he expects some support from the Cambodian 
government in facilitating his business operations. However, instead of getting support, 
a change in government policy leads to his company losing some of the land. He says, 
“It’s like a nightmare. Even the [Cambodian] government could do this to us, and there 
is nothing we could do about it. We don’t know exactly how much land we’re losing.” 
In Mr Jeong’s view, the Cambodian government is not encouraging FDI into the 
country.  
He is confused and disappointed by the government’s decision to revoke some parts of 
the land concession granted to Company B before the general elections without prior 
consultation. The government decided to consider issuing land titles to claimants over 
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unresolved land conflicts with Company B. To minimise the expected adverse effects of 
the government’s new land title policy, Mr Jeong seeks an intervention from the Korean 
embassy in Cambodia. However, this issue is beyond the embassy’s control, and he 
does not receive a satisfactory response.   
Operational	  Challenges	  
When asked about his experience of doing business with Cambodian business people, 
Mr Jeong says “It’s very tough [doing business with Cambodian subcontractors],” with 
a disappointed expression. Most of the soil in Company B’s plantation is fertile, 
especially the areas overlapping with some of the villagers. Thus, caring for the rubber 
saplings is not a challenge for Company B. However, he reports that dealing with 
subcontractors is very challenging.  
According to the master plan, the ELC’s development tasks are subcontracted to Okhna 
Odom on an annual basis. All the expected outputs, time frame and budget are detailed 
in the annual outsourcing contract. The company pays 20 per cent up front for each task. 
During the first year, the outsourcing contract lists all the tasks in detail, but the 
responsibilities of Company B are not clearly stated and make it difficult for Mr Jeong 
and his employees to deal with the subcontractor’s team. Learning from this experience, 
the subsequent contracts clearly identify Company B’s responsibilities, especially in 
performing monitoring of the subcontractors’ performance.  
Based on his experience of dealing with Cambodian subcontractors, Mr Jeong reports 
that they can be irresponsible and unreliable and need close monitoring: “…they [the 
subcontractors] don’t care about the company. They only think about how they can 
make money out of this company.” He expresses disappointment that the subcontractors 
do not share the company’s goals, even after working for Company B for some time. Mr 
Jeong admits that language barriers are another challenge in dealing with the 
Cambodian subcontractors. “We always have to talk and discuss, but because I can’t 
speak Khmer, and there’re some kinds of limitation,” he adds. The subcontractor’s team 
who are based in the plantation speaks neither Korean nor English. To overcome the 
language barrier, Mr Jeong hires a Khmer–Korean language interpreter. However, this 
strategy does not work effectively, due to some ethical issues regarding confidential 
information. After the interpreter fails him, Mr Jeong decides to use English as the only 
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means of communications with the subcontractors and continues learning the Khmer 
language. As a result, most of the communications have to be channeled through the 
Cambodian project manager. 
Mr Jeong states that his level of trust in doing business with Cambodian subcontractors 
is low. He says:  “They think I’m the person who cannot understand their language. So, 
even when I am there at … [the plantation], sometimes they can lie.” The source of the 
problem is that the Cambodian subcontractors and Mr Jeong have different working 
cultures and expectations. Nevertheless, he tries to maintain his business relationships 
by improving communication with them rather than recruiting new subcontractors. 
Another operational issue for Mr Jeong is managing Cambodian employees. “I feel like 
they [Cambodian staff] don’t know how we do [things],” Mr Jeong says, shaking his 
head with disappointment. Mr Jeong mentions that his Cambodian employees are 
qualified for their jobs, but he admits that managing local employees is challenging for 
a foreigner due to cultural differences. He considers they are not serious about their 
work. He has attempted to build a good working relationship with them. For example, 
instead of sitting in a separate office, Mr Jeong sits close to his office employees. He 
also has lunch with them each day. However, he is unable to overcome the cultural 
barriers in the workplace. Although Mr Jeong acknowledges the different working 
cultures of Cambodians and Koreans, he has no concrete strategy to address the issue. 
He says: “…it’s hard to explain to them about this is not right,” but seems 
uncomfortable about introducing a new working culture. 
Support	  from	  Sub-­‐national	  Government	  	  
Despite having a powerful Cambodian intermediary (Okhna Odom as Company B’s 
representative), Mr Jeong still feels that gaining support from sub-national authorities—
especially in dealing with the land conflicts with local people—is challenging. He 
considers that his company is not welcome, particularly at the commune and village 
level. For example, he expects the local authorities to reject the villagers’ claims on 
overlapping areas with the company’s ELC, given Company B’s legal ELC leasing 
status. He and the president rely heavily on Okhna Odom in dealing with the authorities, 
believing that Cambodians may communicate more effectively with each other than 
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with foreigners. However, the relationship between Company B and local authorities 
does not improve.   
Mr Jeong notices differences between the support local authorities provide to 
Cambodian companies and to foreign companies. He has also noticed that 
communication plays a vital role in gaining support from the local authorities and says: 
“I think, lack of communication with Cambodian officers [is a major challenge], 
because, I’ve never seen these problems in Cambodian companies, operating in big 
concession land.” However, he admits that he has not worked out how to improve 
communication between his company and local authorities. He has tried using similar 
communication strategies to those of Cambodian companies, such as using Cambodian 
people to communicate with the local authorities and making donations in a form of 
financial contributions to the local authorities. However, none of the strategies seem to 
work. 
Contributions	  to	  Local	  People	  
Mr Jeong acknowledges that his company has made limited contributions to local 
people but says this is because his company is in an early developmental stage. “We’ve 
kept spending. We don’t make any profit. There’s nothing we could contribute to this 
society, maybe only giving jobs to people,” he says. The company has established a 
wooden school building near the labourer’s accommodation for the employee’s children. 
The school also welcomes children from the neighbouring villages but none attend the 
school due to its distant location. He also says he plans to build a hospital in the 
plantation for the labourers and the neighbouring villagers in the future. He envisages 
the relationship in these terms: “In business terms, it’s marketing. We’re just advertising 
and marketing. […] That’s a very good way to let people know our name, our company.” 
Although the company has made minimal infrastructural contribution to the local 
community, Mr Jeong regards the contribution as important for building a good 
company image. 
Best	  Practice	  
Reflecting on his business venture in Cambodia, Mr Jeong says “well, the success is I’m 
still here. I do not quit. At least, I still have good vision.” Mr Jeong seems to be 
optimistic about his business in Cambodia, regardless of the obstacles he has 
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encountered so far. However, he reveals that it is hard to identify best practice of the 
company: “We don’t have any successful stories yet as we keep spending money and 
the trees are young and we don’t get any latex yet.” He seems to be a typical investor 
and considers that the company’s success will be judged by its ability to make a good 
profit.  
Handling	  Land	  Disputes	  
When Company B starts to develop the land concession, it encounters land conflicts 
with people from the local community in the Sambo commune. Some parts of the 
company’s ELC overlap with some villagers’ plantations and are viewed as illegal land 
possessions, according to the government’s technical group. Mr Jeong and the president 
hire Okhna Odom to handle these issues as part of the ELC development subcontract. 
Okhna Odom discusses the unsettled land conflicts with the commune chief, district 
governor and provincial governor on behalf of the Korean management team.  
The company offers land swaps and cash as compensation to the affected families. 
These strategies only work with poor households. Okhna Odom is responsible for the 
land swap. Company B agrees to allocate three hectares of land in a new area on the 
company’s ELC to each family who owns more than three hectares of land in the 
contested area. For the affected families who own one or two hectares of land in the 
conflicted area, they receive the same size of land in the new area. Each affected family 
who owns only a residence receives 0.5 hectares in the new area.  
5.4.2 Main	  Subcontractor	  
Okhna Odom remains the main subcontractor to Mr Jeong’s company and has had his 
own Cambodian team stationed in the ELC since the land was granted. The team 
consists of a supervisor and team members, who are all military personnel equipped 
with machine and stun guns. The supervisor is trusted by Okhna Odom and both are 
known to the local community and authorities as representatives of Company B. The 
supervisor, the representative who granted the researcher the first access to Company 
B’s plantation, has military medical experience and all his team have a military 
background and wear military uniforms. Information from other sources suggests that 
Okhna Odom is a high-ranking military government official. His government status 
helps to explain why he employs men with a military background.  
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“The Koreans [Korean management team] only come to check the outcome,” explains 
Participant 2.2. The Okhna team rarely interacts directly with Mr Jeong or the other 
founder because there is a considerable distance between the plantation and Company 
B’s office and there is also a language barrier. The team only meets Mr Jeong once 
every three months at the plantation or in Phnom Penh for urgent matters, during which 
Company B’s office staff assist in communication. The absence of the Korean personnel 
at the plantation seems to provide Okhna’s team with some freedom to work at their 
own pace. “We take care of everything in the plantation site just like our own plantation 
because if the task is not successful we will not get paid,” explains Participant 2.2 
assuring his team’s commitment to providing good services to Company B. However, 
the subcontractor team appears to have a different understanding of their job 
responsibilities. The team supervisor introduces himself to the researcher as a manager 
in charge of Company B’s ELC management, while Company B’s employees and 
management team have a different view of the supervisor’s responsibility.   
“When I first arrived [at the ELC], the villagers were very poor. They didn’t have such 
big houses as they do today,” comments Participant 2.2 referring to the impact of Mr 
Jeong’s company on the local community. The Okhna team believes that the arrival of 
Company B in the local community has a positive impact on the local community, with 
jobs, business opportunities, road construction and rehabilitation connecting the remote 
villages to district markets. Moreover, the team asserts that they have maintained a good 
relationship with the authorities who “are friendly and cooperative.”       
5.4.3 Company	  Employees	  
Cambodian employees say that they appreciate Mr Jeong’s management style—which 
is described as respectful, motivating and empowering—and his personality. “I consider 
myself lucky. I have good bosses,” says Participant 2.4. Another employee, Participant 
2.3, adds: “He is down to earth and helps us out whenever he sees our limitations. He 
gives us constructive feedback.” The Cambodian employees also say they are 
empowered and encouraged by the Korean management team. “The management [Mr 
Jeong and his business partner] give staff opportunities to lead, even the supervisors are 
encouraged to make decisions and report,” explains Participant 2.3. The staff 
encouragement and empowerment by Mr Jeong and his business partner are considered 
to be the biggest opportunity for the Cambodian staff, especially for the project manager. 
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Cambodian employees also appreciate Korean culture at the workplace. For example, 
Participant 2.3 says, “One thing, I’ve learnt from the Korean people is that they respect 
each other very much.” Given the small number of employees, the Phnom Penh office is 
normally quiet. However, the Cambodian employees report that they like their working 
environment. There is a good relationship between the Cambodian employees, the 
Korean management team and the Korean intern and they have drinks after office hours 
a few times each month. 
The Cambodian management regards the company’s operational style as best practice. 
“This can minimise headaches and avoid trouble in dealing with daily operations and 
labourers,” says Participant 2.3. The Korean management team outsources most of the 
operational tasks to subcontractors. For the responsible Cambodian personnel, this 
operational style helps to reduce the work burden on Company B’s employees and 
management. Job creation for people inside and outside the local community is also 
considered as another best practice. “Some labourers didn’t even know a US dollar bill. 
But now they can get a regular salary and free accommodation and utilities,” says 
Participant 2.3. The Cambodian management, in particular, asserts that the company’s 
investment in the ELC has largely improved the living standards of labourers and their 
families.  
However, employees based in the plantation acknowledge that not many labourers 
(employed by the company or the subcontractors) from the local community work on 
the plantation. “The local people around here have their own farms to work on,” 
explains Participant 2.4. Supervisors say that the labour supply from the local 
community is irregular and does not meet demand when the company regularly requires 
a large amount of labour. Thus, the job opportunities may benefit those outside more 
than inside the local communities.  
The Cambodian employees rate the establishment of the elementary school for children 
of workers and neighbouring villages in the company’s compound as other best practice 
of Company B. 
Company B’s Cambodian personnel identify three challenges for the company’s 
operations: dealing with the subcontractor’s team; management skills; and unpredictable 
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government regulatory changes. Although the outsourcing practices reduce employees’ 
workload, these practices have created challenges for company employees, especially 
supervisors. The Cambodian personnel who deal directly with the main subcontractor’s 
team say they feel powerless and under pressure when monitoring and evaluating the 
team’s work due to unclear responsibilities in the outsourcing contract. Having the 
company’s employees assess progress against deliverables not only upsets the 
subcontractor’s team but also Okhna Odom who thinks that Mr Jeong and the president 
do not trust him. The company staff said the subcontractor’s team makes them feel 
unwelcome. After the revision of the outsourcing contract, the Cambodian employees 
are more confident in performing their monitoring and evaluation tasks. “I have to 
confront the subcontractors, and to challenge them to fulfill the works according to the 
contract,” says Participant 2.3. Although the situation has improved, performing 
monitoring and evaluation is still challenging due to the powerful social status of the 
subcontractor.   
Another challenge for the company, especially the project manager who is responsible 
for compiling progress reports, is that supervisors have a limited ability to write 
progress reports. The supervisors are technical people who have a limited command of 
English and do not have any experience in report writing. As a result, the supervisors 
prefer to use verbal reporting. To address this issue, the project manager provides 
advice to the supervisors about report structure and encourages them to present short 
and simply written findings. 
The company is currently facing the government’s new regulation on land titles, which 
is threatening its development and future. All land development is postponed until the 
land titles in the affected areas are completed. Without further investigation, the 
implementation of the new regulation implies that Company B loses all the unresolved 
overlapping land and other plots of land. “It’s unfair to the company… When the new 
regulation was issued, there were newcomers who came to live in that area and claimed 
their land ownership. The government’s taskforce came and issued land titles to them,” 
complains Participant 2.3. This implies that opportunists from outsides the local 
community may have illegally encroached on the ELC area. The company may 
therefore lose more land to claimants, in addition to previously unresolved land claims. 
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5.4.4 Labourers	  
There are more job opportunities since Company B started to take over some tasks from 
its subcontractors in 2012. On average, Company B employs 140 labourers to clear 
debris, weed, spray pesticide and apply fertilizers and chemicals. However, all these job 
opportunities are taken by people outside of the local community and none of the 
villagers in the local community work for the company. The labourers come from 
mainly the Kampong Cham and Kampong Speu provinces. Most are young males and 
females aged between 18 and 21 years. No work experience is required, but the 
company has physical and age requirements (be physically able and between 18 and 40) 
and applicants need to provide proof of identity. If labourers do not have the necessary 
documents, they must be guaranteed by a relative who has proof of his or her own 
identity.  
The company has wooden accommodation built in the plantation for the labourers. It is 
not well constructed. Four labourers share one unfurnished room. They sleep on their 
own mat placed directly on the wooden floor. The labourers are grouped randomly and 
are responsible to their group leader and supervisors. Each group leader supervises up to 
approximately 25 members. Each morning, the labourers gather at 6 am, waiting for 
tasks to be assigned from the supervisors before setting off to the assigned location in 
the company trucks. They work seven days a week and get one day off at the end of 
each month. 
The labourers have a good impression of the company regarding job opportunities and 
compensation. They all report that the workload is light and the working conditions are 
flexible and result-oriented. That means labourers can rest as soon as they complete 
their assigned tasks for the day. “I’m happy, because the work is easier than my 
previous work. I can earn the same,” says Participant 2.6. The labourers enjoy their 
result-based working patterns. Most manage to finish their work before lunchtime and 
have the whole afternoon off. The labourers have never talked to Mr Jeong or his 
business partner. They only interact with the Cambodian manager and supervisors. They 
have a good impression of the Cambodian management team, describing them as nice 
and caring people: “They [Cambodian management] have never used bad language on 
us whenever they told us to do something,” says Participant 2.5. Some of the labourers 
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compare the current Cambodian management with their previous employers and rate the 
current management team more highly.  
The labourers are happy living at the accommodation in the plantation, despite its 
remoteness. “The company truck drives us to the district market on our payday to buy 
stuff. The supervisors also organise a dancing party for us at that night. We have lots of 
fun working here,” says Participant 2.11. Working for Company B is the first paid job 
for many of the labourers. The company does not impose any rules at their 
accommodation. For example, the labourers can choose their room and group mates. 
Some even claim that working for the company is their first independent experience and 
an opportunity to meet more friends. 
5.4.5 Local	  Community	  
Socioeconomic	  Contributions	  
The main occupations in the Sambo commune are growing rubber, pepper, rice and 
other seasonal cash crops. Most villagers work on their own farm or collect forest by-
products. Only a small proportion works as labourers. Villagers in the local 
community—especially those who share the border with the ELC—are unhappy with 
the presence of Company B. They complain that the company does not benefit their 
local community. “We can’t work on our own farm as before. Our cattle used to walk 
freely; now we have to tie them at one place. There is no water to use as we used to 
have before their arrival,” says Participant 2.12. Before the arrival of the company, 
Kreng Sangke villagers fetched water from a stream inside the ELC. Their access to the 
stream has been cut off and they have had to fetch water from other sources since the 
company started to develop the ELC. 
In 2010 some Kreng Sangke villagers worked as seasonal labourers for the company’s 
contractors, weeding, digging and planting rubber saplings at daily wage of 10,000 riels 
(approximately USD 2.50). However, the labourers quit their jobs, complaining of fraud 
concerning their wages, ranging from late and inaccurate payment to not being paid at 
all. This could be one of the reasons why other local villagers do not want to work for 
Company B. Local residents are not aware of the subcontracting arrangements; to them 
subcontractors and contractors of Company B are all company employees. Hence, local 
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residents think it is Company B’s poor business practices and the local community 
blames Company B for all their bad experiences. 
Infrastructural	  Contributions	  
Some local residents, in particular Kreng Sangke villagers, complain about road safety 
issues since Company B has started to develop the land. To get to the plantation, the 
company had a dirt track renovated that cuts across Kreng Sangke village. Villagers 
lived along the dirt track before the ELC was granted to Company B.  Although the 
renovated road is twice as wide as the old dirt track, villagers claim that the road has 
become dusty and dangerous for their children. The track was quiet before the arrival of 
the company. The villagers, especially small children, have been used to walking on the 
road. Since the company arrived, more heavy equipment trucks have used the road. 
Some people drive fast. The villagers, especially parents, claim to be distracted, as they 
have to keep an eye on their small children and/or cannot leave their small children with 
older siblings at home.  
Local residents similarly complain that Company B does not do anything to benefit their 
community. The company does not even contribute to improving an old school building 
in Kreng Sangke village that is located along the road to the company’s first entrance 
checkpoint. It is a one-teacher elementary school, a four by eight-metre wooden 
building that is in disrepair. The teacher lives in the village and teaches all students aged 
between six and ten years old. Parents of the students are concerned about the quality of 
the education for their children, as highlighted in Participant 2.21’s remark: “My son 
doesn’t learn anything from school here. The teacher teaches the same alphabet for one 
whole week”. The lessons are held in the morning and irregularly, and depend on the 
availability of the teacher. Due to the low salary paid for teaching, the teacher has to 
engage in other income-generating activities to earn a living. Some children do not want 
to go to class, complaining that they have been taught the same lesson for many days.   
On the initiative of the parents and with the support of NGOs and local authorities, a 
proposed new school was approved and will be built by the Cambodian government in 
2013. The villagers claim that the decision to build the school has nothing to do with 
Company B.  
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Land	  Disputes	  	  	  	  
Similar to Case Study One, villagers surrounding Company B’s ELC have limited 
knowledge of state land. They do not know how the land is granted as an ELC to 
Company B and were not consulted when government staff from the responsible 
ministries arrived to evaluate the ELC proposal. Consultation with local villagers during 
the government’s technical evaluation mission is not only compulsory (according to 
article 4 of sub-decree146 on ELCs) but also crucial, as the amount of proposed ELC 
land to be granted to the company is made on the result of the evaluation report. 
According to the ELC lease and map, about 25% of Company B’s ELC covers land in 
Kreng Sangke, Treng and Kengkorng villages. However, the government’s evaluation 
report indicates that only 2% of the overlapping area owned by 48 households in Kreng 
Sangke village is excluded from the ELC. The rest of the overlapping area owned by 
more than 300 households in Treng and Kengkorng villages is regarded as illegal 
possession. The affected families are not aware of the government’s decision to grant 
their land to Company B until the company starts to develop its ELC. Some affected 
families claim that they have cultivated their land inside the ELC area since 1996.  
The affected families in the Kreng Sangke, Treng and Kengkorng villages use 
traditional land dispute resolution and bring their land disputes to village and commune 
chiefs, and report whenever the company’s clearing teams clear their land. Their village 
chiefs try to stop the clearing teams but are only effective in some instances. When 
village chiefs cannot stop the clearing teams, families go to their commune office to 
seek an intervention from the commune chief who normally acts as arbitrator between 
the claimants and the company. 
Although affected residents in the Kreng Sangke village lawfully possess their farmland, 
they claim that Company B’s teams still clear their land. They therefore ask their village 
chief to intervene. After negotiations between the village chief and Okhna Odom’s team, 
they accept the company’s offer of reallocating their farms to a new plot of land offered 
by the company. However, at the time of doing the fieldwork, the affected families have 
received areas that are smaller than their previous land, especially for those whose land 
is more than three hectares. The residents say that the new land is less fertile than their 
previous farmland. The affected families in other villages insist they want to keep their 
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farmland and refuse the under-market value compensation offered by the company. 
When the fieldwork finished in November 2012, the issue has not been resolved.    
The villagers think that the company employees and the owners distance themselves 
from locals. Although Company B is known as a Korean company, villagers all report 
that they have not met any of the Korean management since it was granted the ELC. 
The company’s image in local communities is not good. Villagers have strong opinions 
about Company B, and continually mention land disputes. They would rather not have 
the company in their community.  
5.4.6 Local	  Business	  Owners	  
Company B has no direct transactions with shop owners in the local community. All of 
the raw materials and services it requires are supplied by businesses in Phnom Penh or 
other provinces. Shop owners in the local community also claim that they have not 
benefitted from Company B’s investment and have not had any business transactions 
with it.  
Business owners in neighbouring villages claim to have no business contact with the 
company or its labourers: “No, they [company’s labourers] have never come. The 
company is deep in the forest. My customers are villagers only,” says Participant 2.20. 
There are three other small shops close to the ELC’s first checkpoint. However, the 
shop owners report that company employees, sub-contractors or labourers have never 
bought their products.  
Internally, Company B has enabled some entrepreneurial opportunities. One spouse of a 
supervisor becomes a storeowner. She and her baby move in with her husband to the 
labourer’s accommodation. Being bored with staying at home, she starts to look for 
some activities and sees a business opportunity. With support of her husband she sets up 
a soft drink and snack stand inside the accommodation area. 
Nearby is a grocery and food stand run by a couple in their late 30s, formerly sub-
subcontractors for the rubber sapling plantation. The wife sells the goods and her 
husband buys and collects the goods from the district market for their grocery stand. As 
noted earlier, the company has employed its own labourers rather than outsourcing the 
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plantation tasks since 2012. Since they do not want to move back to their province or 
work as full-time labourers, the couple ask the company’s Cambodian general manager 
for a small plot of land (5 by 5 metres) on which they can build the grocery and food 
stand and their accommodation. The manager grants their request and allows them to 
use the utilities provided to the labourer’s accommodation.  
The company also generates a business opportunity for a 40-year-old fast food vendor 
who resides outside the ELC area. He learned about the labourer’s accommodation from 
vendors in the district market. He has diversified his business activities from selling 
only Tapae (a Cambodian traditional dessert) to selling various fast foods and desserts. 
He conducted a brief survey when he visited the accommodation for the first time. Each 
morning, he picks up his orders for fast foods and desserts from a market in his 
commune and carries them in his motorbike to the labourer’s accommodation. He 
leaves the company’s ELC around 5 pm every day. To increase his sales, the vendor 
offers one-week’s credit to labourers during the last week of the month. He has a credit 
record book and asks the labourers to pay off their debts on payday. He also brings 
some people, often his relatives, to work for the company as labourers. 
5.4.7 Commune	  and	  Village	  Authorities	  
After Company B signed the ELC contract, Okhna Odom visited the commune 
authorities to inform them about the company and the national government’s decision to 
grant it the ELC. The Okhna’s visit is appreciated by the commune authorities, who say 
that Company B has shown them courtesy. They received a copy of all the legal 
documents concerning the company’s ELC, including the company’s master plan. 
However, the commune councillors claim to have never met with the company’s 
Korean management. Only Okhna Odom and his team deal with the local authorities 
with regard to all the company’s public relations, including land dispute resolutions. 
This suggests that Mr Jeong’s previously discussed strategy of using only Cambodian 
representatives in interactions with Cambodian people does not work as expected; rather 
it is causing discord. 
The commune council members are suspicious of the company’s ownership transfer 
when the company changed its name to Company B in 2010. They were informed about 
the name change when Okhna Odom delivered legal documents. However, they were 
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not convinced by his explanation that the company owner changed the name in the 
belief that it would bring “good Feng Shui” for the company. The council members stop 
questioning the ownership transfer when they see that the Okhna’s team is still based at 
the plantation as normal.  
Even though the local authorities support the government’s ELC policy, they are 
unhappy with Company B:  “The company [B] is supposed to build a school, hospital, 
roads and drainage systems according to their development master plan. But so far the 
company hasn’t done anything yet,” says Participant 2.14. In their view, the company’s 
investment does not benefit villagers, either socially or economically and it has failed to 
invest in the local community. 
With regard to the land disputes, the local authorities, especially the village and 
commune chiefs, say they have limited power in handling conflicts. They can only 
promise to bring the complaint to the provincial authority and facilitate meetings 
between the two conflicting parties. The local authorities acknowledge during their 
interviews that some plots of land in the conflicting area are illegally possessed by the 
local claimants, according to the 2001 Land Law, and these encroachments are beyond 
the control of local authorities as Participant 2.14 explains: “If the company wants to 
contribute to local communities, they should give the overlapping area back to the local 
communities and they [the company] can develop the rest of the granted land”. Similar 
remarks are made by the local authorities. Although acknowledging that the affected 
land is unlawful possession, the local authorities want some land concessions from the 
company’s owner for the claimants to end the land disputes.  
While local authorities support the government’s ELC policy, they are disappointed 
with its decision to grant the ELC to Company B. “…what can we do with the 
increasing population in the commune? Where are the people going to live? I’m very 
disappointed,” says Participant 2.14. In 2007, the commune councillors designed a 10-
year plan for the commune. They proposed that about 2,000 hectares of land in the area 
be granted as a social land concession for poor local villagers. But their proposal is 
rejected as the national government has decided to grant all the land to Company B as 
an ELC.  
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The local authorities acknowledge that there has been small and large-scale illegal land 
grabbing in the community, both before and after the arrival of Company B. The land 
grabbers are reported to be mostly wealthy and powerful people from the capital city 
who hire labourers to clear forest land and to cultivate cash crops such as rubber trees 
and cassava. A few illegal land grabbers own at least 100 hectares in the commune. 
Small land grabbers are mainly migrants who illegally clear the land and then sell it. All 
the illegal land encroachment is beyond the control of local authorities. 
5.4.8 Provincial	  Authorities	  
According to a department chief, the provincial government supports the government’s 
ELC policy. He said that the policy will help prevent illegal land. At the same time, he 
hopes ELC investors are serious and develop the land according to the contract and 
master plan. The provincial government would also like the company to find a win-win 
solution for the land conflicts with the local community. 
5.5 Summary	  
Company B is a Korean FDI company holding a 70-year legitimate right to clear and 
plant rubber trees on nearly 10,000 hectares of ELC land in the Sambo commune. It is 
founded and managed by two Korean friends and financed from two sources: a Korean 
conglomerate and a Greenfield investment loan from the Korean government. Mr Jeong 
and the other Korean founder have outsourced to a Cambodian tycoon most of the 
plantation development tasks, including handling legal paperwork and land conflicts. As 
an inexperienced foreign investor, Mr Jeong encountered a number of challenges, 
ranging from government regulations to dealing with people (subcontractors, local 
employees and local authorities).  
Company B is unsuccessfully engaged with the local community due to several factors. 
The first factor is that the company and Mr Jeong are reluctant to establish a good 
relationship with local community, considering that the company has a right to develop 
the ELC. The second factor is that the local community does not welcome Company B, 
claiming its arrival has disrupted their way of life and caused land conflicts. Thirdly, the 
government administration imposes many challenges for both the company and the 
local community. The granting process of the ELC is less consultative than it should 
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have been; and the local community has not been clearly informed about the ELC’s 
decision-making process. Company B is also hampered by the government; for example 
issuing of government regulations is a shock to Company B. Overall, these challenges 
result from divisions between the company, government bodies and the local 
community. As a result, the local community does not benefit from this foreign 
investment, not even through job opportunities.  
  
Chapter	  6: Case	  Study	  Three	  
6.1 Introduction	  
This chapter presents the third case study examining the embedding process of Korean 
FDI companies and their contribution to the local development in Cambodia. This case 
study describes Company C, a Korean company that holds a 70-year legal right to 
develop a less than 10,000-hectare economic land concession (ELC) in rural Cambodia. 
This case study examines the operational activities of the company on its ELC. It also 
describes its process of securing the ELC entitlement, emphasising how, unlike 
Companies A and B, it manages to minimise land conflict with the local community. 
The case study highlights the role of the company founder and his views on running the 
ELC business and contributing to local development. This case study uses qualitative 
data gathered during the researcher’s fieldwork from December 2012 to March 2013.   
The chapter is structured into five sections. The next section describes the researcher’s 
journey to the Company C’s ELC, how she found out about Company C and her first 
impressions. The third section introduces Mr Yoon,20 the company’s founding manager, 
presents the company’s profile and operations in the ELC and its process of acquiring 
the ELC. The fourth section presents the views of the stakeholders in regard to their 
engagement in the ELC development. The fifth section is the summary. 
6.2 Journey	  to	  Company	  C	  
On her first field trip for this case study, the researcher feels excited and disappointed at 
the same time. Similar to previous cases, she visits a human rights NGO in the province 
where Company C’s ELC is located. However, the NGO does not have any contacts in 
the company. Interestingly, the NGO staff have never been aware of any land conflicts 
between this company and the local community.  
With no lead from the NGO and her networks, the researcher decides to visit the 
company’s ELC. She is excited to locate the company’s billboard at an entrance which 
confirms that it is still in business. She plans to walk in and ask for information and 
permission from security guards (if any) at the Company’s plantation. However, she is 
                                                
20 All names of places and people in this case study are pseudonyms to safeguard the participants’ privacy. 
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advised not to visit the company’s ELC on that day due to a crime that occurred that 
morning where the victim was killed on the spot. Thus, she changes her strategy and 
visits the local authority in the area instead. Through the local authority she manages to 
meet Company C’s subcontracted clearing team, and that eventually leads to gaining 
access to Company C’s provincial and Phnom Penh offices.  
Unlike Companies A and B, Company C does not have a security checkpoint or security 
guards stationed at an entrance to plantation, only a big company signboard standing on 
two stilts. To the researcher’s surprise, Company C clearly marks its ELC boundary. 
One-metre concrete poles are placed along the boundary of the company’s ELC. Its 
plantation looks quiet, with fewer labourers than the other two companies’ plantations. 
The plantation gets quieter after 5pm as the company’s personnel and clearing team do 
not stay on the ELC at night. In the ELC only small-scale cassava plantation is found. 
Rubber trees—listed as one of the company’s main products—are not planted on the 
land. The roads inside the plantation are not well paved.  
During the first field visit, the researcher notices that local people know very little about 
Company C when she asks them for directions and during informal chats. The 
researcher wonders if the company’s employees and management actually interact with 
the local community. In addition, the company displays all the information on the 
billboard in English, a foreign language, in a remote Cambodian community where 
most residents can barely read the national language. This makes the researcher even 
more curious about Company C’s engagement with and impact on the local community. 
6.3 Company	  Profile	  and	  Operations	  
6.3.1 Company	  Profile	  and	  Organisational	  Arrangement	  
According to the ELC contract, Company C is a limited liability Korean FDI company. 
However, there is no record of its investment on the database of the Council for the 
Development of Cambodia (CDC) as its investment capital is less than USD 1 million. 
Only companies with investment capital of USD 1 million and above are usually listed 
on the CDC database. Company C is an investment project of a Korean conglomerate 
based in Korea that engages in the manufacture of food products. It manufactures a 
wide range of products including fruit jam, egg yolks, egg whites, dried vegetables, 
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chilli powder, concentrated fruit juice and fermented milk. It is also involved in the 
production of plastic materials such as containers, spoons and container caps, and in 
biogas businesses and overseas crop production.  
Unlike Companies A and B, Company C has only one source of finance and is solely 
financed by the Korean conglomerate. Company C did not apply for the Greenfield 
investment loan from the Korean government, claiming it was too complicated and the 
reporting requirement that is a lending condition would be too time consuming. Instead, 
Company C has received sufficient funding from the conglomerate to operate the 
plantation. The financial flow of the company is presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Financial Flow of Company C 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015  
Even though it is an investment project for the Korea-based conglomerate, the head 
office is in Vietnam, managed by a Korean chief executive officer (CEO). The Korean 
CEO is permanently based in Vietnam, leaving the day-to-day management of 
Company C to Korean and Cambodian general managers who are based in Cambodia. 
Company C’s offices and plantation are located in different areas. This company has 
two offices: in the province where its ELC is situated and in the capital city (Phnom 
Penh). The provincial office is located in a different commune to the company’s ELC. It 
also serves as accommodation for the company’s Korean personnel. The company’s two 
offices have different functions and responsibilities. The provincial office oversees the 
day-to-day plantation development, whereas the Phnom Penh office deals with the 
administrative documentation and legal procedures of the ELC development. An 
overview of Company C’s Profile and organisational structure are outlined below in 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3.  
Head 
Office 
In Vietnam 
Company C 
A Korean 
Conglomerate  
In Korea 
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Figure 6.2: Company C’s Profile 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
Figure 6.3: The Organisational Structure of Company C 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015 
Note:        denotes staff at the Phnom Penh Office.   
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   Admin	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Company C’s Profile 
Business activities:  Cassava and rubber plantation and development 
Investment capital:  Less than USD 1 million 
Economic land concession:  Less than 10,000 hectares (for an overview see Figure 6.4) 
Products:  Cassava starch and semi-processed rubber gel for export 
(Potential) markets:  China and Korea 
Progress (as of March 2013): Planted cassava on 6 per cent of the total economic land concession 
Staff arrangements:   
1. Korean personnel:  CEO (based in Vietnam office), a general manager (Mr Yoon) and a 
technical manager 
2. Full-time Cambodian personnel (16 employees): a project manager, check and control 
supervisors, planting specialists, office staff, a driver, security staff and cooking staff  
3. Seasonal Cambodian labourers: 40 labourers during peak season and fewer than 20 labourers 
during low season 
Staff benefits:  
1. Korean personnel:  salary, fully furnished accommodation, utilities, three daily Korean meals, 
and transportation 
2. Full-time Cambodian personnel: office-based personnel receive salary and three daily meals. 
Plantation-based personnel receive salary, unfurnished accommodation, utilities and 
supervisors also receive a motorbike and regular gasoline supply.  
3. Seasonal Cambodian day labourers: 20,000 riels (USD 5) daily wage (in 2013) 
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More	  About	  Cambodian	  Workers	  
Company C, like Company A, does not outsource its production activities. However, 
Company C hires a much smaller number of employees due to its smaller plantations 
and fewer plantation development activities. Its organisational structure is therefore 
simple. More than 80 per cent of the Cambodian staff, mostly from the Kampong Speu 
and Kampong Cham provinces, are based at the provincial office.  The Cambodian 
employees at the plantation stay in rented accommodation outside the company’s ELC. 
“It was hard to manage them [full-time labourers] at that time. So, we decided to lay 
them off,” explains Participant 3.2. During the first phase of the plantation development, 
Company C employed 20 full-time labourers who were provided with meals and 
accommodation in a four by eight metre house, in addition to a monthly salary. The 
company management team considered managing full-time labourers was a burden due 
to limited human resource availability. They therefore modified their strategy from 
recruiting full-time labourers to using seasonal day labourers.  
Since then, Company C has only employed seasonal day labourers. These casual 
labourers come mainly from outside the local communities. The company does not 
provide them with transportation, but they can stay in the plantation’s wooden 
accommodation that was built for the former full-time labourers. Due to the remoteness 
of the ELC, there is no electricity or running water available. The labourers collectively 
own a power storage battery that can be used for light at night, and use water pumped 
from a well near the accommodation for their cooking, drinking and washing.  
No work experience is required for seasonal labourers in Company C which uses similar 
selection criteria to Companies A and B. The selection criteria are based solely on 
physical capability and age (between 18 and 45 years of age). Each morning at 7 am all 
seasonal labourers gather at the company’s meeting point, which is near their 
accommodation, to register their attendance. The supervisors then assign tasks. They 
work from 7:00 am to 11:00 am with a 10-minute break at 9:00 am. Then they have a 
two-hour lunch break from 11:00 am to 1:00 pm. They resume work at 1:00 pm and 
work until 5:00 pm with a 20-minute break at 3:00 pm. Due to the nature of the work, 
the company employs the labourers seven days per week during peak periods and only a 
few days per week during the low season.    
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6.3.2 Recruitment	  and	  Capacity	  Building	  
Company C uses both formal and informal recruitment practices including a third-party 
company, headhunting, employees’ networks, and public announcements in villages, 
but it mostly uses professional recruitment agents to hire Cambodian professional 
employees. The company’s Cambodian general manager who has wide networks in the 
agricultural sector head hunts employees for some of the technical positions.  
The company also recruits day labourers through employees’ networks, especially 
during peak periods. During the low season, it uses public announcements in a 
neighbouring village to hire day labourers. Its supervisors visit the local migrant 
community on the way to the company’s plantation to hire as many day labourers as 
required. Seasonal day labourers from outside the local community need to stay on the 
plantation as the company’s ELC is too far for them to go home at the end of the day. 
They therefore prefer to come to work at the plantation in a large group. As a result, 
during the low season when demand for labourers is low, it is hard for the company to 
attract workers from outside the local community.  
Similar to Company B, Company C does not have a capacity-building programme for 
local employees. Employees are not aware of the company’s staff capacity-building 
policy and have not attended any training it has provided or sponsored. The capacity-
building programme is not viewed as a priority, according to the company’s 
management team. Both Mr Yoon and the Cambodian general manager claim to employ 
experienced and highly skilled employees for the plantation development and there in 
not much demand for capacity building. Although there is no formal capacity-building 
training, the Cambodian planting specialists and the Korean technical manager meet 
regularly to discuss techniques and issues; the management team therefore believes that 
there is some knowledge transfer among the technical team. The seasonal day labourers 
receive on-the-job training from supervisors and planting specialists or other more 
knowledgeable workers.  
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6.3.3 About	  the	  Investor	  
Getting	  to	  Know	  the	  Investor,	  Mr	  Yoon	  
“Please have a seat,” says Mr Yoon calmly, gesturing to the researcher to take a seat on 
the other side of his office desk. In his late 30s, he is one of the founding management 
team members of Company C. and one of the two Koreans based in Cambodia. He 
oversees day-to-day operations of the provincial office and the plantation development. 
Mr Yoon spends more time focusing on his work than socializing, and shows little 
interest in getting to know his neighbours. He has settled in Cambodia, but did not bring 
any relatives with him. He now has a Cambodian partner who was formerly his 
employee in the provincial office. They live at the provincial office. His brother-in-law 
also works for Company C. Although Mr Yoon has a Cambodian partner, he can speak 
very little Khmer and communicates with his partner in English and Korean. 
“Other Korean investors may need to join an association, but not me. I don’t need to 
join any Korean association as we [Company C] can get the land in Cambodia by 
ourselves,” explains Mr Yoon opening a thick folder of printed documents that look like 
financial transactions. Since moving to Cambodia, he has not joined any Korean 
associations and he rarely has personal or business contact with other local Korean 
investors. Securing an ELC was his only priority and a task that he found most 
challenging. As noted previously, acquiring an ELC can be difficult for foreign 
investors and networking with business associations can help newcomers to get access 
to the right contacts to facilitate the ELC acquisition process. As Mr Yoon managed to 
successfully secure the ELC on his own initiative, he sees no reason to join any Korean 
associations in Cambodia. The only business transaction he has with a Korean 
construction company is outsourcing the land-clearing. “They [the Korean construction 
company] came to me and asked for the clearing tasks,” says Mr Yoon, indicating that 
the construction company approached him. 
Mr	  Yoon’s	  Journey	  to	  Cambodia	  and	  Interest	  in	  Agriculture	  
Mr Yoon’s first visit to Cambodia was in 2008 on a business mission of one of his 
Korean conglomerates which is interested in expanding agricultural production in Asian 
countries. He and Company C’s CEO were looking for a large plot of land for cassava 
and rubber production. “In the investment world, we need infrastructure and markets. 
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We have markets, but we can’t find land in Vietnam and Laos, but Cambodia has land 
for lease,” explains Mr Yoon. Company C therefore decided to invest in Cambodia 
because of the ELC incentive provided by the Royal Government of Cambodia to 
foreign companies. 
Mr Yoon asserts that finding markets for Company C’s products is not a challenge 
because its head office has established market networks. Its potential markets are Korea 
and other Asian countries, especially China. Agriculture has always been a focus for Mr 
Yoon since he started working for the Korean conglomerate, as agricultural business is 
one of its investment portfolios.  
Mr	  Yoon’s	  Business	  Management	  
According to Mr Yoon, the founding CEO of Company C was actively involved in 
searching for an ELC, and after securing it returned to Vietnam where he is permanently 
based. All the day-to-day operational management was then delegated to Mr Yoon and 
the Cambodian general manager. The Cambodian-based management team regularly 
updates the CEO about the ELC’s progress against the company’s master plan which 
was submitted to MAFF for approval in 2010. Company C receives ongoing support—
such as technical human resources and some raw materials—from the head office in 
Vietnam. The two Cambodia-based managers have clear and separate responsibilities. 
The general manager is responsible for the company’s public relations, while Mr Yoon 
is mainly involved with the company’s internal affairs, particularly strategic planning 
and financial management.  
Unlike, Mr Lee of Company A, Mr Yoon rarely holds staff meetings or visits the 
plantation. His office is about a one-hour drive from the plantation. Instead, he relies on 
the Korean technical manager who monitors the plantation’s development activities and 
reports back on a regular basis. Compared to the technical manager who is not popular 
among day labourers, Mr Yoon is calmer and speaks slowly and in a clear voice.  
About	  the	  Acquisition	  of	  the	  Economic	  Land	  Concession	  
Company C’s ELC acquisition is faster than the other cases in this research, taking only 
about six months from the time the application is acknowledged by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to the ELC contract being signed. Company C’s 
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ELC is part of a large ELC granted to a Cambodian company (hereafter named the 
Bopha Company) in 2008. The Bopha Company agreed to divide its ELC into two 
separate plots of land and sell one plot to Company C in the form of a formal ELC 
ownership transfer. Bopha Company took care of the paperwork for the transfer of 
ownership.  
In 2008 Bopha Company submitted a letter to Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF), requesting that two new ELC contracts be drawn up to replace the 
one previously granted and undertaking to meet all the legal costs involved. A week 
after the MAFF Minister acknowledged this correspondence the Prime Minister 
approves the request under the following conditions: 
• The two companies have to cooperate with relevant authorities to mark the land 
territories and to exclude overlapping with villagers’ land and protected areas. 
• The companies have to register the land concession as state-private land before 
signing new ELC contracts with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries. 
• The companies have to ensure that the local communities benefit from these 
investments. The companies have to put on hold their operational activities in 
any area where there is conflict with local residents until there is proper 
resolution. 
• The companies can only develop the ELC according to their approved master 
plan and with approval from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery. 
• If there is no business activity for six months, the ELC contracts will be 
terminated. 
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After the ELC is divided and assessment has been completed, Company C took a further 
legal step to secure the land title for its ELC by proposing to register it as state-private 
land. The land title request was granted by MAFF in 2009 and the company received a 
title for its ELC. After securing the land title, Company C officially signed an ELC 
lease with MAFF. About three months later, the company submitted its master plan for 
the rubber and cassava plantation development and requested approval to clear about 
500 hectares of land in 2010. The master plan and request were approved about two and 
a half months later. An overview of Company C’s ELC acquisition is highlighted in 
Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4: Company C's Economic Land Concession Acquisition 
Source: Compiled by the author, 2015  
6.3.4 Getting	  Started	  
Soon after signing the contract with MAFF, Company C organises a meeting with local 
authorities at the commune office to formally notify them that the company has legally 
taken possession of the land and to introduce its business operations. However, the 
company did not develop the ELC for some time. It aimed to start the plantation 
development activities in 2010 but did not actually start clearing land until 2011. By 
2012 it had only developed about 6 per cent of the ELC. The management team told the 
researcher that the company has never suspended its development activities. 
Company C’s Economic Land Concession Acquisition 
Application type:  A private investor initiated proposal 
Processing time:  6 months 
Requested ELC size: Less than 10,000 hectares  
Technical evaluation:  9-day mission to assess the proposed ELC 
Evaluation results:  21 per cent of the proposed ELC overlaps some part of protected areas and 
waterways. About 11 per cent of the proposed ELC affects some part of a 
neighbouring ELC and villagers’ land. 
RGC decisions: Agreed to divide the previously granted ELC into two new ELCs. About 30 
per cent of the proposed land to be deducted from the proposed land for 
Company C. 
Approved ELC size:  Around 70 per cent hectares of the proposed ELC (according to the ELC 
contract) 
Leasing period:  70 years (with a deposit of USD10 per hectare) 
Annual rent: Not stated in the contract   
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Nevertheless, they do acknowledge delays in production due to unforeseen technical 
issues. 
After being granted the ELC, Company C hires a specialist to test the soil to identify 
which plots are suitable for rubber or cassava plantation. The results forced it to make 
substantial changes to its entire production plan and future direction. The company’s 
original production plan is to have a rubber and cassava plantation, with the ELC 
divided into two parts: one part for each crop.  But the test results indicate only 25 per 
cent of the total land is suitable for rubber plantation, so the company has to change its 
original production plan from equally investing in rubber and cassava production to 
mainly focusing on cassava production. No rubber had been planted by the end of the 
fieldwork and the company is considering dropping rubber production from its future 
work plan. 
Company C’s ELC developmental activities improved after the Cambodian general 
manager joined the management team in 2011. He has extensive experience and 
networks in large-scale ELC development. This experience includes handling all ELC 
legal documents, and liaising with relevant government authorities to get official 
approval for each development activity. He is crucial to Company C’s ELC 
development. An ELC company has to seek prior approval for each development 
activity, especially land clearing. This legal obligation requires ELC companies to deal 
with the Cambodian government’s administrative system which can be confusing and 
time consuming. Therefore, experienced staff like the general manager are an asset to 
Company C. He also deals with illegal land encroachment on the ELC. 
As mentioned earlier, Mr Yoon outsources the land clearing and preparation of the ELC 
to a Korean construction company which approached him. While these investment 
companies and the construction company are both owned by Koreans, they are not 
related. The construction company is based in Phnom Penh and specialises in land 
clearing and construction. It owns heavy equipment and machinery and has its own 
Cambodian clearing team. To Mr Yoon, this is good for his company as he saves money 
on advertising.   
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The land-clearing outsourcing procedure is simple and fast. After signing an official 
contract with Mr Yoon, the construction company sends out a clearing team and 
machinery. The nationality of the service provider plays a vital role in this business deal. 
“We are Koreans, we speak the same language, so it’s easy for us to communicate and 
do the business together,” he says, indicating that he prefers to do business with 
Koreans because of cultural and language factors. 
During the clearing period, the construction company’s team stays at rented 
accommodation outside the ELC. The team comprises one Cambodian supervisor and 
10 men. They all wear military uniforms and look thin. They also brought their families 
with them to the accommodation. The clearing team stays and eats together as a group. 
As soon as the clearing team starts work, the management team hires a recruitment 
agent in the provincial town to hire skilled employees and full-time labourers. The agent 
advertises on provincial radio and through banners, and recruits about 20 full-time 
labourers who are stationed in the plantation. The Cambodian general manager also 
head-hunted skilled employees through his networks and successfully recruited a 
qualified planting specialist. The company then started to prepare the land for cassava 
planting.  
During the research fieldwork, the company was still in the process of testing three 
different cassava-planting techniques: Khmer, Thai and Vietnamese. It hires three 
Cambodian planting specialists to demonstrate their planting techniques on 324 hectares 
of the land. Each specialist is assigned a plot of land to grow cassava. The company 
provides the specialists with all the necessary materials and labourers, with each 
planting technique to be judged by the cassava yields. The highest yielding technique is 
then be used as a standard planting technique for the company’s cassava production. Of 
the three planting specialists, the specialist of the Vietnamese technique is 
recommended by the head office in Vietnam.  
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6.4 Company	  C’s	  Embedding	  and	  Engaging	  Process	  
6.4.1 The	  Investor	  
Experience	  in	  Dealing	  with	  Government	  Administration	  
Yoon does not encounter any problems in the ELC acquisition because he does not deal 
directly with the Cambodian government and secures land through another company 
which had been granted an ELC and then divided it and took care of all the paperwork. 
However, any company obtaining and developing an ELC cannot really avoid dealing 
with red tape, as ELC’s need to seek government approval for every land development 
activity. They also need to submit quarterly progress reports to the government bodies. 
Luckily, for Mr Yoon, the Cambodian general manager takes care of these matters. 
Nevertheless, Mr Yoon notes that dealing with the red tape can be expensive. For 
example, in order to speed up the approval process on Company C’s request, the 
company has to pay some unofficial fees. 
Operational	  Challenges	  
Mr Yoon considers that managing Cambodian staff is another operational challenge. 
“Their salary, you know, is not enough. When we hire them, they just work, but they 
don’t work hard enough,” Mr Yoon explains in discussing his experience in managing 
Cambodian personnel. He admits that managing Cambodian employees is a challenge 
for a foreigner due to the different work cultures and expectations. He considers that the 
employees’ attitude to work is laid-back and indicates lack of commitment to the 
company. He justifies their poor performance by saying they are struggling to balance 
earnings and living expenses, but has no strategy apart from financial incentives to 
motivate them to work harder for the company and share its vision. He explains that 
“the company hasn’t made any profit yet.” Because it is in an early stage of 
development, it cannot offer higher wages to employees. 
Mr Yoon acknowledges that communication plays a vital role in managing his business 
in a foreign country, and admits that the language barrier is a challenge in dealing with 
local people, noting, “Different cultures are difficult for doing business in here. 
Communication is the technique in solving difficulty.” He does not speak the local 
language and most of the local people do not speak Korean or English but he seems to 
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have no intention of learning the local language. Instead, he delegates all 
communication-related issues to the Cambodian general manager who is skilled in 
dealing with Cambodian employees and local authorities. 
Support	  from	  the	  Sub-­‐national	  Government	  
Mr Yoon always attends meetings with sub-national authorities, even at the commune 
level. The authorities, especially at the commune and village level, barely speak English 
or Korean; however, Mr Yoon claims to have a good relationship with them and can 
gain their support with the help of the Cambodian general manager. The company has 
managed to avoid land conflicts with the local community. Before starting its operations, 
the company officially marked its ELC territory, excluding all the overlapping areas 
claimed by local villagers from the company’s ELC, and securing the cadastral land title. 
Thus, Company C’s management team uses an effective method when legalising its 
ELC to attract more support from the authorities. Handling conflicts with the local 
community is challenging for the sub-national authorities, as they prefer not to be 
perceived as taking sides with the company.   
Contributions	  to	  Local	  People	  
While contributing to the local community is part of Company C’s ELC master plan, it 
does not seem to be a priority because, according to the company’s management, its 
ELC development is at an early stage and is not yet making a profit. In fact, Mr Yoon 
claims that the company plans to contribute to the local community through education 
and skill development in the future. “We cannot give them money because we are a 
company. But, we can supply them with different things such as skills and education,” 
says Mr Yoon. The Korean CEO has close contact with church people in Korea who 
agree to build a church and school in Company C’s ELC where most local villagers 
practice Buddhism.  When the fieldwork was concluded in March 2013, the 
construction plans have not yet been finalised. The church and school projects are 
expected to provide bibles and skills training for the company’s employees and local 
community. 
Best	  Practice	  
Due to the early stage of the plantation development, Mr Yoon finds it is too early to 
discuss his company’s best practice. He considers that securing a land title for the ELC 
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as best practice for his business in Cambodia. Unlike many other companies, his 
company lawfully excluded all the overlapping land and did not have any land conflicts 
with local people in the communities. This success may be attributed to the land title 
registration and the manageable size of the ELC.  
Handling	  Land	  Disputes	  
Unlike other ELC companies, Company C has encountered no complaints from the 
local community as it settled all the overlapping areas and secured its land title. “…we 
have all the legal rights to stop the illegal land clearing by the local people,” says Mr 
Yoon. While it has encountered some illegal encroachments, mostly from newcomers, 
these do not concern Mr Yoon as his company took the necessary legal measurements 
to secure its ELC’s land holdings. Therefore land conflicts are easily resolved as any 
land clearing on the company’s ELC is considered unlawful according to the company’s 
land title. 
6.4.2 Company	  Employees	  
Cambodian employees, especially at the management level, say they are empowered by 
the Korean top management which effectively delegates the company’s operations to 
them: “The Korean management only cares for the final result. They don’t care what I 
did in order to get the document approved by the relevant authorities,” says Participant 
3.2.  For example, although this is the first time he has worked for a Korean company, 
the Cambodian general manager feels empowered and trusted by top management. He 
states that Company C’s Korean management acknowledge his capacity and ability and 
he feels accepted and appreciated by them. The Korean management always consult 
him and seek his intervention or opinion when there are difficult issues. 
The office-based employees refer to Mr Yoon as “the big boss”. The researcher 
observes that they have adopted the Korean greeting culture, for example, they normally 
bow before speaking to Mr Yoon or leaving his office. The company’s Cambodian 
employees describe their social relationships with Mr Yoon and the Korean technical 
manager as not close, and say they are more comfortable discussing their problems or 
opinions with the Cambodian general manager. While those who have been working 
closely with Mr Yoon claim to appreciate his commitment to the company, they only 
have a professional relationship. Mr Yoon’s social relationship with the Cambodian 
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manager is not close either. For example, when the two general managers whose offices 
are located about 300 kilometres from each other meet, they spend all their time 
discussing work. There is no social interaction after their meetings.  
“The Korean managers don’t understand Cambodian culture and tradition; they don’t 
know how things work,” explains Participant 3.2. Some Cambodian employees have 
negative opinions of the Korean’s management style, describing it as being direct and 
hurrying people to doing their work. This style does not work effectively in the 
Cambodian context where people tend to be asked indirectly and treated politely. They 
reported that it not only causes miscommunication in the workplace, but also de-
motivates employees. According to the Cambodian general manager, these opinions 
result from cultural differences, citing an increasing number of miscommunications 
between Cambodian and Korean personnel at the provincial office. To improve the 
working environment he advises Mr Yoon and the Korean technical manager to adjust 
their management style and notices an improvement in Mr Yoon’s behaviour. But the 
Korean technical manager does not change his behaviour.  
According to the Cambodian general manager, Company C’s best practice includes 
securing the ELC, the land title and the land encroachment prevention strategy to avoid 
land disputes with local people. Compared to other active ELCs in the local community, 
Company C has the lowest record of land disputes with local people and all have been 
effectively settled. Its land encroachment prevention strategy plays a key role in keeping 
it out of conflicts with the local community. To avoid further illegal encroachments, it 
has employed a special team to patrol the ELC each day.  
In addition, the Cambodian general manager considers Company C’s investment is a 
source of job and business opportunities for people in or beyond the local communities. 
Currently, about 30 per cent of the day labourers are domestic economic migrants who 
have settled near the company’s ELC borders. The other 70 per cent are recruited from 
elsewhere. No local villagers work for Company C. Despite job advertisement banners 
in the commune, only a few local villagers express interest in working for Company C. 
This implies that the company’s advertisements are irrelevant to the local community.    
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“We will need to buy more cassava from farmers as our production will not be enough 
for the factory production,” says Participant 3.2. Company C is also expected to 
generate more and regular employment and business opportunities in the future when, 
instead of selling raw cassava roots, it sets up a cassava-processing factory. Due to its 
current plantation size, the company may need to source cassava from other local 
producers to meet the demand for the factory production.  
Despite his lengthy work experience, the Cambodia general manager said that dealing 
with the Cambodian government is still a major challenge for Company C. Issues 
include:  red tape, outdated information, limited dissemination of laws at the grass-roots 
level and limited capacity and short-term thinking of local authorities. The general 
manager reported that the time spent getting approval from the relevant authorities has 
delayed the company’s operations. To overcome the challenges, the general manager 
uses strategies such as paying unofficial fees to deal with the relevant government 
officers to speed up the process. 
Another challenge is the lack of coordination between—and slow information flow 
from—national and sub-national levels of government. As part of his job the 
Cambodian general manager needs to be updated about government investment and 
ELC regulations and laws. To gain more support from local authorities he plays a 
proactive role in sharing updated information, including any approval given to 
Company C with the relevant authorities, with the commune and village chiefs. “… he 
[a commune councillor] only thinks short-term, but we think long-term. He thinks it’s 
the best choice for him at the moment as he could get something out of that [decision], 
but he didn’t think about problems he may get in the future, for example, allowing 
illegal settlement in compensation to some benefits,” says Participant 3.2. The short-
term interest of the local authorities is a challenge for the company, especially in 
dealing with illegal land encroachment. The Cambodian general manager says he gets 
the impression that the commune councillors lack long-term vision when making 
important judgments, particularly concerning illegal land claims. 
The limited knowledge that rural villagers have about land rights is another challenge 
for Company C’s operation. The general manager claims that rural villagers do not 
understand land laws. In most cases, encroachers claim to be lawfully clearing the land 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 132 
in the ELC as it is forest land. The Cambodian general manager’s strategy in dealing 
with them varies from case to case, but he frequently hands them over to the commune 
chief.  
Besides the administrative challenges, the project manager says another challenge for 
Company C is finding a partner to invest in the business. During the fieldwork, it was in 
the process of attracting other partners. The future shareholders are not limited to 
Koreans. The Cambodian general manager mentioned that the company’s priority is to 
ensure the plantation development goes smoothly and to avoid adverse publicity in 
order to gain the confidence of potential shareholders. 
6.4.3 Seasonal	  Labourers	  
There have been some job opportunities for the local community since Company C 
started to develop the ELC, including unskilled tasks such as unloading cassava trees 
from trucks, clearing debris, weeding, digging, planting, spraying pesticide, and 
applying fertilizers and chemicals. The labourers report that they have been approached 
at home by Cambodian supervisors whenever the company needs workers.  
“He treats us like we are cattle,” says Participant 3.3, referring to the Korean technical 
manager who oversees the plantation. The casual day labourers say the workload is not 
heavy and they are paid on time and the correct amount. They work on a time basis, 
meaning they can leave the assigned work when it is time to go home, even if they have 
not finished the job. However, they feel pressure from the Korean technical manager 
whom they describe as pushy: “He is rude. Everybody nicknames him ‘A Chruok’ 
(‘pig’). He yells at labourers who he thinks are less active,” says Participant 3.4.  Thus 
labourers who have alternative sources of income have stopped working at the ELC. 
This may be one of the reasons why Company C finds it hard to attract local day 
labourers even though it offers pay rates comparable to other companies in the area.  
6.4.4 Local	  Community	  
Socioeconomic	  Contributions	  
Most villagers in the Sila commune engage in rice production, and some collect non-
timber products as an additional income-generation activity. Those who work as 
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seasonal day labourers are newcomers from other districts or provinces who live on 
cleared land near the company’s plantation site. In early 2013 about 30 families settled 
in a newly established residential area in the forest near the ELC. Most of them first 
arrived in the commune between 2010 and 2011. The newcomers say that local 
authorities are aware of their settlement and by the time the fieldwork concludes, there 
are no objections from the authorities, even though the newcomers are living on forest 
land.  
The villagers who do not work for Company C are unhappy about its presence, 
complaining that it does not benefit local people. “I don’t see any benefit generated 
from this company to us. The company has never given anything to us. The company 
only makes it difficult for us, for example, we can’t free our cattle in that bush area 
anymore,” says Participant 3.7. Participant 3.9 agrees, adding, “I think this company 
does not benefit us at all. Since the company has arrived, we cannot do our farming on 
our land. We cannot grow cassava as we used to. Now, I cannot find any Kampoul 
[Triang]21 as the company already cleared the forestland.” Before Company C’s arrival, 
the ELC was forest land that everybody could access to look for wild plants and wild 
animals for supplementary income, to cultivate their crops, and to graze their cattle. The 
company informs local residents that it will impound any cattle walking into their ELC 
and owners will have to pay a fine to have them released. However, although no penalty 
has been yet been imposed, as noted by Participant 3.13, the threat works as a deterrent, 
“We are very poor. We can’t afford the fine set on our cattle by the company.” A few 
local residents report that the company’s employees have seized their cattle and warned 
them they would be penalised in the future.  In general, the villagers who do not directly 
benefit from the company complain that life is harder since the company started its 
operations. 
Infrastructural	  Contributions	  
The company does not make any infrastructural contribution to the local community; 
instead it damages the village road. Villagers who reside along the track leading to the 
forest and the company’s plantation complain that the company’s trucks and land-
clearing machinery have damaged the track. It is not meant to be used by cars or heavy 
vehicles, as it is only two-metres wide and designed for cattle carts. In the rainy season 
                                                
21a wild plant used for making mats, sacks or roofing  
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there are large muddy puddles, some deep enough to cover half a motorcycle wheel. 
Company C has not yet rehabilitated the village track, and it has not invested in much 
infrastructure inside the ELC. Unlike Company A’s concrete roads, the trails inside 
Company C’s ELC are only unpaved dirt.  
The newcomers report that they are happy with the company’s plantation development. 
They live in an area that has been converted from dry forest land to housing. They faced 
water shortages before the company set up a well with a pump in the plantation. 
Previously they transported water some distance for their daily consumption. “I am 
thankful to the company. There is no water stream or pump well in this place. … Now, 
we use water from the company’s pumped well,” says Participant 3.12. The residents 
normally collect water from the pumped well in the evening when the company’s 
employees finish work. The company’s plantation is always left unguarded at night as 
all the company employees live outside the ELC. 
Land	  Disputes	  
“I cleared this land in 2010 before Company C arrived. I built my house and have 
grown some crops on the land since. The company just arrived in 2012 and started to 
clear two-thirds of my land,” says Participant 3.9. This is typical reasoning of 
newcomers and local villagers in regard to forest land ownership. Local people consider 
forest land as a free communal asset for everyone. Actually, the villagers do not know 
that they are cultivating land that had been granted to Company C. Most do not know 
about the 2001 Land Law. Moreover, they do not understand how Company C has been 
granted the ELC in their community and they were not consulted. The company has 
officially excluded all the overlapping land, according to the government’s technical 
evaluation report dated 19 August 2009, conducted as part of the ELC granting process.  
Since the company secured the land title, only residents in the newly established 
community have complained about their land being lost to the company. “When I came 
back home, the company people already cleared my backyard. I talked to them [the 
clearing team] and they stopped clearing more of my land,” says Participant 3.12, 
sharing his experience of dealing with the land conflict. The affected families in the 
newly established community consider themselves to be landowners as they have 
resided and cultivated the land since 2010, before the company clearing team arrived. 
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Some report the clearing incidents to local village and commune chiefs who visit the 
areas and intervene with the land clearing team. At the time of writing this thesis, these 
land conflicts had not been resolved: families had not received their land back but the 
clearing team had moved away to clear other areas. After this incident, the residents 
said the company marked their territory more clearly by placing concrete and painted 
poles on the border at 10-metre intervals. In addition to the above claimants, residents 
whose land is located inside the company’s territory cannot claim back their land. The 
affected families feel unfairly treated as they had cleared the land at least two years 
before the company’s clearing team arrived in 2012, without knowing that the land had 
been granted to the company in 2009.       
6.4.5 Local	  Business	  Owners	  
Company C has no transactions with any local business people. All the raw materials 
and services are supplied by businesses from outside the communities and the country. 
Microbusiness owners near the company’s billboard said there has been no difference in 
their business activities since the company arrived, because their customers are villagers 
who have no contact with the company’s operation. “No, they [company staff] have 
never come to buy my product,” says Participant 3.6.  There is one exception—a food 
stall owner near the temporary accommodation for the clearing team claims that her 
sales have increased since the team moved into the accommodation. 
6.4.6 Commune	  and	  Village	  Authorities	  
According to the commune authorities, the company has cooperated with them since it 
was granted the ELC. They appreciate the respect that the top Korean management 
shows them by introducing themselves. Moreover, the Korean and Cambodian general 
managers always attend meetings with the local commune:  “When the company first 
arrived in 2009, they made an appointment with the commune councillors to introduce 
themselves. The company’s Korean director [the CEO] came to meet with us at that 
time,” says Participant 3.5. However, the commune and village authorities are not 
informed about the company’s ELC application and approval.   
The commune chief acknowledges that there is ongoing illegal land encroachment on 
the company’s ELC, mostly by people from different provinces. The common practice 
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is for the company to bring the encroachers to the commune office. The commune chief 
advises them that it is illegal and makes them agree in writing to stop clearing the land.  
However, the practice is different for locals: “For some small [illegal land clearing] 
cases caused by my villagers, I asked the company to compromise and close their eyes. 
I think the company people are easy to talk to. They understand us and want to help 
local people,” says Participant 3.5. Due to hardship of some local residents, the 
commune councillors sometimes ignore local villagers clearing forest and company 
land. The commune chief sometimes even asks the company to compromise with the 
villagers, but its management finds this hard to accept.  
“I think if the company does not invest here, it is better,” says Participant 3.5. 
According to commune councillors, a win-win solution would be for the company to 
stop investing in the ELC. They claim that the local community does not socially or 
economically benefit from the company’s investment. This is supported by local 
authorities who assert that the company has not made any infrastructural contribution to 
local communities, and has not even rehabilitated the road they damaged. Moreover, 
local residents do not benefit from the company’s job creation as few villagers work for 
it. Another reason for the company to stop investing in the community is the poor soil 
quality of the ELC. The local authorities are aware of the infertile soil condition in the 
company plantation area and think that the cassava yields will be low.  
6.4.7 Provincial	  Authorities	  
In contrast to local authorities, the provincial government supports the ELC policy and 
the national government’s decision to grant the ELC to Company C, believing that if 
ELC investors develop the land according to their contract with the government, the 
local community will benefit. The provincial authority claims that the ELC policy will 
also help to prevent illegal land encroachment. Overall, the provincial authority is 
happy with the company’s legal approach to avoiding land conflicts with the local 
community.    
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6.5 Summary	  
Company C is an investment project of a Korean conglomerate. It holds a 70-year legal 
right to cultivate a rubber and cassava plantation on more than half of 10,000 hectares 
of ELC land in the Sila commune. Company C is founded by a Korean management 
team led by a Korean CEO based in Vietnam. After securing the ELC, the CEO 
delegated Company C’s day-to-day management to a Korean general manager, Mr 
Yoon and a Cambodian general manager. Mr Yoon deals more with the financial 
management and strategic planning, while the Cambodian general manager deals with 
the ELC’s legal documents and with local authorities.  
Unlike the other two companies studied, this company does not apply for the Korean 
government’s Greenfield investment loan. Due to the poor soil quality of the ELC, 
Company C has to adjust its production plan in order to allocate more land to planting 
cassava rather than rubber. As with other foreign investors, Mr Yoon faces challenges in 
managing local employees due to different working cultures and expectations. 
Surprisingly, Company C manages to avoid land conflicts with local villagers as they 
legalised their ELC through securing a cadastral land title and have their employees 
patrolling the ELC boundaries to prevent illegal land encroachment. 
Company C fails to engage with the local community for three reasons. Firstly its ELC 
development is isolated from the community. The Korean management are not keen to 
establish a close relationship with the local community, believing that it is not necessary 
and the company is legitimate in the ELC development. Secondly, the local community 
does not welcome the company’s investment in their community, complaining that its 
arrival disrupts their livelihood and does not benefit locals. Thirdly, there are gaps 
between the national government, sub-national government and local community 
concerning the ELC granting process, including lack of consultation with the local 
community. These barriers have prevented the local community from benefitting from 
this company’s ELC investment.   

  
Chapter	  7: Embedding	  Processes	  of	  Korean	  FDIs	  
ANALYSIS	  OF	  THE	  CASES	  
7.1 Introduction	  
Based on the empirical descriptions of the three case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this 
chapter now turns to the analysis of the data gathered for each case. It analyses the data 
from each case according to four main themes: operational pattern, entrepreneurship, 
stakeholder engagement and value added. These themes are derived from the four sub-
questions in order to demonstrate the embeddedness and contributions of each company 
to the local community. The aim of this intra-case analysis is to relate the main findings 
of each case related to these four themes and to answer the four sub-questions 
accordingly.  
This chapter has five sections. This section introduces the chapter. The second, third, 
and fourth sections focus on the analyses of Case Studies One, Two and Three 
respectively. The intra-case analysis sections are outlined in a standardised format, 
according to the four main themes. The analysis of each theme will be concluded by 
answering the corresponding sub-question for each case. The last section is a summary 
of the chapter. 
7.2 Analysis	  of	  Case	  Study	  One	  
7.2.1 Operations	  in	  Economic	  Land	  Concession	  
The within-case analysis reveals that the FDI investor’s (Mr Lee’s) approach to the 
establishment of Company A in the agricultural sector in Cambodia is a locally 
embedded one. Mr Lee has familiarised himself with the business environment and 
government system in Cambodia prior to establishing Company A (see Section 4.3). 
Thus the findings of this case extend previous literature on large-scale land investments 
by Hallam (2009) and De Schutter (2009) through providing insights in regard to a 
Korean FDI’s extent, nature and operational pattern. The current findings extend 
Hallam (2011) research by providing empirical evidence of a privately owned Korean 
FDI in an ELC in Cambodia to support these authors’ claim about the increasing trend 
of privately owned FDIs in large-scale land.  
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Mr Lee directly and actively operates Company A in the rural Cambodian community 
(see Section 4.3). The data demonstrates that although he has no experience in 
agricultural business, he manages to run the company smoothly, including introducing a 
new working culture. In the first year of its operation, the investor relied heavily on 
Korean personnel and experts. However, this operational system proves to be 
ineffective, forcing him to restructure Company A to be a locally based operation, using 
Cambodian experts. After the restructuring, fewer Korean personnel remain in top 
management, while more Cambodians are promoted to middle and low-level 
management positions. The current findings extend Hallam’s (2011) research which 
claims investors of large-scale agricultural land investments tend to take a passive role 
in managing investments, due to their limited technical knowledge about agricultural 
production. This dissertation finds that despite the fact that Mr Lee has limited technical 
knowledge of agricultural production, he is actively involved in the operation, rather 
than relying solely on specialists.  
Notwithstanding its infrastructural contributions to the local community, Company A’s 
engagement with local businesses is found to be rather limited (see Sections 4.3.5 and 
4.4). Its business model is vertical and does not have any farming contracts or 
partnerships with Cambodians. All three companies Mr Lee owns in Cambodia have 
close business transactions with each other. The analysis finds that Mr Lee’s business 
transaction model manifests a basic Chaebol model, as described by Chang and Shin 
(2007), in that he establishes and owns some basic supply chains for his business 
(Company A). These findings also imply that Company A may not need to engage in 
the local community.  
Sub-question 1: How do Korean companies operate economic land concessions in local 
Cambodian communities? 
Company A, a privately owned FDI from Korea, takes a legal approach to the ELC 
acquisition from the Cambodian government. The founding investor has an extensive 
knowledge of the local business environment. He employs a locally embedded approach 
to establish the company. In addition, he introduces a new working culture in the 
company. All of the management team is strongly encouraged to involve their 
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subordinates in every stage of their planning. Although he is actively involved in the 
business management, he depends on local staff to develop the plantation. 
Company A has developed the ELC in a vertical business model and there is no contract 
farming or partnership with Cambodians. Nevertheless, the investor demonstrates a 
positive attitude towards establishing good relationships with the local community 
through providing some infrastructural contributions. The company provides the staff 
with furnished and clean accommodation and free utilities. Evidence of Company A’s 
labourers’ strategy suggests that the investor is interested in providing jobs for the local 
community, especially the company’s neighbouring communities. 
7.2.2 Entrepreneurship	  	  
Opportunity	  Recognition	  	  	  
The evidence in Case Study One suggests that Mr Lee is good at opportunity 
recognition and identifies and develops three entrepreneurial opportunities in Cambodia. 
While the first of these is complex, he nevertheless manages to develop the 
opportunities into three full business plans. In Mr Lee’s case, the opportunities emerge 
from changes in politics and regulations in Cambodia. These findings provide empirical 
evidence to confirm Schumpeter’s (1934) claims that political and regulatory changes 
are sources of opportunities.  
The first entrepreneurial opportunity that Mr Lee developed results from a coup de 
force22 in July 1997. About six months after the coup, he visited Cambodia, where the 
socio-economic conditions were weak. Companies were severely affected by the coup 
de force, and estimated compensation claims made by the companies on the Cambodian 
government went up to USD 100 million (Peou, 1998). The chaotic situation in 
Cambodia at that time may have frightened many (potential) foreign investors, but Mr 
Lee sees the situation as a source of entrepreneurial opportunity. Based on his 
knowledge of the small Korean population in Cambodia, he discovers an 
entrepreneurial opportunity for his consulting business.  
                                                
22 On 5th–6th July, the co-prime minister, Hun Sen, staged a coup against his political rival Prince 
Ranariddh and FUNCIPEC (for more detail see Peou (1998)).   
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Mr Lee’s second business opportunity emerges from changes in agricultural investment 
regulations endorsed by the Cambodian government. The government’s commitment to 
promoting the agricultural sector provides foreign investors with cheap and large-scale 
land concessions (called economic land concession) for up to 99 years) The ELC policy 
generates Mr Lee’s idea for his second business, Company A.  
Mr Lee’s third entrepreneurial opportunity also derives from the strong commitment of 
the Cambodian government to promoting the agricultural sector. “Cambodia is an 
agricultural country and at this moment the government emphasises agriculture very 
strongly,” Mr Lee notes. Recognising the strong commitment of the government, he 
develops a full business plan for his third business in Cambodia. 
The data suggests that Mr Lee’s approach to the opportunities discussed above shifts 
from a prospective customers’ perspective to an unemployed resources’ perspective 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003, pp. 108-109). He develops the first business opportunity by 
looking at his prospective Korean customers. He understands how Koreans think and is 
able to predict what they want as new foreign investors in this least developed country. 
Thus, his approach to his first opportunity development in Cambodia is to put himself in 
his prospective customers’ shoes. After familiarising himself with the business 
environment in Cambodia, he approaches the second and third opportunities from the 
perspective of unemployed resources. He develops his second entrepreneurial 
opportunity to make use of the ELCs granted by the Cambodian government and the 
low interest-rate loan provided by the Korean government. Similarly, he makes use of 
the relaxed tax on agricultural products and supplies offered by the Cambodian 
government to develop the third opportunity.   
The nature of Mr Lee’s opportunity recognition is associated with a number of attributes 
frequently discussed in the literature: personal traits (optimism, confidence and 
creativity), prior knowledge, social networks and alertness to information (Shane, 2003). 
He has been optimistic about business opportunities since the start of his career. Instead 
of seeing risks in the chaos resulting from the 1997 coup, he predicts that more 
Korean’s will invest in Cambodia and will be his prospective clients. He is also an 
optimist and confident in developing his second entrepreneurial opportunity, a 
completely new business terrain for him (see Section 4.3.3). Clearly, his optimism 
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triggers opportunity recognition. This finding is consistent with those of Krueger and 
Dickson (1994), Krueger and Brazeal (1994), Guth et al. (1991), Neck and Manz (1992) 
and Neck and Manz (1996), who support the notion that those who see opportunities in 
new information, as opposed to risks, should be more likely to discover entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Shane, 2003).  
The data implies that Mr Lee is creative, evidenced in his opportunity discovery and 
development. After visiting his friend’s small-scale cassava plantation, he forms and 
develops a business idea into a full business plan for a large-scale rubber plantation, 
about 19 times larger than his friend’s plantation. The evidence in Mr Lee’s case 
supports the notion that creativity plays an important role in entrepreneurial decision-
making and opportunity identification, as noted by Schumpeter (1934), Kaye (1986), 
Hills et al. (1997) and Hyrsky and Kangasharju (1998).  
Prior knowledge also plays an important role in Mr Lee’s opportunity recognition. He 
has considerable practical business management and life experience. He founded and 
successfully ran his own businesses in Korea prior to coming to Cambodia and he has 
gained knowledge of how to serve markets. In addition, he worked in the public sector, 
where he was able to gain insight into legislation and the public sector in Korea, which 
he claims is similar to the Cambodian system. He travelled to 40 developed and 
developing countries before coming to Cambodia, supporting Shane’s (2003, p. 46) 
claim that life experience, such as job function and variation in experience, increases the 
probability that people will discover opportunities. 
Mr Lee’s prior knowledge and life experience contributed to his opportunity recognition, 
clearly evidenced in his second and third opportunity development in Cambodia. He 
gains knowledge about markets through his business providing consulting services to 
Korean investors in Cambodia, and enabling him to obtain valuable information across 
markets, which allows him to discover opportunities. He gains vital information about 
agricultural markets through his experience in acquiring ELCs for his clients. “… so I 
have enough experience to operate my own business. Of course, practices in agriculture 
are different,” Mr Lee recounts. With his existing marketing information he can relate 
the agricultural business concept to his prior knowledge about how to serve markets, 
leading to him developing the idea of an agricultural venture for his second business.  
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After operating his second business in Cambodia, he is familiar with the products 
needed for the operation and their distribution and sources of supply. Moreover, he 
notices that the local demand for fertilizers and agricultural machinery is high. He 
therefore establishes his third business in Cambodia supplying fertilizers and 
agricultural machinery imported from Korea. This finding is consistent with Shane’s 
(2000) claim that a person’s knowledge of product development and distribution 
increases the likelihood of his or her entrepreneurial opportunity discovery.  
The findings in Mr Lee’s case are also consistent with those of Casson (1982), Delmar 
and Davidsson (2000) and Lerner and Hendeles (1996), who argue that geographic 
mobility and participating in a business start-up increase the likelihood that a person 
will gain access to necessary information for opportunity discovery. However, the 
current finding rejects Shane’s (2000) claim that an entrepreneur will discover only 
those opportunities related to his or her prior knowledge. The evidence from Mr Lee’s 
case clearly suggests that his prior knowledge plays an important role in his opportunity 
recognition; however, it is not necessarily limited to the opportunities related to his 
prior knowledge. As illustrated in his second opportunity recognition, he discovers 
opportunity in a completely new business terrain.  
The nature of Mr Lee’s networks may also contribute to his opportunity recognition. He 
establishes networks with diverse groups of people, ranging from Korean associations 
to Cambodian investors (see Section 4.3.3). Additionally, he extends his Korean 
networks to local business people and Cambodian government officials. He actively 
participates in a yearly public and business forum, an ideal place for him to meet 
prominent Cambodian business people and high-ranking officials. He claims he has 
established some good relationships with Cambodian business people and influential 
government officials. He also has connections with other investors in the agricultural 
sector. Furthermore, he has established a relationship with the provincial government at 
his rubber plantation. Thus, given his multi-layered social networks, Mr Lee is in a good 
position to find valuable business information and recognise business opportunities. 
Firstly, he has access to information. Secondly, as he is alert to business opportunities, it 
is easy for him to discover new business opportunities. This finding supports Hills et 
al.’s (1997) research that entrepreneurs’ networks are important to opportunity 
recognition.   
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Another attribute to opportunity recognition is Mr Lee’s purposive visit to Cambodia. 
He visits Cambodia to look for business opportunities; hence he is alert to all business 
possibilities. It does not take long for him to recognise the business opportunities 
available. Moreover, he has market knowledge when providing his consulting services 
to his customers. He is especially alert to the demand for rubber in the world market. 
This market knowledge contributes to him recognising the opportunity for an 
agricultural business. Mr Lee’s information-search attribute supports the notion that 
“people are more likely to find information that is useful to the discovery process 
through deliberate search than through random behaviour” (Shane, 2003, p. 48). 
Being alert to business opportunities is clear in Mr Lee’s continual discovery of 
entrepreneurial opportunities in Cambodia. The nature of the existence of these 
opportunities suggests he is alert to business opportunities (see Section 4.3.5). This 
empirical evidence is consistent with research that supports the notion that high 
awareness increases the likelihood of an opportunity being recognised (Gaglio and Taub, 
1992; Hisrich, 1990; Ray and Cardozo, 1996; Sathe, 1989).  
Opportunity	  Exploitation	  
Evidence from the case study indicates that Mr Lee is good at opportunity exploitation. 
He exploits three recognised entrepreneurial opportunities in Cambodia. He gathers all 
the information required and evaluates it based on his business management, start-up 
and industry experience, and his personal traits, which are aligned with Shane’s (2003, 
pp. 75-83) claim that one’s experience in start-up, management and industry, and 
personal traits play vital roles in one’s opportunity exploitation. Mr Lee has two 
decades of management experience and has set up a number of companies. From an 
operational perspective, he is more than capable of starting up and running a new 
company. This finding concurs with earlier empirical research supporting the argument 
that prior business and start-up experience enables a person to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Cobas, 1986; Delmar and Davidsson, 2000; Evans and Leighton, 1989; 
Evans, 1989; Robinson and Sexton, 1994; Schiller and Crewson, 1997). 
In addition, Mr Lee has knowledge about the market and industry of the new business 
opportunity that he is going to exploit. For example, he discovers that the demand for 
rubber in the world market keeps increasing; confirming that his decision to exploit the 
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opportunity to set up a rubber plantation is right and profitable, which is consistent with 
studies such as Aldrich (1999), Johnson and Cathcart (1979) and Kaufmann (1999). 
Furthermore, he has links with various groups of people in the business environment 
both in Cambodia and back in Korea. His position in these social networks provides 
potential to exploit the identified opportunity. This finding confirms Aldrich’s (1999) 
claim that to exploit an opportunity, an entrepreneur must be able to gain access to 
resources and information that facilitate the exploitation process. These resources are 
often channeled through a person’s social networks.  
Importantly, Mr Lee is optimistic, confident, a risk-taker and desires achievement. He 
sees possibilities instead of risks. He projects profitable business opportunities in the 
long run and is confident that he can manage the business successfully and smoothly. 
As soon as he starts Company A, he dedicates himself to being the first successful 
Korean agricultural company operating in the sandy soil. These personal traits have 
encouraged him to exploit the opportunity, which reflects earlier research such as Wu 
(1989), Caird (1991), Cromie and O'Donaghue (1992), Collins et al. (2004) and Begley 
(1995).  
The data demonstrates that Mr Lee exploits opportunities through new venture creation. 
As suggested by Venkataraman (1997), this process involves not only establishing 
routines but also structures that will be used to re-combine resources into the product or 
service sold to customers and to create the entity that will undertake the combined 
activity (Shane, 2003). The process of Mr Lee’s new venture organising manifests his 
entrepreneurial activities and strong ability in new venture formation.  
Like many new venture formations, resource acquisition is challenging. Mr Lee starts 
his companies in Cambodia with his own savings and earnings from other companies in 
Korea. After securing the ELC, he begins to look for more investment funds from other 
sources (see Section 4.3). The use of his own savings for starting up the business is 
consistent with several studies such as Aldrich (1999), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) 
and Roberts (1991), who note that self-financing is a solution to resource acquisition, 
due to uncertainty and information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and resource 
providers. His resource acquisition starts from self-financing to seeking resources from 
other sources due to costly investment. His financial strategy supports Smith’s (1967, 
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pp. 46-47) claim that in addition to using available resources, entrepreneurs utilise a 
variety of sources of finance such as bank loans, overdrafts, hire purchase, leasing and 
various government or local authority grants.      
As evident in his extensive social networks and experience in setting up and managing 
previous companies, Mr Lee has the human capital necessary for establishing the new 
venture. He looks for an ELC, registers Company A, recruits employees, and sets up an 
organisational chart and human resource management. There is evidence that in the 
process of organising this new venture, he uses social networks to get access to 
information and resources (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.5). He also recruits staff through 
job advertisements in local newspapers and on radio. This finding extends the work of 
Aldrich (1999) and Francis and Sandberg (2000), who found that entrepreneurs 
frequently hire people with whom they have direct ties, such as their friends or close 
social contacts, in early recruiting efforts. Thus, the entrepreneurs seem to utilise all the 
available sources in staff recruitment. However, the current finding contradicts that of 
Zimmer and Aldrich (1987) as Mr Lee does not involve his spouse or other family 
members in his new ventures in Cambodia.         
The evidence of Case Study One suggests that Mr Lee systematically organizes 
Company A and its employees into different divisions and departments. Each staff has 
clear job responsibilities and reporting lines: “Without the system, we cannot manage 
them [employees] because a rubber plantation is handled by people not machinery,” he 
explains. He also establishes a routine of regular staff meetings to maintain a smooth 
workflow. His employees indicate that they understand their responsibilities and 
company policies and even unskilled workers are fully aware of these policies: “If we 
don’t submit our leave request in advance, they [the company] will deduct two days 
from our salary for one absent day,” says Participant 1.8. This evidence supports the 
findings of Reynolds and White (1997) and Aldrich (1999) that as the entrepreneur hires 
more people, s/he needs to establish mechanisms to monitor and control employees.  
The data indicates that Mr Lee designs the organisational structure for Company A 
based on those of his previous companies. The present findings are consistent with other 
research which finds that new company’s human resource practices typically have their 
origin in the founders’ employment models (Baron et al., 1999; Cooper, 1990; Hannan 
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et al., 1996). However, when the organisational design for Company A proves 
ineffective (see Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2), he then re-designs it. This finding concurs 
with Drucker’s (1985) claim that a willingness to experiment and innovate until one 
discovers what works is an important aspect of successful entrepreneurial behaviour.   
Sub-question 2: To what extent do Korean investors perform their entrepreneurial 
activities in economic land concession development? 
The story of this investor’s venture in Cambodia validates the definition of 
entrepreneurship described in Section 2.4. He performs his entrepreneurial activities 
throughout the ELC’s development processes, ranging from recognising the opportunity 
for the ELC investment to managing Company A and the ELC development. Moreover, 
his entrepreneurial activities are also evident in the two other businesses that spun off 
from his first business in Cambodia. He is good at opportunity recognition and 
exploitation through new venture creation. The findings confirm several factors that 
contribute to the investor’s entrepreneurial activities, including changes in politics and 
regulations for entrepreneurial opportunities; his prior knowledge, personal traits and 
social networks encourage him to be alert to and recognise entrepreneurial opportunities 
(and do not limit him to only recognizing opportunities in the same business terrain); his 
personal traits and knowledge of industry context helped him to successfully evaluate 
opportunities; and with his rich entrepreneurial, human and social capital, he managed 
to repeatedly set up new companies, thus exploiting three entrepreneurial opportunities 
in Cambodia. 
7.2.3 Stakeholder	  Engagement	  
Mr Lee’s extensive and diversified social networks are concentrated outside the local 
community, as shown in Figure 7.1. The findings suggest that he manages to establish 
good relationships with his Korean directors and Cambodian management team. Due to 
the language barrier, Mr Lee and the Korean directors are unable to communicate with 
their seasonal day labourers, although he expresses interest in making contact with them. 
All communication is therefore bridged by the Cambodian management team. 
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The Korean directors, Cambodian skilled employees and seasonal day labourers may 
have similar interests in Company A, as they all want to be employed and paid. Thus, 
they may share the company’s goals and vision. In fact, the Cambodian skilled 
employees’ shared interests in the company do not come naturally. The data shows that 
most employees consider the workplace environment is an important reason for them to 
remain with the company. In the first year of its operation, the Cambodian managers 
were excluded from the development of its operational plan, making them feel less 
valued by the company than the Korean personnel. The lack of a good workplace 
environment is evident in the low production rate in the first year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Company A's Stakeholder Relationship 
Source: The author, 2015 
However, Mr Lee is able to bridge the gap and improve the workplace environment. 
The employees assert that they like their current workplace environment better than the 
previous one. He pays attention to his staff as he considers them as dominant 
stakeholders who are both powerful and legitimate and their influence in the firm is 
assured. As they possess power with legitimacy, they form the “dominant coalition” in 
the enterprise (Cyert and March, 1963). This finding supports Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
claim that managers (or in this case the investors) must learn which legitimate 
stakeholders possess power and have the aim of imposing their will on the firm. These 
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stakeholders must be considered if the managers/investors are to serve their legal and 
moral interests.  
Case Study One demonstrates that Mr Lee tries to establish a good relationship with the 
local community through his labourer employment strategy and donations (see Sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2). While he wants to make a profit from his business, he also wants to 
contribute to the development of local communities. He adopts a classical aid 
development concept by applying the practices of infrastructural contribution: donating 
the concrete bridge, providing health and childcare services, and sponsoring commune 
road rehabilitation and high school students. He thus acknowledges the importance of 
being welcomed by the local community for the success of his business. However, Mr 
Lee’s contributions are not appreciated by the local communities. Apparently, his 
campaign to win support from local people is a one-way approach, assuming that all the 
villagers need are the infrastructural contributions. The local communities do not see 
benefits from the company being in their community, saying its arrival has disrupted 
their daily lives. As a result, the local community does not share the goals and vision of 
his company.  
In fact, Mr Lee’s interaction with local stakeholders—residents (other than his seasonal 
day labourers), businesspeople, and commune and village chiefs—manifests the low-
interaction stakeholder engagement described by Sloan (2009) as the control model. 
Firstly, Mr Lee’s interaction with the local stakeholders is at arm’s-length. Although he 
intends to build a good image of his investment in the community, he personally seems 
to distance himself from local people. He has, for instance, never participated in any 
cultural ceremony at the local pagoda to get to know the local culture and villagers or 
met with the commune council members. Mr Lee does not seem to understand the needs 
of the local community. He will not meet the local community’s expectations unless he 
talks to them and finds out what they want. Showing respect for the local people and 
culture is part of the Cambodian culture. In rural Cambodia, in particular, the 
participation of a newcomer in local community events means a lot to the locals. But his 
lack of direct communication widens the gaps between Company A and the local 
community. Addressing concerns of local people in person and showing them respect in 
a Cambodian way may be worth more than infrastructural contributions. Secondly, the 
local stakeholders have not participated in Mr Lee’s core business operations since the 
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start-up stage. His company does not involve local stakeholders in business partnerships 
or collaboration in its business strategies. Thus, he seems to engage with the local 
stakeholders in order to manage risk rather than viewing them as a source of 
opportunity.  
Therefore, Mr Lee’s low-interaction stakeholder engagement results in his failure to 
gain support from the local stakeholders. Other factors may also contribute to this 
failure such as firstly, he overlooks the different working culture of the government 
officials at the grass-roots and national levels. Because he has a lawful investment 
licensed by the central government, he presumes all local government officials will 
willingly support him and therefore makes no effort to establish a close relationship 
with them like he does with the national government officials. Local government works 
differently from the central government. At the grass-roots level little gestures such as 
greeting in person and showing respect to the officials can make a huge difference. The 
grass-roots government expects Mr Lee to personally attend meetings at the commune 
office to settle land disputes with the local community. However, he instead continues 
to send staff to the meetings on his behalf. His absence is translated by the grass-roots 
government officials as disrespectful behaviour, and he has failed to meet their 
expectations.     
Secondly, the villagers, especially those who have alternative sources of income, have 
different expectations of Company A and Mr Lee than he has actually provided. They 
imply that the local community cannot distinguish foreigners who work for NGOs from 
those in the private sector. Often villagers, especially in rural areas, expect that 
foreigners will help them, perhaps influenced by their experience of development 
activities of expatriates working for NGOs in Cambodia.  Mr Lee may have satisfied the 
local community with all the contributions he makes if he were a local rather than a 
foreign investor. The local community may need time to adjust and to distinguish the 
differences between the foreigners with NGOs and those with the private sector.  
In summary, Mr Lee seems to consider the local stakeholders as discretionary 
stakeholders. To him they are legitimate but have no power to influence the firm and no 
urgent claims on him. In fact, the local community is a very important stakeholder for 
the company (Freeman et al., 2010), and has many issues with and interests  in Mr Lee’s 
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company. However their needs are not recognized or fulfilled by the company. The 
evidence of Mr Lee’s relationship establishment with the local stakeholders is in a form 
of control rather than collaboration (Sloan, 2009). Mr Lee’s stakeholder engagement 
can further be interpreted as a form of “strong paternalism” as described by Greenwood 
(2007); that “strong paternalism” leads firms or management teams to act in the 
perceived interest of legitimate stakeholders without consultation. They also indicate 
that Mr Lee’s company could implement positive changes in the local community 
(Rindova et al., 2009) if only he would see the local community as an important 
stakeholder.  
Sub-question 3: How do Korean investors interact with their stakeholders in local 
communities? 
The findings suggest that the investor’s relationship with local stakeholders is not close. 
He is not engaged in the local community, instead preferring to diversify his wider 
business networks in Cambodia. He employs a control model of stakeholder 
engagement rather than a collaborative one. The interaction between him and local 
stakeholders is channeled through his Cambodian employees. The only group of local 
stakeholders with whom he engages is villagers who work as labourers. Due to poor 
business infrastructure, the company has managed to develop its plantation without any 
interaction with the local community.  
But local stakeholders do not engage in the ELC either. There appears to be a gap 
between stakeholders at the national and local level, and locals have not been involved 
in or informed about the ELC investment since its early stages. Limited knowledge 
about land laws, state land and poor land tenure create conflicts between the company 
and some local stakeholders, making many residents unhappy with its arrival.        
7.2.4 Value	  Added	  
At	  the	  Individual	  Level	  
Mr Lee has established three companies to exploit the opportunities in Cambodia. 
Starting with a consulting firm, he recognises and develops an opportunity for Company 
A. After exploiting that opportunity, he discovers another opportunity for an agricultural 
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supply company. His goal in forming Company A’ is more than just wealth creation, as 
he explains:  “… finally I decided, ok, my final job in my life is [in] agriculture.” 
Moreover, his strategy in employing local labourers and contributing to the local 
community indicates that he tries to create value for the local community, especially for 
residents adjacent to the plantation. This finding supports Rindova et al.’s (2009) view 
that individuals often engage in entrepreneurship for motives other than wealth. 
However, the value added for the local community is limited due to the nature of Mr 
Lee’s relationship with local stakeholders. 
At	  the	  Company	  Level	  	  
The findings suggest that this company creates some value for the local community by 
generating entrepreneurial and business opportunities, job creation and human resource 
development. Most seasonal day labourers are women from the local community. 
Therefore, these findings support Watkins and Fowler (2002) argument that FDI 
companies create employment opportunities for local people. However, most new local 
business start-ups are micro-businesses and are to some extent generated by demand 
from local unskilled day labourers employed by Company A. There is thus no evidence 
of indirect employment created by this company to support the claim of UNCTAD 
(1999, 2005). The current study finds that Company A has invested in local staff 
capacity development, consistent with Lim (2001) and Miyamoto and Todo (2003) 
research that FDI companies contribute to local development through staff training. The 
current finding also supports Braunstein (2006) and Joekes and Weston (1994) claims 
that FDI companies increase employment opportunities for women in poor Asian 
countries.  
Overall, the pattern of local value added generated by the company suggests that the 
impact of the investment on local development is short-term and mainly limited to 
seasonal day-labourer employment. Therefore, the current findings support previous 
research that the positive effects of FDI companies on local development are only 
evident when there are business relations between the FDI and domestic firms (Javorcik, 
2004). The recipient countries can benefit from FDI companies only when their 
development, human resource and infrastructure are at a level that can absorb the 
spillover effects from these companies (Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Blomström et al., 
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1994; Borensztein et al., 1998; Spiezia, 2004; Xu, 2000). In regard to wages, the current 
study finds that Company A pays local rates to its employees which contradicts the 
research of Haddad and Harrison (1993),  Girma et al. (2001) and Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2004), who find that FDI companies pay higher wages in comparison to domestic firms.   
The limited value added for the local community may be caused by a disconnection 
between it and the company. The case study illustrates that the local community is not 
fully engaged in the ELC, even though the central government aims to develop local 
communities through this process. However, the local community and local authorities 
are not well informed about the granting of the ELC, and the arrival of the company that 
is supposed to improve the local community startles local people; only the villagers 
employed on the plantation benefit from the ELC investment. 
The findings suggest that the separation between the local community and the ELC 
investment can be mainly attributed to the gaps between stakeholders at the local level 
and the central government. Local people are not consulted about whether or not they 
want the investment in their community and/or what concerns they may have about 
project. The national government does not coordinate with government at the grass-
roots level. The commune council is not informed about the arrival of Company A. The 
council does not even have a copy of the economic land concession (ELC) contract 
and/or the company’s investment plan. The gaps between these stakeholders indicate 
that the national government is not embedded in local community.  
Sub-question 4: What value added do Korean companies generate in local communities 
and the Cambodian agricultural sector? 
At the organisational level, Company A generates a few entrepreneurial opportunities, 
but only for its employees and employees’ relatives. The company directly generates 
seasonal jobs for residents in the local community. Indirectly, it generates some local 
business opportunities through its seasonal employment creation. At the individual level, 
the investor intends to create more value added for the local community than for 
outsiders. For instance, he tries to employ as many labourers as possible from the 
neighbouring villages throughout production. He also makes infrastructural 
contributions to the local community by donating a bridge, rehabilitating the main road, 
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providing free health check-ups to the villagers, extending the company’s health clinic 
services to the villagers, and providing free pre-school and pick-up services to the 
villagers.    
However, Company A’s value added appears not to be well received by local 
stakeholders. Stakeholders at the local and national levels are not well coordinated with 
regard to the ELC policy and implementation. The divide between these two 
stakeholder groups reflects the ineffectiveness of the central government in granting and 
monitoring the ELC. Company A’s lack of interaction with local stakeholders leads to a 
deteriorating relationship between the two parties. As a result, the interests of 
stakeholders and the company are uncoordinated which prevents stakeholders from 
benefitting from this FDI on the ELC. In summary, Company A is embedded in the 
local community. Its operational patterns are engaging the local community, and depend 
largely on Cambodian specialists and local villagers (day labourers) in the ELC 
development. The company also engages its local stakeholders through infrastructure 
and service contributions and its employment strategy, which is to employ as many 
workers as possible from neighbouring villages. The company creates value directly for 
the local community through employment and contributions, and indirectly through 
entrepreneurial opportunity generation and business start-ups.  
7.3 Analysis	  of	  Case	  Study	  Two	  
7.3.1 Operations	  in	  the	  Economic	  Land	  Concession	  
Company B is an agricultural investment project of a Korean conglomerate, being 
granted a 70-year right to cultivate a rubber plantation on almost 10,000 hectares of 
ELC in Cambodia. The founding investors’ approach is to use a Cambodian 
intermediary (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4). The Korean management team travels to 
Cambodia to look for business opportunities and contact with high-ranking Cambodian 
government officials and an Okhna. This Case Study, like the previous one, extends the 
literature on large investments in land raised by Hallam (2009) and De Schutter (2009) 
and provides empirical evidence of another Korean FDI in a Cambodian ELC in terms 
of its extent, nature and operational pattern.   
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The founding Korean management team legally secures the ELC from the Cambodian 
government through a Cambodian Okhna (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Due to their lack of 
experience in managing a large-scale agricultural business in rural Cambodia, they 
outsource the operational tasks to the Okhna who stations his employees at the ELC. 
The Okhna also sub-outsources some tasks to contractors who are outsiders. The 
investors mainly stay at their office in Phnom Penh and visit the plantation in the 
province every three months to monitor progress (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Despite 
outsourcing most of the operations, Company B also employs a vertical business model 
and the company owns 100 per cent of the production. The company does not engage in 
contract farming with the local community. The current findings support Hallam’s 
(2011) view that FDI investors in large-scale land have limited technical knowledge of 
agricultural production and are only indirectly involved in plantation development.  
Sub-question 1: How do Korean companies operate economic land concessions in local 
Cambodian communities? 
Company B is an investment project of a Korean conglomerate that invests in various 
businesses. Although financed by the Korean conglomerate, its management team in 
Cambodia has autonomy in managing its day-to-day operations. It receives financial 
support from the Korean government in a form of a Greenfield investment loan. The 
Korean founders employed an intermediary, a Cambodian Okhna, in order to establish 
the company.  
The Korean management team has no prior knowledge of large-scale agricultural 
business and therefore relies heavily on the Cambodian Okhna in the form of an 
outsourcing business arrangement. The Okhna sub-contracts the tasks to other 
contractors. Although Company B outsources most plantation activities, it has 100 per 
cent ownership of production in the ELC. The investors distantly manage the plantation, 
visiting it every three months to monitor development. The investors are the only two 
Koreans in management positions in the company. The company hires a Cambodian 
manager and supervisors to monitor the ELC development. Because the ELC 
progressed slowly in its first year, the investors take over some of the outsourced tasks 
and the company then starts to recruit its own labourers and more supervisors.  
Chapter 7: Embedding Processes of Korean FDIs 
 157 
7.3.2 Entrepreneurship	  	  	  
Opportunity	  Recognition	  
Evidence suggests that like Mr Lee in Case Study One, Mr Jeong is good at opportunity 
recognition. By the time he arrives in Cambodia the country is experiencing a boom in 
Korean investment in the garment and real estate sectors. Most new Korean investors 
are targeting these two sectors. However, Mr Jeong recognises an entrepreneurial 
opportunity in a sector that is less attractive to many Koreans—agriculture. A few years 
later, the agricultural sector becomes a new investment target for Koreans. 
This opportunity mainly emerges from changes to agricultural investment regulations in 
Cambodia. Due to its commitment to promoting the agricultural sector, the Cambodian 
government has made some reforms in taxes and state-owned land. The investment 
incentives—especially the tax holiday offered by the government—generate a large-
scale agricultural business idea for Mr Jeong. He also learns that labour costs, which are 
one of the main production factors in agricultural businesses, are cheaper in Cambodia 
than in neighbouring countries. Given these favourable conditions, Mr Jeong and his 
business partner develop his ideas into a full-scale business plan. The findings of this 
case study indicate that his entrepreneurial opportunity results from regulatory changes 
in Cambodia, which is consistent with Schumpeter’s (1934) perspective that changes in 
regulations, technology, political forces, macro-economic factors and social trends are 
sources of entrepreneurial opportunities, as they create new information that 
entrepreneurs can use to deduce how to re-combine resources into more valuable forms.  
Mr Jeong’s approach to opportunity recognition was value added capability (Ardichvili 
et al., 2003, pp. 108-109). He came to Cambodia to search for a business opportunity. 
Moreover, the Korean government was promoting Greenfield investments abroad by 
offering loans to Korean companies who confront investment capital challenges. “Three 
per cent per year. That’s free money,” says Mr Jeong, referring to the favourable 
conditions of the investment loan offered by the Korean government. The untapped 
resources in Cambodia and the under-utilised resources made available by the Korean 
government help him and his best friend to develop the entrepreneurial opportunity. 
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Mr Jeong’s opportunity recognition is aligned with a several attributes widely discussed 
in the entrepreneurship literature, such as personal traits, social networks and alertness 
to information. He is optimistic about business possibilities in Cambodia. Having 
recently graduated from a US university, he has neither previously run any businesses 
nor possesses any experience in operating agricultural businesses. His optimism triggers 
opportunity recognition. This finding aligns with Krueger and Dickson (1994), Krueger 
and Brazeal (1994), Guth et al. (1991), Neck and Manz (1992) and Neck and Manz 
(1996), who conclude that being an optimist makes entrepreneurs see opportunities 
rather than risks in any new information received, and leads them to discover 
entrepreneurial opportunities.   
The data indicates that social networks also play a vital role in Mr Jeong’s opportunity 
recognition. Networking with powerful people in Cambodia leads him to successfully 
develop the entrepreneurial opportunity for his agricultural business. He first makes 
connections with high-ranking government officials in Cambodia and through them is 
introduced to a Cambodian elite involved in large-scale agricultural businesses that has 
secured ELCs and acts as an ELC broker. Clearly, his links with these powerful people 
put him in a good position to access vital information regarding ELC investments. This 
finding affirms Hills et al.’s (1997) claim that entrepreneurs’ networks are influential in 
opportunity recognition.  
Another attribute of Mr Jeong’s opportunity recognition is his purposive visit to 
Cambodia to seek business opportunities and his high alertness to entrepreneurial 
opportunities. As a result, he does not take long to recognise a business opportunity. 
Therefore, his information search attributes contribute to his successful opportunity 
recognition. This finding is consistent with the notion that “people are more likely to 
find information that is useful to the discovery process through deliberate search than 
through random behaviour” (Shane, 2003, p. 48). Moreover, the finding concurs with 
other research suggesting that higher alertness to new information and business 
opportunities increase the likelihood of an opportunity being recognized (Gaglio and 
Taub, 1992; Hisrich, 1990; Ray and Cardozo, 1996; Sathe, 1989).  
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Opportunity	  Exploitation	  
Evidence from this case study indicates that Mr Jeong is good at exploiting opportunity. 
Although he is inexperienced and has no prior business interests, he manages to utilize a 
large-scale entrepreneurial opportunity in a foreign and poor business environment. He 
evaluates the opportunity based on personal traits and knowledge of high demand 
projection for the agricultural products in the market rather than prior knowledge and 
experience. Regardless of his limited management experience in the agricultural 
business, he is optimistic that the opportunity is positive. He says he is still optimistic: 
“Well, the success is I’m still here. I did not quit. At least, I still have a good vision.” 
He sees possibilities instead of risks. He projects a profitable business opportunity in the 
long run and was confident that he could successfully manage the company. Although 
his parents own businesses in Korea, he is neither involved in nor interested in these 
businesses and has always wanted to set up his own business. His personality attributes 
contribute largely to his positive opportunity evaluation, which consequently leads him 
to exploit the identified opportunity. This finding is consistent with other research 
which shows that personal traits contribute to an entrepreneur’s decision to exploit 
opportunities (Begley, 1995; Caird, 1991; Collins et al., 2004; Cromie and O'Donaghue, 
1992; Wu, 1989). 
The data suggests that Mr Jeong has substantial market knowledge of future products. 
He recognises that demand for rubber is increasing. The predicted high demand in the 
market confirms his opportunity evaluation will be profitable if he decides to exploit it. 
This reflects earlier studies such as Aldrich (1999), Johnson and Cathcart (1979) and 
Kaufmann (1999). The nature of his social networks may also contribute to his 
successful opportunity exploitation. Links with officials and the Okhna have given him 
access to vital information needed for investment in the country. Thus, Mr Jeong’s 
social networks in Cambodia facilitated his opportunity exploitation, which concurs 
with Aldrich’s (1999) view that to exploit an opportunity, an entrepreneur must gain 
access to resources and information that facilitate the process.  
Mr Jeong fits the age profile of entrepreneurs who decide to exploit recognised 
opportunities (younger than 44 years old) (Shane, 2003, pp. 90-91). This finding is 
consistent with the previous research of Long (1982), Borjas and Bronars (1988), Boyd 
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(1990), Sanders and Nee (1996), Alba-Ramirez (1994) and Taylor (1996), who all claim 
that age has a curvilinear effect on the likelihood of self-employment.  
The data suggests that Mr Jeong exploits the opportunity through new venture creation. 
His company’s start-up process demonstrates his entrepreneurial activities, ranging 
from acquiring resources to organising the company. As with many new venture 
formations, resource acquisition is challenging for him and his business partner as they 
do not have enough capital to act on the recognised opportunity, so they have to seek 
funds from other sources (Shane, 2003, p. 171). They manage to convince a 
conglomerate business in Korea to finance their business plans in Cambodia and apply 
for a Greenfield investment loan from the Korean government. This financial strategy 
confirms Smith’s (1967, pp. 46-47) finding that, in addition to using available resources, 
entrepreneurs utilise various sources of finance such as bank loans, overdrafts, hire 
purchase, leasing and government or local authority grants.   
In the process of organising this new venture, Mr Jeong uses his social networks to 
access the necessary information and resources. Through his good relationship with 
Cambodian officials and an Okhna, he acquires knowledge about the agricultural 
investment regulations and environment in Cambodia. Using the Okhna as a broker, he 
is able to secure an ELC. Consequently, the Okhna becomes the subcontractor 
responsible for the company’s ELC development. He also gained access to potential 
employees and supplies through his trusted employees and the subcontractor. This 
finding is consistent with the studies of Aldrich (1999) and Francis and Sandberg (2000), 
that during early recruiting efforts, entrepreneurs frequently hire people with whom they 
have direct ties, such as their friends or close social contacts. The finding also extends 
previous research by indicating that entrepreneurs use job advertisements in local 
newspapers as well as close contacts. But it does not support Zimmer and Aldrich 
(1987) claim that that family members of entrepreneurs are usually involved in a new 
business. Mr Jeong is involved in the planning and strategic management of this new 
venture, including operational activities and expenses. He is also involved in recruiting 
staff and setting up and registering the company in Cambodia. His new venture 
formation falls into the category of external corporate venturing of entrepreneurship 
suggested by Sharma and Chrisman (2007). His company is a new establishment 
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outside the conglomerate business domain and although he has to regularly report to the 
mother company in Korea, he has full autonomy in managing it.  
The lack of prior experience in establishing and managing a company is a challenge. 
Neither Mr Jeong nor his business partner has any prior experience in designing a new 
organisation. As a result, the company’s staffing is initially not effective as there is no 
systematic organisational structure and staff responsibilities are unclear, especially for 
those who are based at the plantation. Moreover, subcontractor’s responsibilities are 
unclear, staff meetings are not held regularly, and some staff do not follow rules. Given 
the limited knowledge of the founders of the organisation’s design, these findings align 
with Kirzner’s (1997, p. 355) notion that entrepreneurs who have limited knowledge of 
organisational design run their new organisations on the basis of erroneously imagined 
decision frameworks and establish routines and structure that prove to be ineffective.  
Sub-question 2: To what extent do Korean investors perform their entrepreneurial 
activities in economic land concession development?  
Mr Jeong’s venture in Cambodia displays the basic characteristics of entrepreneurship 
defined in Section 2.4. His approaches to opportunity discovery, development and 
exploitation show his entrepreneurship in the ELC investment. But in terms of new 
venture creation and operational management, he is less engaged than the entrepreneurs 
discussed in the literature that are keen to pursue their entrepreneurial dream through 
active involvement in every stage of the operations.   
The findings suggest four main factors contribute to his entrepreneurial activities: 
regulatory changes are a source of opportunity; his personal traits and network led him 
to be alert and recognise the entrepreneurial opportunity; his personal traits, networks 
and knowledge of the industry context helped him to successfully evaluate and exploit 
the opportunity; and, due to lack of prior knowledge about new venture creation and 
management, he faces challenges in organisational design and management.  
7.3.3 Stakeholder	  Engagement	  
Although Mr Jeong has strong networks, they concentrate around certain stakeholders: 
provincial and national government officials, employees and subcontractors. There is no 
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evidence of any attempt to establish good relationships with stakeholders in the local 
community. Therefore, his value added for stakeholders focuses only on employees and 
subcontractors. His stakeholder relationship is illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2: Company B’s Stakeholder Relationship 
Source: The author, 2015 
Mr Jeong relies heavily on the Cambodian employees, especially his management staff. 
According to Freeman et al. (2007), employees are one of the company’s primary 
stakeholders as they are legitimate and their support is vital for the company’s operation. 
The current finding supports Freeman et al.’s (2007) claim as Mr Jeong’s employees 
possess not only legitimacy but also power due to the ineffective company structure. He 
relies on his Cambodian employees, especially when at the head office in Phnom Penh. 
He only travels to the plantation every three months to check on progress.  
Company staff at the plantation speak little English, making interactions with Mr Jeong 
challenging. All communication between him and the fieldwork staff is channelled 
through head office staff, primarily the Cambodian project manager. Therefore, 
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assistance from head office staff is crucial for his business operations. This finding 
supports Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder classification; company employees (that is, 
management staff) are a dominant stakeholder. While Mr Jeong has managed to build 
good relationships with staff at head office in Phnom Penh, his relationship with 
plantation-based staff is not close. As a result, he generates limited value for company 
employees. Only the programme manager claims to have learned from him, while the 
supervisors struggle with the report writing they are required to do. These findings 
extend De Mello Jr’s (1997) claim that employees of an FDI company in the recipient 
country will benefit from the management know-how transferred through the 
investment. In this case, the benefit is not only very minimal but is also concentrated on 
those close to the investor.  
The findings imply that Mr Jeong substantially relies on subcontractors for the ELC 
development, consistent with Freeman et al. (2007) and Freeman et al. (2010) who 
argue that such suppliers are crucial for a firm’s survival. He also considers the sub-
contractors a dominant stakeholder, as described by Mitchell et al. (1997), giving them 
both legitimacy and power. Since Mr Jeong outsources most of the plantation work to 
the subcontractors, the success of the company’s operations depends mainly on their 
performance. He makes no effort to engage this group of stakeholders in the company’s 
goals and vision as he has the impression their commitment to the company is limited 
and short-term. Instead, he tries to control them by enforcing more conditions in their 
contracts. Thus, his relationship with this group of stakeholders exhibits Sloan’s (2009) 
control model. 
The case study shows no evidence of Mr Jeong engaging with the local community. His 
company does not employ any local labourers. If he wants to engage with the local 
community, he should try to attract villagers to work for the company. This lack of 
interest in establishing a good relationship with the locals isolates him and the company 
from the community. He tries learning the Khmer language to communicate with staff 
and subcontractors but not to connect with the local community.  
Mr Jeong is reluctant to build good relationships with local stakeholders. Since the 
company has been granted the land, he neither meets with commune and village chiefs 
nor visits neighbouring villages. He focuses solely on his business within the boundary 
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of the land concession. He considers that communication with villagers is not necessary 
for the success of his business at this stage. As he explains, “We’ve been here for a long 
time and we’ve kept spending, we don’t make any profit. There’s nothing we can 
contribute to this society, maybe only giving jobs to people.” Generating profits from 
the investment is more important than building a good relationship with or contributing 
to the local community at this point in the company’s development.  
Mr Jeong considers that locals are discretionary stakeholders, as described by Mitchell 
et al. (1997). While they have legitimacy, they have no power to influence the firm and 
no urgent claims that need to be addressed. However, the local community are 
important stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2010) whose needs and interests are not fulfilled 
by the company. These findings suggest that Mr Jeong fails to recognize the local 
community as important stakeholders and supports Greenwood’s (2007) claim of a 
neoclassical type of stakeholder engagement where the manager does not act in the 
interest of the company’s legitimate stakeholders. There are several possible 
explanations. Firstly, Mr Jeong invests in the land concession, which is granted to his 
company with little influence from or consultation with the local community. More 
importantly, granting decisions are made by the national authority, regardless of input 
from the local community. Secondly, Mr Jeong’s company is a FDI that produces solely 
for export. Thus, the local market is not his concern. Lastly, Mr Jeong’s investment is in 
a remote and poor community with limited infrastructure. Thus, the local community 
may have less influence on the investment due to their limited legal knowledge and 
capacity to absorb opportunities.  
Sub-question 3: How do Korean investors interact with their stakeholders in local 
communities? 
The within-case analysis demonstrates that the Korean investors’ relationship with their 
stakeholders at the local community level is not close. All communication between 
Company B and stakeholders at the local community is channelled through a 
Cambodian Okhna. The Korean investors do not deal directly with local stakeholders; 
they delegate this role to the Okhna. They are also reluctant to establish a good 
relationship with local stakeholders as their networks are concentrated on powerful 
people at the national level.  
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The local stakeholders have not been involved in the ELC investment since it began. 
They are not consulted or informed about the government’s decision to grant this ELC 
to Company B. Due to limited interaction and infrastructural contributions from the 
company, the stakeholders are not happy with the company and do not see any mutual 
benefit from this investment in their community.  
7.3.4 Value	  added	  	  
The main aim of Mr Jeong’s business venture in Cambodia is wealth creation, which is 
consistent with the common assumption about the fundamental goal of entrepreneurial 
activities (Aldrich, 2010). There is no evidence of value added for the local community, 
probably due to the nature of his relationship with local stakeholders. 
The findings suggest that this company creates some value in terms of employment and 
business opportunities.  However, on closer examination it only creates value for people 
outside the local community. There is no evidence of either job or business 
opportunities generated for the local community. For instance, all the labourers are from 
outside the local area, suggesting that the company makes no local infrastructural 
contribution. Due to the remoteness of the plantation, local businesses do not benefit 
from the presence of the labourers or have any business transactions with the company.  
Instead, the company generates value for outsiders in the form of entrepreneurial, 
business and employment opportunities by outsourcing the operation to subcontractors. 
This operational pattern generates business opportunities for some Cambodian business 
people outside the local community. For instance, after procuring the land concession, 
the Okhna takes the opportunity to become the main subcontractor since the company is 
looking for a subcontractor to develop the land. However, the Okhna does not own any 
machinery to perform the tasks, so he breaks down the tasks into smaller projects and 
outsources them to small-scale contractors. These small-scale contracting opportunities 
encourage many unemployed people and/or labourers to become entrepreneurs, 
especially those who are involved in the nursery and planting, as these entrepreneurial 
contractors are family based. Through these contractors, Company B also indirectly 
generates employment, as most contractors hire labourers to work for them. 
Interestingly, these contractors and labourers are not from the local community. 
Therefore, the company’s operations have directly and indirectly spun off business and 
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employment opportunities for people outside the local community. These findings 
extend those of Watkins and Fowler (2002) and UNCTAD (1999, 2005), who discuss 
how FDI companies provide jobs and business opportunities directly and indirectly. 
However, all the job and business opportunities are found to only benefit those outside 
the local community. Moreover, the current findings suggest that this FDI company 
pays local rates, which contradicts Haddad and Harrison (1993), Girma et al. (2001) and 
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), who claim that FDI companies not only pay rates higher 
than local wages but also put pressure on wages for domestic firms.  
The lack of value added by Company B for the local community may result from the 
distance between these two parties. The case study demonstrates that the company does 
not engage with the local community physically or socially. Physically, the company is 
isolated from the local community, as it has double security checkpoints that are 
guarded by armed security guards along the entrance to the plantation. Socially, the 
company does not establish any relationship with the local community, evident in its 
labourer recruitment strategy. Instead of encouraging the local community to work for it, 
the company recruits external labourers. Moreover, the company does not make any 
infrastructural contributions to the local community.   
However, the local community does not attempt to engage with the ELC. It and 
authorities at the grass-roots level are not informed of or consulted about the granting of 
the ELC. Their limited involvement results from gaps between them and those at the 
national level. The ELC granting process, including appraisal and approval, is clearly 
centralised. Although the company’s land concession is part of their community, it 
becomes isolated as soon as the land is granted to the company. Community access to 
the land is limited and cut off completely when the company starts to develop the land. 
Moreover, the arrival of the company causes land conflict with the local community. As 
a result, the local community not only feels unwanted, but also does not want to be part 
of this investment. This finding suggests that the company does not engage with the 
local community due to both its lack of commitment and the local context. These 
findings differ from those of Jack and Anderson (2002), who assert that within the rural 
context embeddedness is an important factor of the entrepreneurial process.  
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Sub-question 4: What value added do Korean companies generate in local communities 
and the Cambodian agricultural sector? 
There is no evidence of value added by this investment for the local community. The 
company does not generate any local employment or business opportunities. No villager 
works at the plantation and there have been no business transactions between the 
company and local businesses. Company B has also not made any infrastructural 
contributions to the local community since it started to develop the ELC. Conversely, 
the company generates entrepreneurial, employment and business opportunities for 
people outside the local community. All the labourers, contractors and suppliers are 
from districts or provinces beyond the local community.  
7.4 Analysis	  of	  Case	  Study	  Three	  
7.4.1 Operations	  in	  the	  Economic	  Land	  Concession	  
Case Study Three examines Company C, another investment project from a Korean 
conglomerate on a 70-year ELC in a rural community in Cambodia. The findings of 
Case Study Three extend the limited literature on practices of Korean FDIs in large-
scale land by providing empirical evidence of an FDI company from a Korean 
conglomerate (see Chapter 6 for details on Company C’s background and operational 
pattern). Like Case Studies One and Two, the current case study provides additional 
evidence of another Korean FDI company’s extent, nature and practices in Cambodia 
(Hallam, 2011). Like Case Two, Company C secures the ELC through an intermediary: 
a Cambodian company who legally secured a large ELC and agrees to trade some of it 
with Company C. The Cambodian company takes a legal approach to sharing its ELC 
with Company C. The data suggests that Company C takes further steps to legalise its 
ELC ownership by securing an ELC land title and settling all the overlapping areas 
prior to commencing its operations, thus minimising land conflicts with the local 
community (see Section 6.3).  
The data reveals that Company C relies on local knowledge and experts in their ELC 
plantation. The Korean management based in Cambodia is not actively involved in the 
ELC’s development and legal issues. The company relies on a Cambodian general 
manager to deal with legal issues and government relations, and recruits three 
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experienced Cambodian planting specialists (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4). These findings 
support Hallam’s (2011) claim that FDI investors in large-scale agricultural land need 
specialists to manage and develop the land.  
Company C constantly receives materials and technical support from its head office in 
Vietnam. It outsources the land-clearing tasks to a Korean company, but develops the 
plantation itself. The company does not engage in crop-sharing with the local 
community. Company C’s operational practices suggest that the main purpose of its 
investment is to supply the parent company’s existing value chains rather than looking 
for export markets (see Section 6.3), and is consistent with Cuffaro and Hallam’s (2011) 
point that FDI companies on large-scale land are resource-seeking rather than market-
seeking.  
Sub-question 1: How do Korean companies operate economic land concessions in local 
Cambodian communities? 
Company C is an FDI from a Korean conglomerate that seeks to expand its agricultural 
production in Asian countries. The Korean management team relies on Cambodian 
planting specialists for its plantation. This company is among the few who applied for a 
land title after signing a legal ELC contract with the Cambodian government, and has 
clearly marked its ELC territory. Moreover, the company has its own patrol team to 
prevent illegal land encroachment. The land title has helped the company to avoid 
unnecessary land conflicts with locals and to obtain support from the sub-national 
government.  
Nevertheless, Company C’s engagement with the local community is limited. It 
employs a pure vertical business mode, with no contract farming with the local 
community or any business partnerships with Cambodians. Most of its supplies come 
from the head office in Vietnam, leaving little room for business opportunities for the 
local community.  
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7.4.2 Entrepreneurship	  	  	  
Opportunity	  Recognition	  
Evidence suggests that the Korean management team’s opportunity recognition is not 
entrepreneurial for two reasons: the nature of the opportunity itself and of the 
opportunity discovery. Mr Yoon asserts that the availability of large-scale land opens up 
an opportunity for his company to invest in Cambodia. Thus, the source of this business 
opportunity emerges from the regulatory changes in Cambodia.  However, this does not 
qualify as an entrepreneurial opportunity, according to Shane’s (2003) definition which 
is “a situation in which a person can create a new means-ends framework for 
recombining resources that the entrepreneur believes will yield a profit” Shane (2003, p. 
18). The difference between “an entrepreneurial opportunity and many other situations 
in which people seek profit is that an entrepreneurial opportunity requires the creation 
of a new means-ends framework rather than just optimising within an old framework” 
Shane (2003, p. 18). The findings demonstrate that the opportunity in Case Study Three 
is optimised within an old framework. Although Company C operates in a new 
environment and under new conditions, Mr Yoon does not have full autonomy in 
managing the company. Moreover, the company does not operate independently from 
and outside of its head office’s domain. Thus, it is not an external cooperate venture of 
entrepreneurship as suggested by Sharma and Chrisman (2007). 
The data indicates that the opportunity identification of Mr Yoon and the CEO is less 
exploratory than modes discussed in the entrepreneurship literature. In fact, this Korean 
management team has worked for a Korean agricultural conglomerate company for 
many years. Its opportunity identification in Cambodia is informed by seeking to 
expand this large-group Korean company’s production in other Asian countries. Prior to 
coming to Cambodia the CEO has operated an agricultural company as part of the 
conglomerate’s businesses in Vietnam, where Company C’s head office is located. Mr 
Yoon and the CEO come to Cambodia to look for an ELC by contacting a Cambodian 
company that has secured a large ELC. This company agrees to share its land with them. 
The Korean management team then moves to Cambodia to set up Company C in the 
agricultural sector.  
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Mr Yoon is not interested in establishing networks in Cambodia. He does not join any 
business association as he considers association activities are of little value. He views 
social networks as unimportant to his business venture in Cambodia. In this regard his 
view differs from many entrepreneurs’ perspectives of social networks. According to 
the literature, social networks play a vital role in entrepreneurial processes (Aldrich, 
1999; Francis and Sandberg, 2000; Hills et al., 1997).  
Opportunity	  Exploitation	  
As with opportunity recognition, the data suggests that Mr Yoon and the CEO’s 
decision to exploit the opportunity is mainly motivated by the mission of the mother 
company in Korea to expand their production into other Asian countries. He confirms 
that their aim is to find a large plot of agricultural land for a cassava and rubber 
plantation, and as soon as the Korean management team secures the land they begin 
setting up the business in Cambodia. Thus, compared to many entrepreneurs in the 
literature, this team’s decision to exploit the business opportunity is more focused and 
experiences fewer challenges than other entrepreneurs. As Shane (2003) asserts, when 
entrepreneurs decide to exploit an identified opportunity, they face many challenges due 
to the uncertainty of the opportunity. The entrepreneurs have to weigh up the expected 
value of the exploitation and the opportunity cost for the alternative use of their time 
(Shane, 2003, p. 62).  
Mr Yoon and the CEO’s opportunity exploitation is rational and strategic, which is a 
managerial decision-making rather than entrepreneurial. Managers tend to make more 
rational and less risky decisions for business opportunities (Cuervo et al., 2007) than 
entrepreneurs (Shane, 2003). That is, the Korean management team clearly identified 
products and markets for their new company in Cambodia and allocated resources for 
the operations prior to their arrival to the country.  
The process in setting up the Korean management team also does not align with the 
entrepreneurship criteria described in Section 2.4. The company is established as a 
subsidiary of a conglomerate business in Korea and is managed by Mr Yoon and 
another Cambodian manager who directly report to the CEO in Vietnam. Mr Yoon and 
the CEO come to Cambodia with investment capital looking for a business opportunity. 
Financial acquisition is therefore not a challenge for this Korean management team in 
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establishing the company.  It is commonly known that resource acquisition is one of the 
biggest challenges for many entrepreneurs in the early stages of new venture creation 
(Aldrich, 1999).  
Moreover, the Korean management team is not actively involved in setting up the 
company. Buying the ELC from the Cambodian company required a new ELC contract 
between Company C and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The 
Korean management team avoid all the red tape, as the contract is arranged by the 
vendor. The CEO hires a professional recruiting company to look for a qualified 
Cambodian manager. After securing the ELC, the CEO hands over the company 
management to the newly recruited Cambodian manager and Mr Yoon. Since then, the 
Cambodian manager has been responsible for handling all the company’s 
documentation, staffing and operations. Mr Yoon is mainly responsible for financial 
management. He and the Cambodian manager regularly report to the CEO who is based 
in Vietnam. Company C has received ongoing support from head office, ranging from 
supplying needed materials to human resources. 
There is no evidence that Mr Yoon utilises his social networks to get access to the 
resources needed when organising Company C. However, data suggests that the 
Cambodian manager uses his social networks in recruiting planting specialists as well as 
in processing documentation for the company. Mr Yoon spends most of his time in his 
office managing the day-to-day operations of the company, focusing on financial 
management. He can therefore be regarded as a manager rather than an entrepreneur 
(Cuervo et al., 2007). He also supervises administrative processes which is similar to a 
manager’s role (Cuervo et al., 2007).  
Sub-question 2: To what extent do Korean investors perform their entrepreneurial 
activities in economic land concession development?  
The business operation of Company C’s founding investors does not meet the three 
criteria of entrepreneurship outlined in Section 2.4. The within-case analysis of Case 
Study Three demonstrates that they are managers rather than entrepreneurs. Their 
business start-up is not driven by entrepreneurial opportunity recognition but rather by 
the mission of the mother company in Korea that seeks to invest in agricultural 
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production and expand into other Asian countries where they can secure land. The 
Korean management team come to Cambodia with investment money to buy land and to 
start an agricultural business. The CEO has managed a firm in Vietnam. He goes to 
Cambodia when the government decides to grant economic land concessions to local 
and foreign investors.  
The mode through which they enter the sector is not exploratory but safe and well 
calculated. They go to Cambodia after contacting a local company that has secured ELC 
land and agrees to sell half to them. The business formation is professional as they 
follow all the investment regulations, such as formally transferring the ELC ownership 
from the Cambodian company, securing their land title and excluding all of the 
overlapping areas, as suggested by the responsible authorities. They hire a professional 
company to recruit their staff. They have enough investment funds to set up and operate 
the business. After the company is established, the CEO returns to Vietnam and 
manages the business from a distance. The managers in Cambodia run the company 
according to the agreed business plan and regularly report to the CEO. Company C also 
obtains support and supplies from the mother company in Vietnam.  
7.4.3 Stakeholder	  Engagement	  	  
Case Study Three indicates that Mr Yoon keeps an arm’s-length relationship with local 
stakeholders. He remains in his office which is located outside the plantation which he 
does not visit often. There is no evidence of the Korean management team making any 
effort to establish a good relationship with local stakeholders. Mr Yoon’s failure to 
engage with the local community reflects the nature of his company’s job creation. The 
company does not employ local villagers; labourers are either from outside the local 
community or new migrants who reside illegally on forest land near the plantation. 
Moreover, Mr Yoon’s company shows lack of interest in employing permanent 
labourers.  
The company has made no infrastructural contributions to the community. It does not 
even rehabilitate the main road connected to the ELC which its heavy trucks have 
degraded. Mr Yoon seems to prioritise profit-making over establishing a good 
relationship with the local community: “When the company makes some profits, we 
plan to help the local people with improving their education by building a school and 
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teaching them new skills. We cannot give them money, because we are a company.” His 
relationship with these stakeholders concurs with Sloan’s (2009) control model and 
Greenwood’s (2007) notion of neoclassical stakeholder engagement where a manager 
does not act in the interest of the company’s legitimate stakeholders.  
Due to limited knowledge of ELC regulations, the local community seems to accept that 
it is not involved in the company’s development. These stakeholders, as described by 
Mitchell et al. (1997), have no power to influence the firm or to raise issues that need to 
be addressed. The current findings could be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, 
the local community is not involved in the granting of the ELC. The granting decision is 
a top-down approach, with no local consultation. Secondly, the local community is 
remote and poor with little legal knowledge, and no influence on the company’s 
investment. Thirdly, the company produces solely for export to Korea and China and is 
not concerned with the local market. Lastly, it receives materials supplied from its 
parent company in Vietnam. Thus it acquires all its supplies externally, making it even 
less dependent on the community. Mr Yoon’s stakeholder relationship is presented in 
Figure 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Company C’s Stakeholder Relationship 
Source:  The author, 2015 
Note:  The light blue lines denote relationship between the stakeholders 
           The thickness of the lines indicates the strength of the relationship 
Company C 
Local 
Residents 
VN 
Office 
National 
Cam Govt 
Cambodian 
Staff 
Local 
NGOs 
Local 
Businesses 
Local 
Authorities 
Day 
laboure
rs 
Seasonal 
labourers 
A Korean 
Company 
Provincial 
Authorities 
 
Cam 
Manager 
Mr Yoon 
&KO Mgt 
Cambodian 
Staff 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 174 
The case study reveals that the relationship between Mr Yoon and local authorities is 
not close. However, the Cambodian manager is good at dealing with them. “I think the 
company people are easy to talk to, they understand us,” says Participant 3.5. As 
highlighted by this commune councillor, the relationship between local authorities and 
the company is good. But local residents seem to distance themselves from the company. 
Villagers are not happy with the arrival of Company C, complaining that it disrupts their 
daily livelihood by restricting access to the forest land to look for food or let their cattle 
roam. These findings therefore suggest that Mr Yoon seems to consider local 
stakeholders as discretionary, as described by Mitchell et al. (1997). While the company 
clearly delineates its territory by excising all the areas that overlap with the local 
community and patrolling the ELC regularly, Mr Yoon does not engage with the local 
community as he fails to recognize them as important stakeholders (Freeman et al., 
2010). 
Sub-question 3: How do Korean investors interact with their stakeholders in local 
communities?  
The Korean investors’ relationship with their local stakeholders is distant. All 
communication between the company and local stakeholders is facilitated through the 
Cambodian manager. Due to the company’s secure ELC ownership, the Korean 
investors show no interest in establishing any relationship with local stakeholders.  
Local stakeholders do not engage in the ELC investment. They were not informed of or 
involved in the ELC granting process. Due to limited interaction and mutual benefit 
between the local community and the company, the local stakeholders are not happy 
with the company.   
7.4.4 Value	  added	  	  
There is no evidence of value added for the local community in this case, possibly 
resulting from Mr Yoon’s disengagement with local stakeholders. Due to differing 
expectations, Company C’s Cambodian employees do not benefit much from the 
Korean management.  
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At the company level, the investment has generated some value added. The company’s 
operations have generated some employment and business opportunities but only for 
people outside the local community. For instance, the labourers are either from outside 
or are newcomers who migrated to the local community to look for jobs. Two 
newcomers open their small grocery stands along the road to the company’s plantation 
after learning about seasonal labourers at the plantation. However, the local businesses 
do not benefit from the presence of Company C as they have no business transactions 
with it. Moreover, due to the remoteness of the plantation and the irregular pattern of 
the employment, local businesses do not benefit from the presence of the labourers 
either. More importantly, the company has not yet made any infrastructural contribution 
to the local community. The company has generated some employment and business 
opportunities in the host country. The current findings extend the research of Watkins 
and Fowler (2002) and UNCTAD (1994, 2005) that FDI firms generate job 
opportunities for people in the recipient country, as in this case the opportunities benefit 
only those outside the local community. Moreover, the scale of the opportunities is 
relatively small. The limited value added for the local community could be explained by 
the divide between it and the company and its development stage. On the one hand, the 
company is physically and socially disengaged from the local community. On the other 
hand, the local community also disengages from the ELC investment. The company’s 
plantation is remote and surrounded by wild plants and trees. The road to the plantation 
is narrow and in poor condition. The company has not yet rehabilitated the road, making 
access to the plantation difficult. It has clearly marked its plantation boundary, 
preventing local residents from accessing it. The company is not keen to employ local 
labourers and instead recruits them via networks in other communities or provinces.   
The local community and authorities are not involved in the process of granting the 
ELC. A possible explanation might be that Company C’s ELC land is part of a 
previously approved ELC grant. Although the company manages to avoid land conflicts 
with the local community, it completely cut off the local community’s access to wild 
plants and animals, making them unhappy about the investment. As a result, the local 
community is not keen to work for the company which offers wages similar to other 
domestic companies. The current findings support those of Sangwan (2013) and Neef et 
al. (2013) that FDI companies who invest in agricultural large-scale land do not benefit 
the local community in terms of employment and business opportunities. 
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The company started to develop the ELC two years after acquiring the land. The delay 
results from the lengthy legal process involved in registering a land title and the poor 
soil quality. Instead of planting both cassava and rubber, Company C plants only 
cassava and may not be able to plant any rubber. During the data gathering, the 
company is in the process of clearing the ELC and testing three cassava-planting 
techniques on 300 hectares of land. It outsources the land clearing to a Korean company 
based in Phnom Penh that brings its own clearing staff. Due to the operational nature of 
the company, employment creation is limited, but it pays a rate comparable to other 
domestic companies in the sector. These findings contradict those of Haddad and 
Harrison (1993), Girma et al. (2001) and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), who claim that 
FDI companies pay higher wages than domestic companies. The current findings also 
contradict those of Lim (2001) and Miyamoto (2003) who claim that FDI companies 
provide more training to their local employees than domestic firms. In this case, there is 
no evidence of formal staff training.   
Sub-question 4: What value added do Korean companies generate in local communities 
and the Cambodian agricultural sector? 
The analysis of Case Study Three indicates no evidence of value added for the local 
community. There are no transactions between the company and local businesses, and 
the company has not made any local infrastructural contributions. Due to its early 
development stage, the company generates very limited employment, other than 
seasonal labourer jobs, and pays a wage rate comparable to domestic companies. Local 
villagers do not work for this company. All of the opportunities generated by the 
investment have been taken by those outside and/or newcomers.  
7.5 Summary	  
Chapter 7 presents the analysis of three separate case studies according to four main 
themes: operational pattern, entrepreneurship, stakeholder relationship and value added. 
The aim of this analysis is to answer the four sub-questions guiding this dissertation. 
The first case analysis reveals that Company A has engaged the local community to 
some extent. The investor, Mr Lee, is an entrepreneur, evidenced by his opportunity 
recognition, exploitation and new venture creation. The findings in this case confirm, 
extend and reject some of the previous findings on the attributes of entrepreneurial 
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activities commonly discussed in the literature. The analysis found that the relationship 
between the company/investor and the stakeholders at the local community level is 
distant. In addition to its infrastructural contributions, this ELC investment directly 
generates employment and indirectly creates business opportunities for the local 
community.   
The analysis of Case Study Two finds that Company B’s operations are indirect. It 
outsources its operational tasks to a member of the Cambodian elite who then 
subcontracts them. The nature of the investor’s opportunity recognition and exploitation 
indicates basic entrepreneurial activities. The analysis reveals that the investor is less 
engaged in carrying out the operational tasks than entrepreneurs described in the 
literature. The findings also confirm, extend and reject some of the previous findings on 
the attributes of entrepreneurial activities commonly discussed in the literature. The 
analysis found that the company/investor and the stakeholders at the local community 
level are disconnected. Moreover, this ELC investment is found to only generate 
employment and business opportunities for those outside the local community.  
The analysis of Case Study Three shows that Company C’s operations are a form of 
subsidiary and are distant from the local community. The materials and some experts 
are supplied by the company’s head office in Vietnam. The nature of the investors’ 
opportunity recognition and exploitation, and establishment of a new venture does not 
indicate that these are entrepreneurial activities. Rather, the analysis reveals that the 
Korean management team act like managers. The company and/or investors are isolated 
from local stakeholders. This ELC investment is found to generate limited employment 
and business opportunities, but only for those outside the local community. 
The within-case analysis indicates that the three case studies share similarities and 
differences in their ELC development activities in Cambodia. The three companies 
differ from each other in terms of their embeddedness. Company A is found to be 
embedded in the local community through its operational patterns, infrastructure and 
service contributions, employment strategy and value added. In contrast, Company B is 
not found to be embedded in the local community as it does not involve any local 
residents in its operations on the ELC. Even though the company relies heavily on 
Cambodian subcontractors, specialists and workers, it only creates value for people 
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outside the local community. Similarly, Company C is not embedded in the local 
community. In addition to not engaging the local community in its operations on the 
ELC, Company C continually obtains resources and guidance from its head office in 
Vietnam. No value added by the company for the local community is evidenced, not 
even infrastructural contributions. Chapter 8 will compare and contrast the three cases 
to identify trends in their embedding process in the ELC development.  
  
Chapter	  8: Patterns	  of	  Korean	  FDIs’	  Embeddedness	  
Analysis	  Across	  Cases	  
8.1 Introduction	  
This chapter examines the similarities and differences of the three Korean FDI 
companies’ embedding process and contributions—through their ELC development in 
the rural Cambodian communities—against the theoretical concepts discussed in 
Chapter 2. It compares and discusses data across the cases using the four themes23 as 
presented in Chapter 7.  
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section compares the operational patterns 
across the three cases to answer Sub-question 1. The third section discusses the cases in 
response to Sub-question 2 by focusing on the concept of entrepreneurship. The fourth 
section compares the FDIs’ stakeholder engagement in order to answer Sub-question 3. 
The fifth section analyses the value added across the three cases in response to Sub-
question 4. The final section is the summary. 
8.2 Operations	  in	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  
8.2.1 Similarities	  
The three cases share some similarities in terms of land holding status, the nature of the 
FDIs, and the extent of their operations in the ELCs. Two of the three cases acquired 
financial support from the Korean government in the form of low-interest rates and 
long-term investment loans known as Greenfield investment loans. These findings 
suggest a similar pattern to that of FDIs in large-scale agricultural land in other 
countries, highlighted by Hallam (2011), where investors are mainly from the private 
sector and sometimes obtain financial support from their government.  
In all three cases, the investments are in the form of the acquisition of large-scale 
agricultural land from the Royal Government of Cambodia through leases of 70 years. 
The analysis of the three cases reveals that investment incentives provided by the 
Cambodian government are the main motivation for these companies to invest in the 
agricultural sector. The land and tax concessions for foreign investors are a clear 
                                                
23 The four themes are operational pattern, entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement and value added. 
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indication of the Cambodian government’s commitment to attracting and facilitating 
foreign investment in the agricultural sector, seeing FDIs as potential contributors to 
filling the investment gap in this sector (Cotula, 2009). 
The ELC acquisition of the three companies also shares a common approach, using a 
local intermediary to find an ELC and take care of the paperwork.  Moreover, the 
investors in the three cases are found to lack prior technical knowledge about 
agricultural production. Thus, they obtain the necessary local expertise for acquiring 
large-scale land and managing the complex large-scale agricultural investments (Hallam, 
2011, p. S93). 
The data across the cases shows that the investment arrangement of these Korean 
companies is purely vertical; that is, 100 per cent of production is owned by the FDI 
companies. They do not involve any local businesses as their joint-venture partners or 
engage local farmers in their operations through contract farming or out-grower 
schemes. However, they have some business transactions with domestic suppliers for 
raw materials. The investment arrangement of the Korean FDI companies supports 
Hallam’s (2011) observation that the pattern of the current FDIs varies from the 
traditional FDI pattern and is a looser form of joint venture. The increasing trend of this 
pure investment arrangement of FDI companies may result from the host countries’ 
investment regulations to promote more FDI inflow into the countries. In Cambodia, 
FDI companies are not strictly required to partner with local people. As a result, FDI 
companies prefer to own the companies and production rather than partner with local 
businesses. 
In general, all three Korean FDI companies are involved in rubber plantation businesses 
for export to Chinese and Korean markets. Two of the companies cultivate rubber trees, 
while the other one plants cassava and plans to plant rubber in the acquired economic 
land concessions (ELCs). The companies also plan to set up a factory on the ELC, but 
the factory produces only semi-processed rather than final products. Hence, although 
the companies produce solely for export, their products are not fully processed in 
Cambodia. Thus, these findings indicate that the Korean FDI companies in large-scale 
land in Cambodia are resource-seeking and mainly involved in raw material or food 
production for export back to their home country, rather than cultivating tropical crops 
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for wider commercial export (Hallam, 2011, p. S93). The current findings therefore 
provide empirical evidence to support previous studies (see Aryeetey and Lewis, 2011; 
Cuffaro and Hallam, 2011; Hallam, 2011) which hypothesize that foreign agricultural 
investments are resource-seeking rather than market-seeking. 
8.2.2 Differences	  
The three Korean FDI companies vary in many respects. The data across the cases 
reveals that all the companies pursue different ELC development activities and have 
different levels of involvement with their investors and the local community. One of the 
three companies outsources all the ELC development activities to a Cambodian Okhna, 
while the other two directly develop the ELCs by using their own employees. However, 
they do so in different ways in terms of the involvement of Korean 
investors/management team and the local community. The cross-case analysis shows 
that the approach of the investor to establishing the company and the ELC development 
is more engaged in Company A than in the other two companies. Moreover, Company 
A’s investor, Mr Lee, is actively involved in the operations on the ELC. The investors 
of the other two companies are only indirectly involved in their ELC plantation 
development, and spend most of their time away from the plantations.   
The analysis reveals that Mr Jeong’s strong connection with Cambodian officials and 
political elite plays a minor role in smoothing his business operations.  Compared to Mr 
Lee, Mr Jeong relies heavily on the Okhna to pursue his business plan. However, the 
performance of the Okhna’s team does not meet agreed targets. Another shortcoming is 
Mr Jeong lacks full control of company operations, sharing ownership with another 
investor and a Korean conglomerate based in Korea. Mr Lee, on the other hand, has full 
control of company operations and planning. He runs a staff management and 
monitoring system that to a large extent facilitates him managing the business, although 
he stays at the plantation only three days per week. Moreover, data across the cases 
suggests that only Company A engages the local community in their operations, albeit 
in a limited way, while the other companies do not. Only Company A employs local 
villagers to work at the plantation and  has also made some local infrastructural 
contributions.  According to Cuffaro and Hallam (2011) and Cotula and Leonard (2010), 
no best-case business model has been suggested for large-scale agricultural land 
investment. However, the current findings seem to suggest that operations associated 
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with the ruling elite are less effective and less efficient than those carried out by the 
other Korean FDI companies in the agricultural sector.   
Sub-question 1: How do Korean companies operate economic land concessions in local 
Cambodian communities? 
Findings across the cases suggest that each FDI company uses different entry modes 
and operational patterns. All three companies employ a formal and legal approach to get 
access to the large-scale land, and are qualified as resource-seeking investors. In relation 
to their entry mode, these companies seem to share a common practice—associating 
with the ruling elite such as high-ranking government officials. However, these 
companies’ operational patterns vary to such a large extent that they cannot be 
collectively named as a Korean business model in ELC development. Nevertheless, 
their operations in the ELCs all rely on Cambodian experts to a certain extent. The 
Korean FDIs in the agricultural sector in Cambodia operate in a similar vertical 
ownership pattern and there is no collaboration with local people, such as contract 
farming or joint ventures. However, the cross-case analysis implies that the more direct 
involvement the Korean investors have in the operations, the more the companies 
engage with the local community.  
8.3 Entrepreneurship	  
The cross-case analysis suggests that two of the investors, Mr Lee and Mr Jeong, 
behave like entrepreneurs. The findings further suggest that Mr Lee is more 
entrepreneurial than Mr Jeong. In contrast, Mr Yoon, the investor in the third case study, 
acts as a manager, as discussed below. 
8.3.1 Similarities	  	  
Despite the diversity of the investment behaviour of the Korean investors, they all share 
some similar interests and strategies in investing in and managing a business in large-
scale agricultural land in Cambodia. In comparing data across the cases, the source of 
business opportunity in the three case studies emerges from regulatory changes in 
investment in Cambodia. From the empirical results presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, it 
is clear that each Korean investor is attracted to the investment incentives offered by the 
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Royal Government of Cambodia. These findings support the Schumpeterian perspective 
on the source of opportunity. Schumpeter (1934) argued that changes in regulations, 
technology, political forces, macro-economic factors and social trends create new 
information that entrepreneurs can use to discern how to recombine resources into more 
valuable forms. There is evidence of challenges for the entrepreneurs’ resource 
acquisition and the similar strategies they developed, such as making use of government 
support to finance the venture start-ups in addition to available resources (Smith, 1967, 
pp. 46-47).  
The findings across the cases suggest that none of the three investors brought their 
family members with them to Cambodia; instead, they pursued their venture 
independently. Entrepreneurs, are commonly found to employ family members when 
they start their business and then slowly replace them with waged labourers as their 
business grows (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003). However, in the Chaebol business model, the 
family structure prevails. This does not necessarily mean that family members are 
employed. Rather, the nature of the relationship between employer and employees is 
framed as a family relationship (Chang and Shin, 2007). The current findings may be 
explained by the fact that these investments are located in remote rural areas in a poor 
foreign country and it may be difficult for the investors to relocate or bring their family 
members into this environment.  
In summary, the current findings confirm previous studies (see Shane, 2003) that 
entrepreneurs possess optimism and the need to achieve and search for information, and 
these attributes play important roles in entrepreneurship. Mr Lee and Mr Jeong certainly 
share these characteristics. Mr Lee’s alertness is evident in always seeking information 
for a business opportunity. He is also optimistic about business opportunities. As well, 
he is optimistic and confident about his decision when he discovers another 
entrepreneurial opportunity for his second business. This attitude has contributed to his 
decision to exploit opportunities. In a similar manner, information search plays a role in 
Mr Jeong’s opportunity recognition. He is also optimistic about business opportunities 
in Cambodia. His lack of experience is not considered a major threat as he is confident 
that he can manage to run the business successfully.  
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8.3.2 Differences	  
Even though Mr Lee and Mr Jeong are entrepreneurial, their entrepreneurial activities 
and approaches to opportunity recognition and exploitation are different. Some of the 
key differences are identified in the following sections.   
Alertness	  
The current study provides empirical evidence to support the notion that alertness to 
new information and more local knowledge increase the likelihood of opportunity 
recognition, which is consistent with previous studies (Gaglio and Taub, 1992; Hisrich, 
1990; Ray and Cardozo, 1996; Sathe, 1989). In comparison to Mr Jeong, Mr Lee is 
more alert to entrepreneurial opportunity, development and recognition. During the 
similar period of time they have been in Cambodia, Mr Lee recognises and manages to 
develop at least two entrepreneurial opportunities while Mr Jeong successfully develops 
only one opportunity. And in terms of opportunity recognition, Mr Lee is more locally 
embedded than Mr Jeong.  
Social	  Networks	  	  
The data across the cases confirms Ardichviliv et al.’s (2003) hypothesis that in the 
interaction between social networks and alertness, the first attribute positively affects 
the latter. As Hills et al. (1997) demonstrate, the denser an entrepreneur’s network, the 
higher his/her alertness to potentially successful entrepreneurial opportunities. The 
differences in the ability of Mr Lee and Mr Jeong to recognise and develop 
entrepreneurial opportunities may be attributed to the nature of their social networks. 
Mr Lee explores social networks more than Mr Jeong; he  establishes networks with 
more diverse groups of people, ranging from Korean associations to Cambodian 
investors. In contrast, Mr Jeong establishes only a relatively small circle of networks in 
Cambodia, mainly high-ranking government officials and the Cambodian elite. Thus, 
the nature of Mr Lee’s social network leads him to more valuable business information 
that in turn makes him more alert to entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Prior	  Knowledge	  and	  Experience	  	  
The current findings support the notion that prior knowledge and experience of 
entrepreneurs play a vital role in their entrepreneurship, as highlighted by Shane (2003). 
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However, the current findings, in the case of Mr Lee, reject Shane’s (2000) claim that 
without prior knowledge, opportunities cannot be recognised. The differences between 
the three investors in terms of opportunity recognition and exploitation are also 
attributed to their prior knowledge and experience. Mr Lee’s prior knowledge and 
experience in business management and the business environment in Cambodia play an 
important role in his opportunity recognition. He has considerable practical business 
management and life experience. Moreover, he is more familiar with the Cambodian 
government system and business environment than the other two investors. Hence, Mr 
Lee’s life and business experience contribute to him being more alert to opportunities 
and better able than Mr Jeong and Mr Yoon to develop entrepreneurial opportunities in 
Cambodia. 
Organisational	  Structure	  
The current findings are consistent with the research of Hannan et al. (1996), Baron et al. 
(1999) and Cooper (1990) regarding the influence of entrepreneurs’ prior experience on 
new venture creation. The findings support the notion that in general entrepreneurs who 
have little knowledge of organisational design, and plan their new organisations on the 
basis of “erroneously imagined decision frameworks” (Kirzner, 1997, p. 355) and 
establish routines and structures that prove to be ineffective (Shane, 2003, p. 221). 
Evidence across the three cases suggests that each investor employs a different mode of 
new venture formation. Of the three companies examined, Mr Lee’s company has more 
established organisational policies and structure. He systematically arranges Company 
A’s staff into different divisions and departments. Each staff member has clear job 
responsibilities and reporting lines. Moreover, he establishes regular staff meetings to 
maintain smooth workflow. Conversely, Mr Jeong seems to be in an early state of 
formalising the organisational policies and procedures. His organisation’s routines are 
less structured and formal than those in Mr Lee’s organisation. The responsibilities of 
the staff and the subcontractor team are not clear, especially for those based at the 
plantation. Unlike Mr Jeong’s company, Mr Yoon’s organisational structure and 
procedures are implemented by the CEO based in Vietnam who sends staff over from 
the parent company in Vietnam to work for Company C in Cambodia. However, in 
terms of labour management, Mr Yoon’s implanted system proves to be unsuitable in 
the local context. 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 186 
Creativity	  
The data across the cases suggests that a willingness to experiment and innovate until 
one discovers what works is an important aspect of successful entrepreneurial behaviour 
(Drucker, 1985). The empirical evidence of the current research indicates that each 
investor faces challenges in local staff management. In Mr Lee’s case, there are 
conflicts between Korean and Cambodian specialists during the first year of the 
company’s operation. The conflicts lead to a 50 per cent loss in production (see Chapter 
4 for more detail). In Mr Yoon’s case, his challenges in managing local labourers 
almost provoke a violent response from them. Among the three investors, only Mr Lee 
comes up with creative ideas to develop a strategy and timely remedy for the challenges. 
He takes control of Company A and adjusts its organisational structure. He introduces a 
company culture that encourages management to incorporate the ideas and comments of 
subordinates in any work plan. He is flexible and innovative in terms of adjusting the 
company’s operations from relying heavily on Korean experts to promoting more input 
from local staff. As a result, Company A’s productivity has improved significantly since 
its second year. In contrast, Mr Jeong is reluctant to take action to resolve the situation. 
In Mr Yoon’s case, the investor does not personally deal with any issues concerning 
staff conflicts, the local community or Cambodian government administration, and 
instead delegates these issues to the Cambodian manager. Therefore, the current 
findings support the view that creativity not only plays a critical role in the 
entrepreneurial process (Hills et al., 1997; Kaye, 1986; Schumpeter, 1934), but also has 
a major role in the success of entrepreneurs (Drucker, 1985).   
Sub-question 2: To what extent do Korean investors perform their entrepreneurial 
activities in economic land concession development? 
The cross-case analysis reveals that most of the investors perform their entrepreneurial 
activities throughout the ELC development, ranging from opportunity recognition and 
exploitation to new venture creation. It indicates that entrepreneurial opportunities 
emerged from the investors’ interaction in a multilayered context. Moreover, their 
success in opportunity recognition and exploitation are facilitated by particular 
attributes, among which creativity plays the most significant role in overcoming 
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challenges in entrepreneurial efforts. The investors perform their entrepreneurial 
activities without direct involvement from their relatives. 
8.4 Stakeholder	  Engagements	  
8.4.1 Similarities	  
The cross-case analysis reveals that the relationship of individual investors with their 
stakeholders in the local community is distant. The investors expect local authorities to 
support their companies’ operations as they are legally awarded the land from the 
national government. However, the local authorities have different expectations. The 
analysis of the cases suggests that, to the investors, the local stakeholders seem to 
possess neither power nor urgency toward these FDI companies. The current findings 
indicate that all three cases do not involve local stakeholders in their operations.  
However, the local community claims to have a stake in the companies. The three 
communities in which the companies’ ELCs are located share similar characteristics. 
All three are remote, poor and under developed. Before the three Korean companies 
arrived, many poor households depended on the forest land/common property for 
income. They made their daily living by farming cash crops, hunting, collecting forest 
by-products, and raising livestock. Thus, the arrival of the companies disrupts their 
traditional way of life. Moreover, after their arrival, the three local communities claim 
the companies do not live up to their expectations. The results across the cases reveal 
that the communities share similar expectations of the companies, such as giving back 
to the villagers the cultivated land which has been lost to the ELCs and/or providing 
some financial support or goods to poor households. As the companies do not meet 
these expectations, the local stakeholders are not satisfied with the existence or the 
companies. Moreover, neither they nor the local authorities are informed about of are 
involved with the process through which the ELCs were granted to the companies. No 
meaningful public consultation about the ELC proposal prior to the granting decision 
was held in these three communities, in contradiction to the fifth criterion mentioned in 
the sub-degree on ELCs (Sub-degree No. 146, December 2005). The local authorities 
say they are not well informed and have no decision-making powers in the ELC 
granting process or in monitoring the companies’ development activities. The cross-case 
analysis suggests that although the Korean companies legally acquire the ELCs, the 
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ELC granting processes are one-way consultation and centralised, involving only the 
national government. The current study therefore extends the existing literature on 
large-scale land granting practices by providing empirical evidence of the practices of 
forest land granting in Cambodia, which are similar to those in other countries, as De 
Schutter (2011) claims. The current research suggests that stakeholder engagement 
(Freeman et al., 2010) in the ELC granting process is low (or non-existent), as the local 
community and local authority—who are legitimate stakeholders in the ELC—are not 
involved in the ELC granting process. 
8.4.2 Differences	  	  
Data across the three cases indicates that each of these companies engage differently 
with local stakeholders. Company A shows its interest in establishing a relationship 
with the local community through its employment strategy and donations. In contrast, 
Company B lacks any involvement with the local community, while Company C 
engages with some newly arrived migrants around their plantation. However, as far as 
the local community is concerned, Company C does not involve them in its ELC 
development.  
Therefore, the cross-case analysis suggests that only Company A embeds, to some 
extent, in the local community. Through providing jobs and infrastructural contributions 
to the villagers and community, it has established relationships with some local 
stakeholders. However, the nature of these proves to be superficial due to the limited 
engagement of the local stakeholders in the company’s operations and the unwelcoming 
local community. As Jack and Anderson (2002) emphasise, embeddedness is a two-way 
approach which requires both the actor’s efforts and a welcoming environment. Hence, 
Company A’s attempts to embed in the local community are not entirely successful. The 
analysis suggests that Company B attempts to embed in the local community, although 
again not successfully. In contrast, Company C does not even attempt to embed in the 
local community. Overall, the current findings suggest that not all firms are embedded 
in the community in which they invest. Evidence across the cases indicates that the 
more embedded a company is, the more benefits accrue to the local community. 
Therefore, the findings suggest that the embeddedness of companies in local 
communities is beneficial not only to their development but also to the local 
communities.  
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In contrast, the cross-case analysis implies that all of the companies successfully embed 
themselves beyond the local community. All have good relationships with stakeholders 
at the provincial and national levels. They also maintain good relationships with high-
ranking government officials that help them to capitalise on opportunities and operate 
businesses in Cambodia. Their behaviour is consistent with Granovetter’s (1985) view 
that social relationships facilitate individuals’ economic activities. Nevertheless, the 
embeddedness of these companies beyond the local community varies. Company B is 
more embedded in the sector than the other two. Its relationships with stakeholders at 
the national level allow it to seek support and resources through these networks, which 
is in line with Uzzi’s (1997) claim that such relationships are prominent in business 
processes. But Company C does not fully embed in the sector. It relies on its parent 
company in Vietnam for doing business in Cambodia, and receives resources ranging 
from materials to management. However, it faces challenges in integrating into the local 
community due to its failure to welcome locals and the focus of the management team 
on establishing new networks with government officials in Cambodia. 
Sub-question 3: How do Korean investors interact with their stakeholders in local 
communities? 
The findings across the three cases show that at the investors do not regard the local 
community as important stakeholders, and in some instances not even legitimate 
stakeholders. As a result, they put no effort into establishing any relationship with the 
local community. There is evidence that the most entrepreneurial investor of the three 
unsuccessfully tries to establish a good relationship with local stakeholders, due to his 
failure to recognize the importance of local stakeholders to his company.  
Each individual company engages differently with their stakeholders, but in all cases the 
local stakeholders’ interests are neglected. The company that has the most 
entrepreneurial investor engages more with the local community. This research finds 
that the local community therefore plays a minor role in the ELC development due to 
various legal, social and cultural factors.  
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8.5 Value	  added	  
The cross-case analysis reveals that in general these three companies generate 
employment and business opportunities through their investment activities in the ELCs. 
However, mostly their value added benefits those outside the local communities. In all 
three cases most of the full-time jobs are taken by recent migrants. The three companies 
have business transactions with domestic suppliers in different provinces. According to 
the data, due to its outsourcing practices, Company B generates more entrepreneurial 
opportunities than the other two companies. The current study found that the Korean 
FDIs in large-scale agricultural land have generated employment and business 
opportunities in Cambodia. Thus, these findings extend those of Watkins and Fowler 
(2002) and UNCTAD (1994, 2005) and indicate that most of the employment and 
business opportunities are taken by outsiders. Moreover, the scale of these opportunities 
is relatively small. These Korean FDIs pay local wage rates to their staff, which 
contradicts Haddad and Harrison (1993), Girma et al. (2001) and Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2004), who claim that FDI companies pay higher wages in comparison to domestic 
companies.  
Due to the different operational patterns and interests of the investors, value added for 
the local communities by these FDIs varies. The cross-case analysis indicates that the 
more engaged the investor is in the ELC development, the more value is created for 
local communities. At the individual level, Mr Lee prefers to hire labourers from the 
neighbouring villages than labourers from outside the community. As a result, Company 
A provides up to 400 jobs per day for local labourers that has some socio-economic 
impact on local residents. Directly, Company A provides ongoing income for poor 
households in the community, which helps to improve their living standards. Indirectly, 
the company’s job creation spurs microbusiness opportunities in local communities, as 
the more money poor households earn, the more they spend on food. Moreover, Mr Lee 
has made a number of contributions to the local community.  
In contrast, the investors of the other companies are not keen to hire local residents to 
work at their plantations. As a result, they end up bringing in outside labourers. 
Company B’s labourers are all outsiders and, due to the remoteness of the labourers’ 
accommodation, no business opportunities are generated for the local community. 
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Similarly, Company C hires most of its labourers from outside. A few residents who are 
new migrants to the area and live near Company C’s plantation are occasionally hired 
when the company is short of labourers. There are no business opportunities generated 
by this company for the local community. Therefore, although the data in this research 
is insufficient to identify which business model/practice works best in this context, the 
findings suggest that the more entrepreneurial the investor, the more value is created for 
the local community. These findings are consistent with Cotula and Leonard’s (2010, p. 
116) conclusion that “a genuine willingness of investors to work with local farmers and 
communities is a key ingredient of success.”  
Sub-question 4: What value added do Korean companies generate in local communities 
and the Cambodian agricultural sector? 
The cross-case analysis indicates that all three cases generate full-time and part-time 
employment and business opportunities. The findings also suggest that the outsourcing 
operational practices of Company B generated more business, entrepreneurial and 
employment opportunities than other operational practices. However, most of these 
opportunities are concentrated outside the local community for several reasons such as 
investors’ reluctance to improve the local community’s wellbeing and development and 
the infrastructure conditions of the local community.  
The analysis suggests that locals benefits from the investments when the companies 
and/or investors are willing to contribute to the development of the local community. 
However, it could benefit more from these investments if their infrastructure and 
community were more developed. This research finds that the more entrepreneurial the 
investor, the more value added for the local community. To demonstrate this claim, 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the value added created by Company A, B and C at all the three 
levels: local community (green circle), provincial (purple circle) and national (white 
circle) respectively.  
As depicted in Figure 8.1, if we compare the value added created by Company A across 
the levels, we can see that most value added is concentrated in the green circle, 
indicating that more value added is created at the local community than at the other two 
levels.   
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Figure 8.1: Value Added  
Source: The author, 2015 
In contrast, Company B’s value added is more concentrated in the white circle than the green and purple circles. Thus, compared to Company A, 
this company generates more value added at national level rather than provincial and local community levels. As shown in Figure 8.1, Company 
C’s value added is scattered across the purple and white circles, while the green circle remains empty. Thus, unlike Company A and B where 
their value added is spread across the three levels, Company C’s value added is concentrated outside the local community. 
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8.6 Summary	  
The empirical findings of the study of the three Korean FDI companies and investors, 
particularly their entrepreneurship and stakeholder relationships, are critical to our 
understanding of the embedding process of the FDI companies in Cambodia. The three 
theoretical concepts—entrepreneurship, stakeholder relationship and embeddedness—
shed light on the ways these FDI companies operate in the ELCs in Cambodia and their 
interactions with local stakeholders that contribute to local development.  
Some FDI companies and investors are entrepreneurial in their ELC development in 
Cambodia but are not fully embedded in the local community. The most entrepreneurial 
company in this study attempts to embed in the local community through establishing 
good relationships with local stakeholders. However, their attempts are unsuccessful 
due to divisions between the company, the investor and their stakeholders, especially in 
local communities. Nevertheless, all three companies are found to embed themselves in 
the agricultural sector in Cambodia. They establish and maintain good relationships 
with other stakeholders at the provincial and national level, but their relationships with 
local communities need a lot more work. 

  
Chapter	  9: Conclusion	  
9.1 Introduction	  
Examining the impact of foreign direct investments (FDIs) on local development in 
poor recipient countries needs to focus not only on the outcomes of the investments but 
also the investment process, including interaction between the companies and their 
stakeholders, especially at the local community level. There is limited literature 
addressing the ways in which FDI companies and/or the investors operate and interact 
with stakeholders in recipient countries. This dissertation aims to narrow these 
knowledge gaps by choosing a group of Korean FDIs in large-scale agricultural land in 
Cambodia and focusing on the FDI investors in order to better understand the dynamics 
that lead to improved local community development in the recipient country. The 
Korean FDIs in this study were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, in recent years 
FDIs—especially those from newly developed countries such as Korea—have been 
increasingly interested in large-scale agricultural land in poor countries. However, there 
is little research on FDIs from newly developed countries in Cambodia. Secondly, the 
growing interest of FDIs in land raises concerns over their adverse impact on local 
development in poor recipient countries. In developing countries such as Cambodia, 
most poor people depend heavily on access to land for their livelihoods. By securing 
large-scale land, FDI companies may cut off the access of poor locals to available land 
and farms, which could severely disrupt rather than improve their livelihoods. Given 
these concerns about possible adverse impacts, previous research tends to disregard an 
important actor, the investors, in their analysis. Thus, in an attempt to address the gaps 
in the knowledge about the impact of such investments, the current dissertation focuses 
on the Korean FDI companies and investors in the ELCs in Cambodia. 
Analytically, this research uses a social approach to the FDI field of study incorporating 
the concepts of entrepreneurship, stakeholder engagement and embeddedness. The 
rationale for this framework is to understand how FDI companies operate and how 
investors and firms interact with local stakeholders. Using these theoretical lenses, the 
current research examines the investors’ embeddedness through their entrepreneurial 
activities and relationship with stakeholders in the ELC development to create value 
added.  
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Methodologically, this research adopted a qualitative cross-case approach (Yin, 2009). 
It employed various tools to collect ethnographic data on their embedding process and 
value added in local communities. The tools included interviews, focus group 
discussions, participatory observations, direct and indirect observations, conversations, 
field notes and documentary analysis. Although various data-gathering techniques were 
employed, in-depth interviews with individual informants were the main technique used. 
Three South Korean FDI companies operating in agricultural ELCs in Cambodia were 
selected to explore their investment behaviour.  
This concluding chapter summarises and synthesises the empirical findings discussed in 
the previous eight chapters and examines the theoretical and practical implications of 
this research to the intense debates about the impact of FDIs in large-scale land on local 
development. After the introduction, the second section consolidates the empirical 
findings from the preceding chapters in order to answer the research questions. The 
third section discusses the contributions of these key findings to academic debates, 
while the fourth section suggests implications for the Royal Government of Cambodia 
and the FDI companies. The fifth section identifies the limitations of the study and 
proposes areas of future research. Due to the recent unanticipated impact of an ad hoc 
order from the Cambodian government on its ELC investments, the final section 
discusses these developments and then concludes the dissertation.  
9.2 Answering	  the	  Research	  Questions	  
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the embedding process of the Korean FDI 
companies and investors that can contribute to local development in Cambodia. This 
research aims to answer the main research question: To what extent do Korean investors 
embed themselves in Cambodia’s rural community through their entrepreneurial 
activities in economic land concession development and what do they contribute to 
community development? Four specific research sub-questions are developed to further 
interrogate these issues:  
• How do Korean companies operate economic land concessions in local 
Cambodian communities? 
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• To what extent do Korean investors perform their entrepreneurial activities in 
economic land concession development?  
• How do Korean investors interact with their stakeholders in local communities?  
• What value added do Korean companies generate in local communities and the 
Cambodian agricultural sector? 
In answering Sub-question 1, this dissertation argues that Korean FDI companies 
employ diverse approaches in their ELC investment and development in Cambodia. 
Different Korean companies exercise different strategies and operational patterns, 
depending on the individual investor’s knowledge, involvement and social networks in 
Cambodia. This research found evidence of Korean investors replicating the Korean 
conglomerate business model. These findings suggest that the investor establishes a 
business infrastructure that comprises three different businesses which support each 
other in Cambodia. This infrastructure shares similar characteristics to the Chaebol 
business style described by Change and Shin (2007). This finding implies that the 
conventional Korean business model (Chaebol) can still dominate some Korean FDI 
companies. However, there is no common business practice—which can be called a 
Korean business model—employed by these Korean companies in ELC development in 
Cambodia. In fact, the three Korean FDI companies share a similar vertical ownership 
model, using a production model based on a wage system. These findings suggest no 
collaborative business operations with the local community. This dissertation also 
argues that the Korean FDI companies undertake regulatory approaches through 
acquainting themselves with Cambodian high-ranking government officials and the 
ruling elite to access the large-scale agricultural land in Cambodia. The land acquisition 
of the Korean FDIs in Cambodia occurred through signing official ELC leases with the 
Cambodian government prior to developing the ELCs. Although their approach is also 
top-down, these companies apply the leopard skin policy24 in their ELC development in 
Cambodia, as encouraged by the government, to minimise land conflicts. Thus, the 
current findings provide a different perspective on Korean FDIs practices in large-scale 
land developments in Cambodia. The research extends the limited literature on Korean 
FDIs practices in large-scale land, which are not addressed in previous studies; see for 
example Üllenberg (2009a, 2009b).  
                                                
24In which ELCs are meant to skirt forest and land that is important to local communities, creating a 
patchwork of land holdings in the manner of a leopard’s skin. 
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In response to Sub-question 2, this dissertation finds the Korean investors are 
entrepreneurial in their ELC investment and development activities in Cambodia, and 
identifies regulatory changes (Schumpeter, 1934) in the country as the key source of the 
opportunities. The Korean investors carry out their business ventures in Cambodia 
without their kin’s involvement, which differs from Aldrich and Cliff’s (2003) claim 
that many entrepreneurial practices involve family members, especially during the start-
up phase. Although these investors share some similar personal traits such as optimism, 
the need to achieve and information search, their entrepreneurship and approaches vary. 
The current research confirms the findings of Ray and Cardozo (1996), Gaglio and 
Taub (1992) and Hisrich (1990) that suggest the more investors are alert to new 
information and local knowledge, the more success they have in opportunity recognition. 
The research also confirms that the investors’ social networks (Hills et al., 1997), prior 
knowledge and experience (Shane, 2003), and innovation (Drucker, 1985) play vital 
roles in their entrepreneurship.  
In answering Sub-question 3, the Korean investors establish good relationships with 
national government officials and, in some cases, a Cambodian Okhna. In contrast, their 
relationship with stakeholders in the local community is distant and under-developed. 
The local community plays only a minor role in the Korean FDI companies’ ELC 
development in Cambodia, because the investors fail to recognize the importance of the 
local stakeholders to the companies’ operations as described by Freeman et al. (2007). 
Nevertheless, the findings indicate that the most entrepreneurial investor has attempted 
to establish a good relationship with his local stakeholders, but is unsuccessful for two 
reasons: firstly, the arrival of the company has shocked and worried local residents due 
to the lack of public consultation. Many fear losing their land to the company. As a 
result the company is not well received by locals from the outset. Similarly, the current 
findings indicate that communication between national and local government bodies is 
ineffective. These findings also suggest that there are poor practices in granting ELCs; 
according to established procedures public consultation with the local community is 
required prior to granting of the ELC. 
Secondly, villagers in local Cambodian communities generally have limited or no 
knowledge of land rights, let alone how to process proper land tenure. The villagers in 
this research—who had long been cultivating the land in the ELC—think that they are 
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the rightful owners of the land, regardless of what the law says. But they do not possess 
any title for their claimed land. Their lack of legal knowledge of land tenure makes it 
difficult to handle land disputes with the company. Another barrier for the investor’s 
successful engagement with the local community is the different expectations of the two 
parties. The findings suggest that the investor needed to have more involvement with 
the local community than simply making infrastructural contributions and then 
assuming that he had done sufficient to remedy the damaged relationship. The investor 
should be more cooperative and willing to personally resolve the conflicts with locals 
Sub-question 4 emphasises the value added of Korean FDI companies in the ELCs. The 
current dissertation argues that besides land conflicts with local residents in some 
instances, the three Korean FDI companies in this study have created some value added 
through full-time and part-time employment (UNCTAD, 1994, 2005; Watkins and 
Fowler, 2002), business and entrepreneurial opportunities, human resource development 
and infrastructural contributions (Swedberg, 2006). The value added patterns of each 
company vary according to their operational patterns. However, indirect operational 
control by a Korean company seems to generate more value added, but for recent 
immigrants in the local community, compared to other patterns. Remarkably, the value 
added is concentrated in the local community when the investor is entrepreneurial. 
Despite weak law enforcement from the government, the entrepreneurial investor 
operates his business in a socially responsible manner with the aim of creating value for 
the local community. This finding reflects the notion of entrepreneurship described by 
Swedberg (2006), that entrepreneurs contribute to society through their socially 
responsible business practices, social value adding, sense-making and life orientation, 
alleviating social problems and bringing about social change.   
Main research question: 
To what extent do Korean investors embed themselves in Cambodia’s rural community 
through their entrepreneurial activities in economic land concession development and 
what do they contribute to the community development? 
In responding to the main research question, this research finds that the Korean 
investors do not (fully) embed themselves in the local community due to barriers 
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imposed by the investors themselves and the local community, as embeddedness is a 
two-way approach (Jack and Anderson, 2002). It argues that the more entrepreneurial 
an investor, the more he is willing to embed in the local community. Nonetheless, the 
embedding process of the Korean investors in the Cambodian context still faces a 
number of daunting challenges caused by the actors and the environment. Due to poor 
local infrastructure, the Korean FDI companies manage to operate in the ELCs without 
embedding in the community. They seek supplies from elsewhere for their operations in 
the ELCs, indicating that the companies and investors embed themselves in the 
agricultural sector at the provincial and national levels. The current research found that 
the embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) of these companies and investors in the 
agricultural sector outside the local community facilitates their economic activities. 
Each investor and company is embedded in different ways.  
Moreover, the findings of this dissertation emphasise that these Korean FDI companies 
have contributed to local development through socioeconomic value added (UNCTAD, 
1994, 2005; Watkins and Fowler, 2002), human resource development, social 
development, and entrepreneurial development, but not to their full potential. 
Economically, these companies directly create jobs and indirectly generate business 
opportunities in Cambodia. In fact, the presence of these FDI companies does not help 
to increase wages as found in previous studies, for example Haddad and Harrison 
(1993), Girma et al. (2001) and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004). The current research also 
finds that the different operational patterns of the FDI companies generate different 
scope and scale of impacts on local development. The more involved Cambodians are in 
the FDI companies, the easier it is for them to seize opportunities that they generate. 
Socially these companies can contribute to local development through promoting 
human resource development, improving employee’s wellbeing, making infrastructural 
contributions, and raising living standards of poor villagers through employment 
opportunities. Furthermore, this research argues that the more entrepreneurial the 
investor, the more value added for the local community. The entrepreneurial investor 
tends to operate his business not only in a socially responsible manner, but also 
welcomes the involvement of local villagers in the company’s operations. Moreover, the 
companies may generate even more value added by involving local stakeholders if the 
community is equipped with proper business infrastructure.  
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Politically, the findings suggest that the presence of these FDI companies does not have 
any effect on the Cambodian government system as they deal with the government 
administration through the Cambodian ruling elite. In fact, the companies struggle with 
the government administration in relation to red tape, lack of transparency, legal risks 
and lack of protection for their investment. 
9.3 Academic	  Contributions	  
This dissertation offers five unique insights into debates on FDIs and local development.  
Firstly, it is one of the few studies to introduce a social approach to FDI theory by 
focusing on investors as actors. Most studies on FDIs focus on their investment capital; 
see for example, Busse and Hefeker (2007, p. 399); Büthe and Milner (2008); Lehnert et 
al. (2013). However, FDIs also consist of people, starting with the investors. Therefore, 
as far as the impact of FDIs on local development is concerned, focusing on investors as 
actors in the analysis helps to provide a clearer picture of the impact.  
Secondly, this research incorporates multiple theoretical concepts in its analytical 
process such as entrepreneurship (Shane, 2003) through an entrepreneuring lens 
(Rindova et al., 2009), stakeholder engagement (Freeman et al., 2010) and 
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). By applying multiple theoretical lenses to 
understand the embedding process of Korean FDIs in the Cambodian agricultural sector, 
the dissertation has demonstrated that each FDI investor has contributed in diverse ways 
to local development, which has not been attempted in previous studies. Therefore, this 
research contributes to the study of FDIs and local development by highlighting that the 
FDIs differ from one another in the range of activities in which they engage, their 
degree of engagement, and their embeddedness in the local community. As a result, 
their impact on local development also varies considerably. The contribution of this 
dissertation lies in its illustration of how Korean investors and companies embed 
themselves in society and the community as a strategy to pursue and exploit the 
commercial opportunities in ELC investment in Cambodia.  
Thirdly, the dissertation provides a different methodology for studying FDIs. Much of 
the analysis in previous research is primarily built on quantitative methodology and 
undertaken at a macro or regional level; see for example, Büthe and Milner (2008); 
Embedding Korean Foreign Direct Investments in Cambodia 
 202 
Braunstein (2006); Aliyu (2005); and Jensen (2003). Most scholars who adopt this 
approach tend to look at the impact of FDIs on local development at a macro level and 
in economic terms, which may not explain the actual dynamics and impact at the local 
community level. Therefore, the current dissertation offers a different approach by 
employing a qualitative case study to capture the social phenomenon and dynamics at 
local community level. 
Fourthly, this dissertation investigates the impact of FDIs in large-scale land in a poor 
country by examining the issues at local community level and bringing an important 
actor—the investors—into the analysis. Studies of foreign investment in large-scale 
land rarely focus on this important actor; see for example,Sangwan (2013); Neef et al. 
(2013); Aryeetey and Lewis (2011); and Clements and Fernandes (2013). Thus, this 
dissertation’s main contribution to the study of FDIs in large-scale land is to provide 
another perspective through introducing and triangulating the voices of investors in 
debates on the issues.  
Finally, the current dissertation contributes to the limited literature on Korean FDIs in 
Cambodia by examining Korean FDIs in large-scale agricultural land. Therefore, it not 
only contributes to the limited literature about South-South FDIs in this region but also 
provides empirical evidence to help understand their practices and entrepreneurship in 
the local development context of Cambodia. 
9.4 Implications	  for	  Practice	  
The current dissertation investigates one of the biggest issues that concern large foreign 
investment in land and the livelihood of local people in Cambodia. Therefore, in order 
to enhance the positive impact of these investments on local development, the current 
research findings have implications for policymakers in government bodies in recipient 
countries and for FDI investors. The implications are discussed in the following sub-
sections.  
For	  the	  Royal	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  
It is acknowledged that FDI has strong potential to promote local development. To 
ensure that the investment makes genuine contributions to development in recipient 
countries, collective efforts are needed, especially from government bodies. Therefore, 
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the current research’s findings offer the following recommendations to responsible 
government bodies. 
Firstly, the findings suggest that the dissemination of information about land laws 
remains limited in rural communities. Villagers’ understanding of land tenure is usually 
different from the legislation regarding land. Their poor knowledge of land rights can 
lead to land conflicts between the ELC concessionaires and rural communities.  
Recommendation 1: That the government improve awareness of land laws in rural 
areas by providing information about the relevant legislation and capacity building to 
local authorities, especially village and commune chiefs, so that they can improve local 
knowledge of land laws and help villagers to more effectively campaign on land rights.  
Secondly, local communities and authorities are not informed of the arrival of the 
companies in their communities. The research findings imply that the ELC policy 
implementation and monitoring remains centralized and ineffective. The issues in ELC 
policy enforcement are not new in the context of large-scale land investments in 
Cambodia and other developing countries. However, it is critical that these issues are 
addressed in order to enhance the positive impact of the investments and the ELC policy 
on local development. 
Recommendation 2: That the government improve internal communication between 
responsible ministries and the relevant local authorities in regard to ELC consultation, 
granting of land and monitoring in their respective communities. The local authorities 
can then act as facilitators of the ELC granting and monitoring process in order to 
bridge the interests of the national government and the local community.   
Thirdly, from the investors’ perspective, the research indicates that doing businesses in 
Cambodia is challenging and de-motivating, especially in dealing with government. The 
findings suggest that investors generally have difficulty in dealing with government red 
tape, lack of transparency and a widespread culture of bribery in the Cambodian 
administration. Other challenges are the lack of protection for investment and legal risks 
related to lack of consultation before the government adopts legislative measures that 
can affect the investments.  
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Recommendation 3: That the government provide prior consultation and a grace period 
to all stakeholders, including the private sector, in regard to any amendments to ELC 
legislation. The grace period will allow concerned stakeholders sufficient time to 
prepare for changes. In addition, the government should enact legislation to protect all 
parties involved in ELC investments.   
For	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  Companies	  
This research finds that in addition to the challenges of doing business in Cambodia, 
FDIs are not well received by the local communities in which they invest, suggesting 
that they tend to disregard local stakeholders. The findings also reveal 
misunderstandings between the companies and local stakeholders due to different 
expectations and cultures. Moreover, they indicate that some companies have paid little 
attention to generating expected socioeconomic contributions to the local community. 
Therefore, it is recommended that companies and investors should consider several 
changes in the way they work with local communities. 
Recommendation 4:  That the companies have an experienced liaison officer to work 
with the local community and to deal with legislative and administrative issues. In 
addition, they practise corporate social responsibilities in the local community to 
enhance their image. Moreover, investors should be more cooperative in handling land 
issues with the local community by participating in meetings organised by local 
authorities to resolve land disputes. Investors should also be more understanding and 
adopt more local culture though socialising with the community during cultural events. 
9.5 Limitations	  and	  Future	  Research	  
There are some limitations to the research. The first is that this research employs a case 
study methodology. Although, the research managed to cover three out of the four 
active Korean FDI companies listed in MAFF’s 2011 logbook of FDIs operating in 
large-scale agricultural land in Cambodia, the three case studies are limited to one group 
of Korean investors in one particular time frame and the context within which they are 
observed. Therefore, the findings cannot be generalised across the larger spectrum of 
ELC policies and practices. Conversely, this limitation suggests that future research on 
foreign investment in land is only likely be valuable if conducted in different sectors, or 
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focused on different nationalities of investors, or on small-scale Korean investments and 
their impact on local development.  
Secondly, because the companies were in the early stage of their ELC development, this 
research could not provide the full scope of their impact on local development. 
Therefore, future research on the shortcomings of the spectrum of this research will 
bring additional value to the scientific and development community. Future research 
could explore the perspectives of senior political or government leaders in signing off 
the large-scale agricultural plots to FDIs, in terms of directing local development and 
growth.  
9.6 Postscript	  
What	  is	  Order	  01BB?	  
On 7 May 2012 businesses in ELCs experienced turbulence after the Cambodian Prime 
Minister issued Directive 001 (also known as Order 01BB). The order promotes the 
effectiveness of management of economic land concessions (ELCs). It aims to introduce 
a new land registration campaign that can speed up the land title registration process 
implemented under the systematic and sporadic registration system (RGC, 2012a). 
Directive 001 provides the opportunity to issue private land titles to rightful claimants; 
to revoke untapped or inactive concessionaires; and to address unresolved land disputes 
between the affected communities and the concessionaires through implementing the 
leopard skin policy. Thus, overlapping ELCs are returned to claimants with permanent 
land titles. Each claimant is assessed on the actual crop plantation and other cultivation 
on his/her land, without consulting state institutions that have responsibility for land 
titles and land management (ADHOC, 2013). The Prime Minister’s cabinet office and 
senior Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) officials are engaged in implementing and 
monitoring of Directive 001 (May, 2012a).  The Directive contains four key elements: 
• Suspension of any new granting of ELCs to local and foreign investors; 
• Responsible authorities are authorised to monitor the licensed ELC companies’ 
implementation of the leopard skin strategy in order to ensure that communal 
lands or the livelihoods of citizens are not negatively affected by any ELCs; 
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• ELC concessionaires would have their ELC license canceled if they failed to 
prove their tangible benefits to the nation and its citizens; and  
• Exemption is considered for companies that received permits “in principle” from 
the government prior to the issuance of this directive (RGC, 2012b). 
There are two phases of Directive 001’s implementation: Phase One, from June 2012 to 
June 2013 (before the parliamentary election in July); and Phase Two, from November 
2013 to March 2014. Recruitment of many university student volunteers begins 
immediately after the Prime Minister publicly announced Order 01BB (ADHOC, 2013). 
For example, more than 1,000 student volunteers were recruited in June 2012 from 
various youth associations formed by universities and the dominant political party 
(Khuon, 2013).   
Why	  was	  it	  introduced?	  	  
Order 01BB is mainly criticised for being political or providing benefits to the ruling 
party, due to its timing; it was issued just one month before the 2012 commune council 
elections and one year prior to the 2013 parliamentary election in Cambodia. Moreover, 
the Prime Minster and senior CPP officials have financed its implementation. 
Consequently, human rights activists and experts on land issues conclude that this ad 
hoc land titling campaign is, at least in part, a vote-buying exercise by the ruling party 
ahead of the general elections in July 2013 (LICADHO, 2013; Muller and Zulsdorf, 
2013; Vize and Hornung, 2013). However, a few land analysts speculate that the 
campaign might be the consequence of donor pressure on the government (RFA, 2012) 
and critical reports from UN Special Rapporteur Surya Subedi on land disputes and 
ELCs (Certo and Meas, 2012). Another contributing factor might be the murder of land 
activist Chhut Vuthy and the forced evictions of local residents in recent years (Certo 
and Meas, 2012).  
The Prime Minister and his government officials reject these claims and state that Order 
01BB derives from the government’s previous land reform (Kuch and Seiff, 2012; May, 
2012b). But this explanation contradicts the Prime Minister’s public speech a few 
months prior to the parliamentary election. According to RFA (2013), during a ground-
breaking ceremony in April 2013, the Prime Minister announced to the public that “to 
those whose lands have not been measured and those who have not been given land 
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titles, I would like to inform you that the youths can return to work only if the CPP wins 
the election.” The Prime Minister further assured the public that the youths would come 
back to continue the work, only if the public voted for the CPP (RFA, 2013).        
What	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  implementation	  to	  date?	  
The implementation of Order 01BB resulted in a dramatic fall in the number of newly 
granted ELCs. According to the Royal Gazette, the government awarded only 15 new 
ELCs between May to December 2012, and none after December 2012. However, the 
government’s official report on the number of newly granted ELCs is lower than the 
number reported by NGOs. Following the Order 01BB, 38 new ELCs were awarded in 
2013 (ADHOC, 2014). 
On 24 April 2014 the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction 
reported the result of Order 001BB’s implementation. The report highlighted that the 
Royal Government of Cambodia excised and reclassified a total area of more than 
1 million hectares, more than 340,000 hectares of which was excised from 128 ELC 
companies; nearly 230,000 hectares out of 16 forest concession companies; and nearly 
500,000 hectares from state land and forest land confiscated by provincial order to 
provide ownership to citizens, through 96 royal decrees, 678 sub-decrees and 707 
decisions of the Royal Government. The Council of Ministers publicly announced that 
by 13 October 2014, the Royal Government had cut another 62,569 hectares out of 11 
ELC companies, of which nine ELC contracts were permanently terminated (RGC, 
2014).  
How	  does	  Order	  01BB	  affect	  Company	  A,	  B	  and	  C?	  
During the researcher’s fieldwork in 2012, the volunteer students25 had just started to 
measure land in one of the ELC case studies. The final results of the measurement in 
Company A’s ELC were recently released. In September 2014 Company A was 
informed that half of its ELC has been excised for residents in six villages (Personal 
interview with Mr Lee on 8 October 2014 and the local authorities on 17 November 
2014).  
                                                
25recruited by the Cambodian government to implement Order 01BB. 
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Order 001BB has therefore severely affected Company A and Mr Lee personally. 
Firstly, in compliance with the order, before the measurement results are announced, the 
company is asked to postpone its operational activities on the ELC—especially land 
clearing—delaying its operations. Secondly, Company A has lost half of its grant to 
residents due to the measurement. Mr Lee claims that the measurement of the land and 
the decision to excise some land did not occur in consultation with the company. 
Company A has not fully resumed its operations, apart from maintaining existing rubber 
trees (Personal interviews with the local authorities on 17 November 2014 and Mr Lee 
on 8 October 2014).  
Mr Lee and his business partner are considering closing down Company A. Earlier he 
shut down his third company, Company A’s fertilizer and agricultural material supplier. 
“I don’t understand, how could the government do this to investors? We officially 
signed the contract and then one day, half of our land was taken back,” he says. He is 
disappointed with the government in Cambodia, and considers his agricultural business 
is unsuccessful. He has stopped being a guest speaker to promote investments in the 
agricultural sector in Cambodia. Given his entrepreneurial nature, Mr Lee opened a new 
company in the entertaining business in Phnom Penh in early October 2014 (Personal 
interview with Mr Lee on 8 October 2014).                
Similarly, Company B is affected by the order 01BB. In September 2012 the volunteer 
students measured land that overlaps with its ELC. As a result, by September 2014 the 
company claims to have lost almost 3,000 hectares of its approved ELC (Personal 
interview with a commune chief on 17 November 2014).  Unlike Mr Lee, Company B’s 
investors have sought an intervention from the Korean Embassy in Cambodia. The 
controversial land disputes attract the attention of the Prime Minister, the Korean 
ambassador and the media. The Korean embassy has filed an official complaint with the 
Ministry of Land Management in March 2014, leading to a meeting between the South 
Korean ambassador and a senior minister from the ministry.  
Following pressure from the Prime Minister, official land titles have been handed over 
to hundreds of claimants despite the intervention from the embassy. Both the Korean 
embassy and Company B claimed the government decision is unfair. As Mr Jeong says 
“It’s bad for investors. I meant from the investors’ side it’s a nightmare.” Currently, 
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Company B has brought the case to an international court abroad and is suing the Royal 
Government of Cambodia for its investment loss (Personal interviews with local 
authorities on 17 November 2014).  
In contrast to the first two cases, Company C survives the order 01BB as the volunteer 
students do not measure the land on its ELC. This company has land title for the ELC 
and had cut out all the overlapping areas (Personal interview with the local authorities 
on 17 November 2014). The only effect of the order 01BB on Company C is some 
delays in land-clearing activities. 
9.7 Conclusion	  
This dissertation reveals the specific ways in which Korean FDI companies and 
investors ensure effective operations in large-scale agricultural land in Cambodia. The 
research analyses the challenges that these companies face in their operations and in 
fulfilling their potential for the economic development of Cambodia. Due to the recent 
developments, it is clear that there are considerable risks when investing in the 
Cambodian ELC and agricultural sector, and these can be even greater for foreign 
investors. There is evidence of responsible investors, but their investment is not 
rewarding due to the unpredictable political environment in Cambodia. The government 
tends to adopt legislative measures without meaningful and two-way consultation with 
stakeholders. These practices have degraded the legitimacy of legal contracts in the 
country, as it appears that such contracts can be voided by the authorities at any time.  
Therefore, can FDIs in the agricultural sector contribute to local development in 
Cambodia? After the recent developments in the three Korean case studies, this research 
draws the conclusion that FDIs in the large-scale agricultural land cannot contribute to 
local development in Cambodia. These findings point to the need for commitment from 
the Cambodian government and for investors to recognise the importance of socio-
economic development for the local community through local stakeholder engagement. 
As FDIs are profit-making by nature, the leading role in enhancing the positive impact 
of these FDIs on local development leans towards the recipient government. It has to 
ensure these FDI companies operate in a responsible manner within acceptable social 
and business contexts. Therefore, on the one hand, the government should strengthen its 
ELC granting process, evaluation and monitoring through involving local stakeholders 
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in the process. On the other hand, it should also ensure a reliable and business-friendly 
environment for the companies. In so doing, the government can promote more 
responsible FDI companies as a driving force in boosting the local development process 
in a sustainable manner. As suggested by the current findings, responsible FDI 
companies create not only economic value but also tend to bring about positive social 
change in the local community. As a result, local people have a better chance to be 
involved in the companies’ operations, benefitting the local community in the long run. 
Contribution	  to	  Cambodia	  Research	  Group	  Programme	  	  
The dissertation examines Korean investors—an example of foreign stakeholders in 
Cambodia’s development—as part of the NWO WOTRO-funded Cambodia Research 
Group Programme entitled “Competing hegemonies: foreign dominated processes of 
development in post-conflict Cambodia.” One of the programme’s objectives is to 
assess whether Cambodia continues to depend on foreigners’ knowledge and capital 
investment for its national development. In this regard, the dissertation contributes to 
the Programme with empirical evidence through the lens of Korean stakeholders in 
Cambodia’s development.  
With respect to large-scale agricultural land investments, the research argues that 
Cambodia possesses the necessary human resources. However, it still depends on 
foreign capital investment. The research findings provide clear evidence that foreign 
investors only bring in investment capital, and acquire technical knowledge for the 
large-scale agricultural operations locally. The research concludes that the foreign 
investors do not bring about social change in Cambodia through their capital 
investments. Thus, Cambodia may not be able to realise its own development goals 
solely by relying on foreign stakeholders. In other words, Cambodia may be in a 
position to start deciding its own future rather than leaving it to foreigners. 
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Appendix	  A	  
Table A. 1: Interviewed Research Participants 
No. Participants Title/Affiliation No. Participants Title/Affiliation 
1.  Mr Lee Founding owner 40. Participant 2.3 Manager 
2.  Participant 1.2 Manager 41. Participant 2.4 Supervisor 
3.  Participant 1.3 Manager 42. Participant 2.5 Labourer 
4.  Participant 1.4 Supervisor 43. Participant 2.6 Labourer 
5.  Participant 1.5 Supervisor 44. Participant 2.7 Labourer 
6.  Participant 1.6 Staff 45. Participant 2.8 Labourer 
7.  Participant 1.7 Staff 46. Participant 2.9 Labourer 
8.  Participant 1.8 Staff 47. Participant 2.10 Labourer 
9.  Participant 1.9 Labourer 48. Participant 2.11 Labourer 
10.  Participant 1.10 Labourer 49. Participant 2.12 Villager 
11.  Participant 1.11 Labourer 50. Participant 2.13 Provincial Govt Official 
12.  Participant 1.12 Labourer 51. Participant 2.14 Commune Councillor 
13.  Participant 1.13 Labourer 52. Participant 2.15 Village Chief 
14.  Participant 1.14 Labourer 53. Participant 2.16 NGO staff 
15.  Participant 1.15 Labourer 54. Participant 2.17 Business Owner 
16.  Participant 1.16 Labourer 55. Participant 2.18 Business Owner 
17.  Participant 1.17 Labourer 56. Participant 2.19 Business Owner 
18.  Participant 1.18 Villager  57. Participant 2.20 Subcontractor 
19.  Participant 1.19 Villager 58. Participant 2.21 Business Owner 
20.  Participant 1.20 Villager 59. Participant 2.22 Business Owner 
21.  Participant 1.21 Villager 60. Participant 2.23 Villager 
22.  Participant 1.22 Villager 61. Mr Yoon Co-Founding Manager 
23.  Participant 1.23 Villager 62. Participant 3.2 Manager 
24.  Participant 1.24 Provincial Govt Official 63. Participant 3.3 Labourer 
25.  Participant 1.25 Commune Councillor 64. Participant 3.4 Labourer 
26.  Participant 1.26 Village Chief 65. Participant 3.5 Commune Councillor 
27.  Participant 1.27 Village Chief 66. Participant 3.6 Business Owner 
28.  Participant 1.28 Villagers’ Representative 67. Participant 3.7 Villager 
29.  Participant 1.29 Business Owner 68. Participant 3.8 Villager 
30.  Participant 1.30 Business Owner 69. Participant 3.9 Villager 
31.  Participant 1.31 Business Owner 70. Participant 3.10 Business Owner 
32.  Participant 1.32 Business Owner 71. Participant 3.11 Villager 
33.  Participant 1.33 Business Owner 72. Participant 3.12 Business Owner 
34.  Participant 1.34 Business Owner 73. Participant 3.13 Villager 
35.  Participant 1.35 Business Owner 74. Participant 3.14 Staff 
36.  Participant 1.36 Business Owner 75. Participant 3.15 Staff 
37.  Participant 1.37 NGO staff 76. Participant 4.1 Korean Association 
38.  Mr Jeong Co-Founding President 77. Participant 4.4 Expert in ELC 
39.  Participant 2.2 Supervisor (Main Subcontractor) 78. Participant 4.5 Expert in ELC 
Source: The author (2015)  
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Table A. 2: All Research Participants 
Participants Company 
A 
Company 
B 
Company 
C 
Total 
1. Company 9 6 5 20 
     Korean management 1 1 1  
     Korean intern  1   
     Cambodian managers  2 1 1  
     Cambodian supervisors 2 1 1  
     Cambodian office staff 1 1 1  
     Cambodian driver 1    
     Cambodian security 2 1 1  
2. Company’s Subcontractor  2  2 
3. Local residents: 16 9 7 32 
Whose land is affected: 7 2 3  
The company’s seasonal labourers     
Local residents who have other alternatives 7 2 3  
Whose land is not affected: 9 7 4  
The company’s seasonal labourers 9 7 2  
Local residents who have other alternatives   2  
4. Local business: 8 5 3 16 
Whose land is affected 2 2 2  
Whose land is not affected 6 2 1  
Mobile vendor  1   
5. Local government: 4 3 2 9 
Commune councillor 1 1 1  
Village chief 3 2 1  
6. Provincial and national government: 2 3 5 
District governor  1 
1 
 
Provincial government officials 2 1  
Ministry government officials 1  
7. NGOs and Experts 8 8 
Local NGOs 2  
International NGOs 3  
Experts in economic land concessions 3  
8. Korean Associations 3 3 
Source: The author (2015)  
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Table B. 1: Sources and Collected Evidence 
SOURCE OF 
EVIDENCE 
EVIDENCE 
Documentation 
(including 
Archival 
records) 
• A copy of each company’s economic land concession (ELC) application 
• A copy of each company’s economic land concession contract  
• A copy of each company’s master plan for the ELC development 
• A copy of each company’s budget plan 
• A copy of each economic land concession’s environmental, social and economic impact 
assessment report  
• A copy of each company’s progress reports  
• A copy of the government’s ELC development evaluation reports  
• A copy of local residents’ complaints against Company A in regard to land disputes 
• A copy of the Councils for the Development of Cambodia’s FDI records from 1995 – 2013 
• A copy of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ logbook for large-scale 
economic land concessions 
• A copy of NGO Forum on Cambodia’s publications related to ELCs  
• A copy of NGO data on economic land concessions in Cambodia 
• A copy of the visited communes’ population records 
• A copy of National Institute of Statistics’ General Population Census 2008 
• Maps of the communes 
• Maps of the economic land concessions 
• Maps of the ELC development plan 
• A copy of Companies A and B’ Phnom Penh Post and Cambodia Daily newspaper articles 
Interviews • Interviews and private conversations with the company’s Korean investors and directors  
• Interviews with board members of Korean associations in Phnom Penh 
• Interview with a Korean intern of the company 
• Interviews and private conversations with the company’s Cambodian managers, staff, 
drivers and security guards 
• Interviews and private conversations with the companies’ day-labourers at their homes 
• Focused group interviews with the companies’ day-labourers at the plantation sites 
• Interviews and private conversations with village authorities 
• Interviews and private conversations with commune councilors 
• Interviews and private conversations with government provincial staff 
• Interviews and private conversations with a local community leader 
• Interviews and private conversations with local and international NGO staff 
• Interviews and private conversations with local residents  
• Interviews and private conversations with local businesspeople 
• Interviews with experts on economic land concessions 
• Private conversations with national government staff 
Observations 
(Including 
participant 
observations) 
• Hanging around at the company’s Phnom Penh office  
• Hanging around at the company’s plantation site and provincial office 
• Visiting the workers at work  
• Hanging around at the villages, coffee shops, commune offices, pagodas, commune health 
facilities and rice and cashew-nut fields 
• Hanging around at the local shops 
• Hanging out with the company’s Korean management team 
• Hanging out with the company’s Cambodian managers and supervisors 
• Hanging out with the government’s provincial staff 
• Helping a company’s daily-wage workers put fertilizer on baby rubber trees, etc. 
Source: The author (2015) 
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Appendix	  C	  
TOPIC GUIDE 1 
Interview with Korean Investors (Management Team) 
OBJECTIVES: 
• To explore the business practices in detail 
• To gain insights into the company’s and investors’ entrepreneurial activities and perceptions on 
doing business in Cambodia, including opportunities, challenges and contribution to the local 
community 
• To understand their interaction with local stakeholders   
INTRODUCTION: Self-introduction, confidentiality of the interview (a consent form) and timing, and 
permission to record the interview. 
1. BUSINESS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
• Years of involvement in this company 
• Vision of the company 
• Main business activities of the company 
• Targeted market(s)? Access? Why? 
• Owns other businesses in Cambodia, in Korea? 
• Relationship between this company and the other companies 
• Organizational structure of the company 
o Ownership type 
o Family members in which position(s) 
o Decision-making arrangements 
o Differences in organizational structure when the firm started and now 
• How many day’s stay/visits at the plantation sites? Activities?  
• Numbers of employees, nationalities 
• Recruitment methods 
• Views on managing local employees? Example? 
• Responses to the management challenges? Example? 
• Skills improvement 
• Number of worker strikes, how the company handle the strikes 
2. ENTREPRENEURIAL ACITIVITIES AND PERCEPTIONS 
• The company establishment processes  
• The economic land concession acquisition processes (protocols vs practices) 
• Modes of getting into this business in Cambodia 
• Sources of information used to make the investment decision  
• Reason(s) to invest in Cambodia, and in this business? 
• Personal and professional background 
• Rating the Cambodian business environment? Why? 
• Differences in the Cambodian business environment before the establishment of the company 
and now? 
• Expected changes in the business environment 
• Major challenges in investing in the ELC in Cambodia?  Responses to the challenges? 
• Major challenges in managing the company?  Responses to the challenges? 
• Best practices of the company?  Contributing factors? 
• Contributions to the local community?  What does “contribution to the local community” mean 
to you? 
• Contributions to the sector? Explain? 
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3. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Suppliers or Subcontractors 
• Number of suppliers or subcontractors, locations, nationalities? Selection criteria? Recruitment 
methods? Are written contracts used? When? Why? 
• Views on doing business with local subcontractors/suppliers? 
• How are disagreements resolved? 
• Responses to poor performance? 
• When to use new contractors or subcontractors? 
• How to find new suppliers or subcontractors? 
• Benefits of establishing the relationship? How to maintain the relationship? 
• What are the downsides? Why? 
Local Communities 
• Kind of relationship built with local communities? Who? Why? 
• How did the relationship begin and develop over time? 
• Received feedback/reactions on the company?  How? How often? 
• Responses to the feedback/reactions? How? How often? 
• View on the local communities?  
• View on the local communities’ conditions before and now? Examples? 
• Join community events? Meeting with the communities? Where? How often? 
• Attempt to attain a close relationship with local communities? Why? 
• Barriers in attaining close relationships? Why? 
• Benefits of establishing the relationship? Why? 
• What are the downsides? Why? 
Local Authorities 
• Kind of relationship built with local authorities? Who? Why? 
• How did the relationship begin and develop over time? 
• Received feedback/reactions on the company? How? How often? Responses to the 
feedback/reactions? How? How often? 
• View on the local authorities? Explain?  
• Attempt to attain a close relationship with local authorities? Why? 
• Barriers in attaining close relationships? Why? 
• Benefits from establishing the relationship? Why? 
• What are the downsides? Why? 
Other stakeholders 
• Which other stakeholders does the company contact? Who? How? How often?  
• What kind of relationship formed with local (int) NGOs/local government/high-level 
government?  
• How did the relationship begin and develop over time? 
• How are disagreements resolved? (if any) 
• Membership of any association (business, church etc)? For how long? why? How often do you 
meet? If not, why?  
• Benefits from each type of relationship? Why? 
• What are the downsides? Why? 
4. WRAPPING-UP 
• Future plans for the company?  
• Thank the participant and ask permission to come back for clarification or further information  
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TOPIC GUIDE 2 
Company Employees  
(HR manager, production/procurement manager, or marketing manager, staff and Seasonal Labourers) 
 
OBJECTIVES: 
• To explore the business practices in detail (to verify the Korean participants’ response) 
• To understand their working environment, perceptions on the Korean management team, the 
investment, contributions to the local community 
• To understand the company’s stakeholder engagement practices 
 
INTRODUCTION: Self-introduction, confidentiality of the interview (a consent form) and timing, and 
permission to record the interview. 
1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
• Years of working for the company, position and responsibility in the company 
• Background information: education, working experience, hometown 
• Number of employees (including seasonal labourers)? Nationality and hometown of employees? 
• Company arrangement before and now? 
• Position by nationalities 
• Recruitment process 
• Working environment 
• Skill improvement 
• The owner’s family members work for the company? Which positions? 
• Decision-making process in the company 
• Plantation progress 
2. WORKING ENVIRONMENT AND PERCEPTION 
• How the participant found the company? 
• Reason for working for the company? 
• View before and after joining the company? Examples? 
• How often do you join staff meetings?  
• Power in expressing own views 
• How often do you meet with the owner? 
• Social activities with Korean management team, Cambodian staff, labourers after working 
hours? How often? 
• View on working with Koreans, for Korean company? 
• Major challenges in the workplace? for the company? 
• Responses to the challenges? How effective? Examples? 
• Best practices in the workplace? of the company? 
• Views on living condition of the local community before and now? Examples? 
• Relationship between the company and the local community, local authorities? 
• Land disputes with local community? Responses of the company? How often? 
3. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
• Number of local suppliers or sub-contractors the company has? (how? why? any disagreement? 
how was it  resolved?)  
• Who are other stakeholders that the company has worked with? (How? why? what kind of 
relationship?) 
• Who are other stakeholders that the company has contacted? (How? why? what kind of 
relationship?) 
• When the company has problems or disagreements with the local community, what did the 
company do? When? Who else was involved? How effective?  
 
4. WRAPPING-UP 
• Future plans? 
• Thank  the participant and ask permission to come back for clarification or further information 
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TOPIC GUIDE 3 
Interview with Local Communities 
 
OBJECTIVES: 
• To explore their perceptions of the company, the investor, and the investment’s impacts 
• To understand their engagement with the investment and interactions with other stakeholders 
INTRODUCTION: Self-introduction, confidentiality of the interview (a consent form) and timing, and 
permission to record the interview. 
1. INVOLVMENT IN AND PERCEPTION OF THE KOREAN INVESTMENT 
• Residential period in the village? Background information: Age/ family members/ education 
• Occupation before the arrival of the Korean company? 
• Family member(s) working for the Korean company? 
• Involvement in the ELC granting process? How often? Why? 
• How did you know about the Korean investments? 
• Kind of relationship with the Korean company? 
• Have you met the Korean management team? The company owner? Where? How often? 
• Views on the local community’s condition before and after the arrival of the company? 
Examples? 
• Views on the Korean company, investor, Korean staff? Cambodian staff?  
• What has the company done for the local community? When? Where? How? Why? 
2. INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
• Property owned? How long? Land title? How? Why? If not, why not? Who issued the title? 
• Any property affected by the ELC granting? 
• Heard of any issues with the Korean company? Owner? Korean staff? Cambodian staff? (when? 
where? who else was involved? what was your involvement?) 
• Practices of land dispute resolution  in the village? How? Who to go to? How effective?  
• Kind of support received from the local authorities regarding the land disputes? 
• What would have made a difference at the time when you experienced problems with the Korean 
investment? 
 
3. WRAPPING-UP 
• Future plans? 
• Thank the participant and ask permission to come back for clarification or further information 
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TOPIC GUIDE 4 
Interview with Local business, Subcontractors and Local authorities 
 
OBJECTIVES: 
• To explore the perceptions of the investment’s contribution to local community 
• To understand their networking with local stakeholders   
 
INTRODUCTION: Self-introduction, confidentiality of the interview (a consent form) and timing, and 
permission to record the interview.  
1. PERCEPTION OF THE KOREAN INVESTMENT 
Local Business/Subcontractors 
• Residential period in the village? Background information: Age/ family members/ education 
• Business start-up (Only for business owners)? When? Why? How? Start-up capital? Staff? 
Customers? Business with the Korean company? How often? Why? 
• What did you do before the Korean investors came to invest in this area?  
• Family member(s) work for the Korean company? 
• Involvement in the ELC granting process? How often? Why? 
• How did you know about the Korean investments? 
• Relationship you have with the Korean company?  Has it developed over time? Why? 
• Are written contracts used? When? 
• View on doing business with the Korean investor? Why? How different from other investors? 
• Have you had any problem in working with these investors? (when? where? who else was 
involved? what was your involvement?) 
• How were the disagreements resolved? 
• Views on impact of the Korean company on the business? the local communities? Why? 
• What changes do you want to see? 
Local Authorities 
• How long have you work for this organization? (for NGOs, local government, higher-level 
government) 
• How many villagers work for the Korean company? 
• Involvement in the ELC granting process? How often? Why? 
• Involvement in the Korean company, since the start? How often? Why? 
• How often do you meet with the Korean management? Owner? Cambodian representative? 
• Relationship with the Korean company? Owner? How?  Has it developed over time? Why? 
• Have you learnt about problems between the investment and local community? How? When? 
What happened? Who else was involved? What was your involvement? 
• How were  the disagreements resolved? 
• What kind of feedback on the involvement did you get?  
• How did you react to the feedback?  
• Views on the ELC granting? Examples? 
• Views on the Korean investments? Examples? 
• Views on the village situation before and after the arrival of the company? Examples? 
• What should be done/changed? 
2. NETWORKING WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
• When you had problem with this investment, what did you do?  
• Who did you go for to ask for help or intervention? 
• What kind of support did you get? 
• What would have made a difference at the time when you experienced problem with the Korean 
investment? 
For Local Business 
• Property owned? How long? Land title? Why? How? Who issued it? 
• Any property affected by the ELC granting? 
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• Have you heard of any issues with the Korean company? Owner? Korean staff? Cambodian 
staff? (when? where? who else was involved? what was your involvement?) 
• Practices of land dispute resolution in the village? How? Who to go to?  
• Kind of support received from the local authorities? 
•  
3. WRAPPING-UP 
 
• Future plans? 
• Thank the participant and ask permission to come back for clarification or further information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOPIC GUIDE 5 
Interview with Experts from Research Institutes and Business Associations, NGOs, National Government 
OBJECTIVES: 
• To explore their perceptions of Korean investment in the ELC’s contribution to local 
communities/sectors/country  
• To understand their networking with local stakeholders   
 
INTRODUCTION: Self-introduction, confidentiality of the interview (a consent form) and timing, and 
permission to record the interview.  
1. PERCEPTION OF THE KOREAN INVESTMENT 
• What are the driving forces for the investment boom in this country? 
• What is unique about this investment compared to investments from other nationalities? 
• Views on the investment climate in Cambodia? (What should be done/changed?) 
• Views on the Korean investments in Cambodia? Agricultural Sector? Why? 
• Views on the ELC policy? ELC granting process? Practices? 
• Why do Korean investors invest in tree plantations and cassava? Why not rice, the top 
agricultural production in Cambodia? 
• Have you known about any problems between the investment and local community? (When? 
What happened? Who else was involved? What was your involvement?) 
• What contribution do you think the investment has made to the local communities/ 
sectors/Cambodia? Why? 
• What should be done/changed about this investment? Why? 
• What kind of relationship do you have with this Korean investment?  
• How did the relationship begin and develop over time? 
 
2. INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
• What kind of relationship do you have with other stakeholders? 
• What would have made a difference at the time when local communities experienced problems 
with the Korean investment? 
 
3. WRAPPING-UP 
• Future plans? 
• Thank the participant and ask permission to come back for clarification or further information
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CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERVIEW 
I agree to participate in a PhD research project conducted by Ms. San Tea from the VU University 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about Korean 
investors in the Cambodian agricultural sector and local development. I will be one of the approximately 
60 people being interviewed for this research.  
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my 
participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. If I 
decline to participate or withdraw from the study, no one will be told. 
 
2. If I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to decline to 
answer any question or to end the interview.  
 
3. Participation involves being interviewed by Ms. San Tea. The interview will last approximately 
30-45 minutes. Notes will be written during the interview. An audiotape of the interview and 
subsequent dialogue will be made. If I do not want to be taped, I have the right to refuse the 
taping.  
 
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using information 
obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will 
remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies 
that protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions.  
 
5. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the VU University 
Amsterdam and the NOW WOTRO funded IP “Competing Hegemonies”. For research problems 
or questions regarding the project, please consult: http://www.cambodiaresearch.org/.  
 
6. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions 
answered to my satisfaction.  
 
7. I have been given a copy of this consent form.  
 
 
Interviewee’s Signature: ___________________________  Date: __________________________ 
 
Interviewer’s Signature: ___________________________ Date: ___________________________ 
 
 
For further information please contact: 
Ms. San Tea 
PhD Candidate 
Department of Organization Sciences, VU University Amsterdam 
Tel: +855 (0) 12-734 237 
E-mail: s.tea@vu.nl  
Website: http://www.cambodiaresearch.org/   
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Appendix	  D	  
Table D. 1: Themes and Sub-themes 
Categories/Themes Sub-themes 
1. Operations in the ELCs 
Outsourcing 
Subcontracting 
In-house production 
Value chains (owned by the investors) 
Management style 
Operational challenges 
Business environment challenges 
Legal environment challenges 
Responses to the operational challenges 
Responses to the business environment challenges 
Responses to the legal environment challenges 
2. Entrepreneurship 
Opportunity recognition 
Political and regulatory changes 
Labour force 
Market needs 
Unemployed resources 
Prior knowledge (market, life experience, industry) 
Special interest 
Social networks  
Information search 
Personal traits 
Opportunity exploitation 
Personal traits 
Industry context 
Age 
New venture creation 
Entrepreneurial resources 
Human capital 
Social capital 
ELC acquiring process 
Staffing strategies 
Organisational structure 
3. Stakeholder engagement 
Power 
Legitimacy 
Urgency 
Power + legitimacy 
Power + urgency 
Legitimacy + urgency 
Power + urgency + legitimacy 
Attitude towards local community 
Attitude towards the companies 
Attitude towards the investors 
Attitude towards the ELC regulations and practices 
Perceptions of contribution to local community 
4. Value added 
Employment opportunities 
Expected employment opportunities 
Business opportunities 
Expected business opportunities 
Human resource development 
Infrastructural contributions 
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Within-case Analysis Matrix 
(Sample of Entrepreneurship Category at Individual Level) 
Categories/Themes Quotes Summary 
Individual Level 
Entrepreneurship 
Opportunity recognition 
Political and regulatory changes 
 Government commitment 
 A military coup 
 Political, social and economic chaos 
 Economic land concession 
 Tax holiday 
Labour force  Labour abundance  Low labour cost 
Market needs  Lack of information about Cambodia 
Unemployed resources  Greenfield investment loan 
Prior knowledge 
 Market knowledge 
 Lengthy life experience 
 Industry knowledge 
Special interest   Interested in land 
Social networks 
 Friends 
 Associations 
 Other investors in the sector 
 Connection with high-ranking government officials 
Information search  Searching for business opportunity 
Personal traits  Perceptive ability  Not seeing risks (optimism) 
Opportunity exploitation 
Personal traits 
 Risk taking 
 Need for achievement 
 Over-confidence 
Industry context  High demand  High projected demand 
New venture creation 
a. Entrepreneurial resources 
Economic capital (start-up 
and general capital) 
 Self finance 
 Partnership 
 Greenfield investment loan 
 Investment from big-group business 
Human capital 
 University degree 
 Work experience in public sector 
 Business management experience 
 Lengthy life experience 
 Knowledgeable about the production 
 Knowledgeable about the sector 
 Knowledgeable about regulations 
 Personal time investment 
Social capital (resourceful 
social relationships) 
 No family labour 
 Access to prospective employees via friends 
 Access to information via friends 
 Access to supplies via employees 
 Access to prospective clients via association 
 Access to needed supply via sectorial relationship 
 Access to needed resources via connection with officialdom 
 Links between larger and smaller firms 
b. Organizing 
Acquiring the ELC 
 Via brokers 
 Via formal buying 
 Via informal buying 
Management practices 
 Staffing strategies 
 Systematic organizational structure 
 Special orientation program 
 Creative management 
 Using more local experts 
 Recognizing important of human resource 
 Matching employees’ skills with right tasks 
 Trust in employees 
 Active involvement 
 Empowering staff 
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 Encouraging staff to share ideas 
 Korean business practice modification 
 In-house staff training 
 
Cross-case Analysis Matrix 
(Sample of Entrepreneurship Category at Individual Level) 
  Themes/Categories Company A 
Company 
B 
Company 
C Remarks 
Individual Level 
Entrepreneurship 
Opportunity recognition 
 Political and regulatory changes:     
  Government commitment     
  A military coup     
  Political, social and economic chaos     
  Economic land concession     
  Tax holiday     
 Labour force:     
  Labour abundance     
  Low labour cost     
 Market needs:     
  Lack of information about Cambodia     
 Unemployed resources:     
  Greenfield investment loan     
 Prior knowledge:     
  Market knowledge     
  Lengthy life experience     
  Industry knowledge     
 Special interest:     
 Social networks:     
  Friends     
  Associations     
  Other investors in the sector     
  Connection with high-ranking government officials     
  Connection with elites     
 Information search:     
  Searching for business opportunity     
 Personal traits:     
  Perceptive ability     
  Not seeing risks     
Opportunity exploitation     
 Personal traits:     
  Risk taking     
  Need for achievement     
  Over-confidence     
 Industry context:     
  High demand     
  High projected demand     
  Secure sale channel     
New venture creation     
 Entrepreneurial resources:     
  Self finance     
  Partnership     
  Greenfield investment loan     
  Investment from big-group business     
 Human capital:     
  University degree     
  Work experience in public sector     
  Business management experience     
  Lengthy life experience     
  Knowledgeable about the production     
  Knowledgeable about the sector     
  Knowledgeable about regulations     
  Personal time investment     
 Social capital:     
  No family labour     
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  Access to prospective employees via friends     
  Access to information via friends     
  Access to supplies via employees     
  Access to prospective clients via association     
  Access to needed supply via sectorial relation     
  Access to needed resources via connection with officialdom     
  Access to needed resources via connection with elites     
  Links between larger and smaller firms     
 Organizing:     
  Acquiring the ELC via brokers     
  Acquiring the ELC via formal buying     
  Acquiring the ELC via informal buying     
  Staffing strategies     
  Systematic organizational structure     
  Special orientation program     
  Creative management     
  Using professional recruitment company to look for qualified staff     
  Using more experienced employees     
  Recognizing importance of human resources     
  Matching employees’ skills with right tasks     
  Trust in employees     
  Active involvement     
  Empowering staff     
  Encouraging staff to share ideas     
  Korean business practice modification     
  In-house staff training     
  Outsourcing the operational tasks     
 
 
 
 
